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Abstract 
Carol Jane LONGBOTTOM 
A Food Secure World: Is the United Nation’s Food 
and Agriculture Organisation in a position to provide 
this Global Public Good? 
Key words: Food Security, Global Public Goods, Food and Agriculture 
Organisation 
The challenges faced by the global food and agriculture system in the twenty-
first century are unlikely to be resolved through the implementation of neoliberal 
policies, most notably promoting market liberalisation, privatisation and 
financialisation. Many of these policies have also supported industrial 
agriculture, which has led to the production of many global public bads, such as 
significant greenhouse gas emissions and water pollution. However, industrial 
agriculture is not the only method of food production: sustainable agriculture is 
better placed to provide a wide range of global public goods (GPGs), including 
environmental protection and rural livelihood development, in addition to 
sufficient nutritious food. Therefore, there should be a move towards promoting 
sustainable agriculture with a focus on eradicating hunger and improving food 
security. The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) can play 
a crucial role in ensuring agriculture provides the GPGs required. FAO also 
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produces a number of GPGs through its three main roles; measurement, 
convening and norms and standards setting. This thesis asks if FAO is in a 
position to provide a food secure world. It also asks if the organisation is in a 
stronger position to provide the GPGs required following its extensive recent 
reform. Finally, it asks if a shift in emphasis towards the provision of GPGs will 
offer an alternative to neoliberalism. 
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Introduction: 
The potential of FAO to provide Global 
Public Goods 
Rationale for the study 
Hunger has been prevalent in human history for centuries (Fraser and Rimas, 
2011). This has not changed, however in the last few decades there has 
evolved a greater understanding of the challenges faced and an 
acknowledgement that the present system of food production and distribution 
has to change (De Schutter, 2014; Tansey and Rajotte, 2008; Weis, 2007). 
There are still 795 million people undernourished in the world in 2015 (FAO, 
2015), despite progress made on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
In addition there are many problems associated with micronutrient deficiencies, 
which affect approximately two billion people in the world, as a result of 
inadequate diets (WFP, 2015a). This has deadly consequences, for example, 
zinc deficiency contributes to growth failure and weakened immunity in young 
children and results in some 800,000 child deaths every year (ibid). Globally 
poor nutrition causes nearly half (45 percent) of all deaths in children under the 
age of five; that’s approximately 3.1 million children each year; nearly six every 
minute (WFP, 2015b). This tragedy is taking place every day in a world in which 
1.4 billion adults are overweight, including 400 million who are obese (De 
Schutter, 2014). The problems at both ends of the scale are as a result of 
inadequate diets, often directly related to poverty. 
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The reasons for these failings in the food and agriculture system are complex 
and manifold. At the moment the world produces enough food to feed its 
population, although population increases will place greater strain on the 
system; many of the challenges faced can be attributed to the distribution of 
food and people’s ability to access enough nutritious food. The impact of climate 
change and environmental degradation, especially of scarce fresh water 
resources, will become increasingly challenging as will competition for fertile 
land (De Schutter, 2014; Beddington, 2009; FAO, 2011d). 
 
There are many different methods of food production. These fall into two main 
camps; promotion of industrial agriculture and more sustainable agricultural 
production, often used by small-scale farmers. Sustainable agriculture is 
capable of producing not just sufficient amounts of food but also a range of 
global public goods (GPGs), such as environmental protection, social benefits 
and rural livelihood development. In contrast, industrial agriculture can produce 
a wide range of global public bads, such as significant greenhouse gas 
emissions, water pollution and environmental degradation (De Schutter, 2014; 
IAASTD, 2009; Wanki, 2011; McKeon, 2013; McMichael, 2013). Industrial 
agriculture has been largely promoted through the actions of developed 
countries, most notably the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) as 
well as other large grain producers such as Canada and Australia, international 
financial institutions (IFIs) and multinational corporations, as part of wider 
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neoliberal policies, which have also driven market liberalisation, privatisation 
and financialisation (Weis, 2007; Clapp, 2006; WDM, 2012; Elliot, 2014).  
 
Operating within the arena of food and agriculture there are many different 
actors, from states protecting their national interests to international 
organisations coordinating international responses, and from multinational 
corporations making large profits to small-scale farmers struggling to feed their 
own families; all are working within the same arena creating an interconnected 
network. However, these different actors are always not working together; often 
their actions are in direct opposition to those of the other actors, driven by very 
different motives and ideologies. These complex dynamics make any kind of 
coordination problematic, a challenge faced by any international organisation 
working within this sphere. 
 
The United Nations’ (UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) was 
established at the end of World War Two as part of the creation of the United 
Nations system. It is the UN’s specialised agency with a mandate that covers all 
aspects of food and agriculture and as such is positioned centrally within the 
international system. In the seven decades since then it has endeavoured to 
promote food security, however this central aim has not been achieved. There 
are many reasons for this failure, many of which are beyond the organisation’s 
control.  
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FAO does not operate in a vacuum; instead it is positioned within a system that 
is becoming increasingly globalised and fragmented. This has proved difficult for 
the organisation with many actors within the system voicing their loss of faith in 
its ability to fulfil its remit. In 2004 following mounting criticism FAO launched the 
most extensive independent external evaluation (IEE) in its history; acting upon 
the hundred-plus recommendations in its report (IEE, 2007) FAO has 
undergone a root and branch reform designed to equip the organisation for the 
multiple challenges faced by humanity in the twenty-first century. It is this reform 
and the organisation’s potential to provide GPGs in the future that will be the 
focus of this thesis. 
Outline of the research 
The central argument of this thesis is based upon the hypothesis that the 
challenges faced by the global food and agriculture system in the twenty-first 
century are unlikely to be resolved through the implementation of neoliberal 
policies, which include market liberalisation, privatisation and financialisation. 
Many of these policies have also promoted industrial agriculture, which has led 
to the production of many global public bads. However, sustainable agriculture 
is in a position to provide a wide range of global public goods in addition to 
sufficient nutritious food. Therefore, there should be a move towards promoting 
sustainable agriculture with a focus on eradicating hunger and improving food 
security for all. As the central international organisation operating within this 
arena FAO can play a crucial role in ensuring agriculture provides the GPGs 
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required. FAO also produces a number of GPGs, which offer assistance in 
achieving this aim through its three main roles; measurement, convening and 
norms and standards setting.  
 
This thesis examines the role that FAO plays in the provision of GPGs, which 
are then used to assist in the organisation’s main aim of eliminating hunger, 
food insecurity and malnutrition (FAO, 2013d). It asks if FAO is in a position to 
provide a food secure world. 
 
The research was guided by two secondary questions: 
 Following the extensive reform of the organisation is FAO now in a 
stronger position to provide the GPGs required? 
 Will a shift in emphasis to the provision of GPGs offer an alternative to 
neoliberalism? 
Chapter overview 
To answer these questions the thesis is divided into nine chapters. In the first 
chapter there is an examination of the food and agriculture system in the twenty-
first century, to determine the challenges to food security and the impact of 
different types of agriculture on food security, as well as economic, social and 
environmental issues. The hunger challenge is highlighted before analysis of 
two concepts recognised in international agreements relating to the alleviation of 
hunger, the right to food and food security. Both are important concepts but 
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quite distinct and separate.  The chapter then considers the interconnected 
challenges to achieving food security paying particular attention to the 
liberalisation of markets, the promotion of industrial agriculture over small-scale 
farming, the issues of land tenure, as well as agriculture’s complex relationship 
with climate change, water and land. This first chapter concludes with an 
examination of the food price crisis of 2007-2008, its causes, impacts and the 
way in which it exacerbated existing challenges. 
 
In chapter two examines public goods theory from its inception with the work of 
Samuelson (1954) to its extension into the global sphere as promoted by Kaul 
and her colleagues (1999, 2002a, 2005, 2006). GPGs as non-excludable, non-
rivalrous, global and intergenerational have the potential to offer a framework 
through which goods and services can be delivered, including those designed to 
promote food security. The different aspects of GPGs including the problem of 
free rising and the balance between public and private are discussed, as are a 
number of issues associated with the provision of GPGs such as state 
sovereignty, the weakest link, aggregate efforts, externalities and the principle of 
additionality. Food security and the MDGs have been examined for their 
suitability as examples of GPGs. The chapter concludes by charting the 
changing role of international organisations within the international system. 
 
The third chapter gives a brief overview of the different theories associated with 
international relations, realism, neo-realism, liberalism, neoliberalism, 
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constructivism and cognitivism. Four key themes addressed by all six theories; 
the identity of the main actors, their level of autonomy, the interdependence 
within the international system and the importance granted to information and its 
providers, are identified. The chapter then concludes with an examination of the 
wider international context within which FAO operates, from post-war era of 
regulated capitalism to the promotion of neoliberalism from the 1980s onwards.  
The next two chapters, four and five, give a historical analysis of FAO from its 
creation in 1945 to the Independent External Evaluation (IEE) in 2007, which led 
to the reform of FAO.  
 
Chapter four gives a detailed analysis of the discourse of nutrition that emerged 
in the 1930s and helped inform the foundation of FAO in 1945. It was 
championed by a group of scientists and academics, the champions of nutrition, 
who campaigned throughout World War Two to establish an international 
organisation with a mandate to govern the food and agriculture arena. There is 
an examination of the organisation’s founding principles and its early history up 
until 1974 and the World Food Conference. Highlighted are a number of 
proposals put forward by the organisation’s first directors general, Boyd Orr, 
Dodd and Sen and an overview of the challenges faced in its first three 
decades.  
 
Chapter five continues to chart FAO’s history, from the World Food Conference 
in 1974, to the evaluation of FAO in 2007. The World Food Conference was an 
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attempt by the international community to address the increasing pressures on 
the world food system. The chapter starts with an examination of the crisis that 
led to the conference and the conference’s outcomes and their critiques. This is 
followed by a brief assessment of the impact of the structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) implemented through the IFIs and FAO’s response to 
increasing food insecurity from the 1990s onwards. It concludes by considering 
the roles of the different actors operating within the international system, which 
has become increasing fragmented and globalised. States, international 
organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private foundations, 
multinational corporations and farmers are all discussed. 
 
Chapter six examines the reform of FAO following the extensive IEE, which 
published its report in 2007. It starts by examining the role of the IEE, its 
findings and recommendations and then how these were implemented through 
the reform process, which included strengthened global goals and streamlined 
strategic objectives. The reform process has not been straightforward with 
concerns expressed by the UK Government, and with strain placed on budgets 
and human resources. These challenges and the progress made so far have 
been discussed. 
 
Chapters seven, eight and nine discuss the findings of the research. A selection 
of GPGs have been examined in relation to the three main roles of FAO: 
measurement, through data collection, analysis and dissemination; its role as a 
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convener, bringing together its member states and a wide range of non-state 
actors to debate issues and form agreements; and its normative function 
through norms and standards setting. These roles were chosen as they have 
been at the core of FAO’s work since its creation in 1945 and will always form 
part of its remit. They also qualify as GPGs as they are non-excludable, non-
rivalrous, global and intergenerational. 
 
FAO’s measurement role has been discussed in chapter seven, through an 
analysis of its provision of statistics and publications and the potential impact 
that the reform of FAO has had in this provision and its potential as a GPG in 
the future. In chapter eight FAO’s role as a convener has been discussed in 
relation to its work through the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) and 
the promotion of civil society participation in the negotiation process. Finally in 
chapter nine the FAO’s role as a norms and standards setter is also assessed in 
relation to international treaties, the MDG framework and the development of 
the sustainable development goals (SDGs) as well as its standards work. 
Theoretical framework 
This research has been informed by four main bodies of literature; food security, 
global public goods, regime theory and neoliberalism. There is a large body of 
work focussed on the many different aspects of food security, food and 
agriculture and the associated challenges, such as climate change. De Schutter 
(2010, 2013, 2014), the former special rapporteur on the right to food has 
written extensively on the challenges to food security, as have authors including 
10 
 
Clapp (2006, 2011; Clapp and Murphy 2013) and Murphy (2013; Murphy, et al 
2012). These are in addition to the extensive body of research produced by 
international organisations, including FAO, as well as individual states. By 
examining the different aspects of the food and agriculture arena it was then 
possible to ascertain the most suitable theoretical framework for its analysis. 
 
Regime theory provided a basis for the initial examination of the ways in which 
international organisations operate within the international arena. Through the 
different strands of regime theory; realism (Mearscheimer, 2001), neo-realism 
(Waltz, 1979, 1993), liberalism (Doyle, 1983; Fischer, 2000), neoliberalism 
(Keohane, 1984, 1994, 1998, 2005), constructivism (Wendt, 1992; Finnemore, 
1996) and cognitivism (Haas, 1992, 1993) it was possible to draw out four key 
themes addressed by them all. This in turn helped to inform the decision to 
critique neoliberalism as an economic, social and political system (Harvey, 
2005; Chomsky, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002).   
 
Global public goods theory has been chosen as a potential alternative to the 
dominant neoliberal policies promoted by many in the international arena. The 
work of Kaul and her colleagues (Kaul et al, 2002a, 2005, 2006) and the 
International Task Force on Global Public Goods (2006) as well as the early 
theorists of public good theory Samuelson (1954) and Olson (1971) have 
informed this decision. Sandler (1999, 2001, 2009) has extended GPG theory 
by examining the intergenerational aspects and its suitability to address climate 
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change issues and Cooper, Hart and Baldock (2009) have investigated the 
provision of GPGs through agriculture in the EU. However, the suitability of 
GPGs to address the goods and services provided by FAO in its work to 
address global food insecurity has not been addressed. 
Methodology 
This study aims to contribute to the debate by deepening understandings of the 
complexity and diversity of the challenges facing the actors within the 
international food and agriculture arena attempting to address the multifaceted 
challenges of food insecurity. FAO, as the central international organisation 
operating in this arena, was the obvious candidate for investigation. 
 
Data was gathered through twelve elite semi-structured interviews with people 
working for FAO, many at a senior level in the organisation, or within the food 
and agriculture arena. The interviews followed two week-long observation 
sessions at FAO during the Committee for World Food Security’s (CFS) annual 
meetings, which were instrumental in informing the research project’s focus.  
 
The interviews took place during June 2013 at FAO headquarters in Rome. 
Sampling methods included snowballing, purposive and convenience 
approaches. A number of the interviewees were targeted specifically, including 
Erwin Northoff, Nick Rubery and Andrew MacMillan as they played crucial roles 
within FAO or had a unique insight into the organisation, whilst other 
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interviewees were recommended to the author as potentially valuable sources 
by interviewees during earlier interviews. This was the case with Josef 
Schmidhuber, Tina Farmer and Michael Clark. The sampling of interviewees 
was not representative but instead informed by the exploratory nature of the 
research project. 
 
The interview period followed two week-long observation sessions at FAO, 
during the annual CFS meetings, which are detailed below. It was during the 
observation sessions that a clearer understanding was gained of the 
organisational structure of FAO and the reform process taking place. Informed 
by this insight the interviewees were chosen because of their relevance in the 
overall governance structure of FAO, to its provision of GPGs within its three 
main roles, or due to their direct involvement in the reform of the organisation.  
 
During the interviews each interviewee was asked about the GPGs provided by 
their own department and FAO as a whole. Questions were also asked about 
the reform process and the impact that this would have on FAO’s ability to 
provide GPGs in the future and the organisation’s work towards creating a food 
secure world. As the interviews were semi-structured they followed the same 
pattern but did not follow a rigid set of questions. This allowed for flexibility for 
the author to respond to the new information as it was being gathered and for 
subsequent interviews. Shorthand notes were taken throughout all interviews. 
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These notes were then transcribed by the author and this data used to inform 
the research process.  
 
References for each source are indicated in the text and are listed in appendix 
one. All respondents were happy to be named in the research and were 
generous with their time. 
 
In addition to the interviews, the author attended the CFS annual meetings at 
FAO headquarters in October 2011 and October 2012. Throughout this period 
the author attended plenary sessions, working groups, Civil Society Mechanism 
(CSM) meetings and side events, as well as conducting informal interviews with 
participants. Shorthand notes were taken throughout the observation sessions, 
which were then partially transcribed and used to inform the focus of the 
research project. These two periods of observation also played a crucial role in 
the selection of potential interviewees. 
 
Observations took place during a time of dynamic transition with many more 
participants actively engaging with the negotiation process than ever before. It 
was clear to the author during these sessions that FAO was in the midst of a 
major reform process and that this placed the author in a strong position from 
which to observe the process and some of the outcomes. However, it has to be 
noted that at the end of the data gathering period the reform process was still in 
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progress and so the final outcomes were not available for analysis. It will take 
many years for the final outcome of the reform process to be known. 
 
During the three data gathering visits to FAO headquarters in Rome the author 
also examined a number of primary source documents, many relating to the 
organisation’s early history, in FAO’s library. A wide range of additional primary 
sources were also used including statements and resolutions from the UN, FAO 
documents outlining policy and other official sources. The final primary data 
collection period ended in June 2013. An extensive review of secondary sources 
has also helped inform this research, including theoretical analysis from 
academic books and articles, surveys, working papers, reports and news 
commentary. This secondary data collection period extended until the summer 
of 2015. 
 
The research would have benefited from a larger number of elite semi-
structured interviews, from across all FAO’s departments. This would have 
allowed for a more representative view of the GPGs provided by the 
organisation and a more in-depth understanding of the reform process. 
However, this scale of investigation was beyond the scope of this research 
project. In addition, an interview with the new director general, Jose Graziano da 
Silva, would have been very informative. Although the author did make 
enquiries about a possible interview the director general, understandably, did 
not have time to see the author, and so his views have been taken from 
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secondary sources, such as statements to FAO and the UN, press interviews 
and speeches. Additionally, the data gathering during the observation sessions 
was limited to the number of meetings the author was able to attend as many 
meetings were held concurrently. However, the author did acquaint herself with 
the documentation resulting from the meetings not attended. 
 
The flexible design of this research project has proved very useful, allowing for a 
flexible approach to the qualitative primary data collection through the semi-
structured interviews. This gave the author the opportunity to adapt the 
interviews throughout the data gathering stages as new information became 
available. This added nuances to the overall understanding of the complexity 
within this arena and assisted triangulation.  
 
At the time that the interviews were conducted in June 2013 the new director 
general was just about to present his programme for change to the FAO 
Conference. The interviews reflect a sense of uncertainty, of change but overall 
a sense of optimism.  
 
Research ethics 
Permission to attend CFS meetings as an observer, to visit FAO’s library and to 
access interviewees was gained through liaison between the University of 
Bradford and FAO. The author’s supervisor, Professor Paul Rogers, supplied a 
letter of introduction, which proved the author’s academic credentials. FAO and 
16 
 
individual interviewees were made aware of the nature of the research project 
and were happy to grant access and to participate, respectively. Following the 
interviews the author continued to liaise with the interviewees and once all 
interviews had been transcribed each interviewee was contacted again and 
asked if they would wish to see the transcription of their interview. Three asked 
to see the transcriptions and subsequently gave their permission for the 
information to be used. 
 
The author did not experience any ethical challenges during this research 
project. Permission to access FAO was granted for three separate data 
collecting periods and all interviewees were happy to participate and to be 
named. 
Scope of the research 
The scope of this research is wide, with an overview of the global food security 
situation in the present day, a historical analysis of FAO and the international 
arena and economic landscape within which it operates, as well as an 
examination of a range of GPGs that it provides through its three main roles. By 
taking this historical analysis approach an understanding of the position of FAO 
within the international arena has been gained, as well as an appreciation of the 
GPGs that it provides.  
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However, there are a number of areas that are beyond the remit of this 
research. It has to be acknowledged that there are many different types of food 
producers, including those who rely on fishing in all its forms, to provide food.  
These are not included in this thesis instead it concentrates on agriculture as a 
means of food production.  
 
There are many challenges to the provision of a food secure world and although 
a number of these are examined in the first chapter it is not possible to 
investigate them all. Therefore among the factors not discussed, despite their 
considerable impact, are the world’s increasing population, changing food 
consumption habits, food waste, intellectual property rights and the gendered 
dynamics of agricultural production. In addition the important role of FAO as a 
provider of technical assistance has not been addressed as this occurs at the 
local or national level and is therefore not a GPG. 
 
The reform process is still in progress and it will be many years before it will be 
possible to gauge its success. It would be worthwhile revisiting this research 
area to investigate the reform’s impact, not only on FAO but also its partners, 
especially those working through the CFS in their attempt to make global 
negotiations more inclusive and representative of the people affected by policy 
decisions. The GPGs highlighted through this research are only a sample of the 
GPGs that the organisation provides. A wider study of these GPGs and their 
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impact on food security would be an interesting avenue to examine in more 
depth. 
Contribution of the research 
Although the theory of GPGs has been used as a tool of analysis for issues 
relating to a number of different areas, such as the environment (Sandler, 2001, 
2009; International Task Force on Global Public Goods, 2006) it has not been 
used to examine the provision of food security, and very little on the associated 
global public goods or bads that can result from the different types of agriculture 
(Cooper, Hart and Baldock, 2009). Industrial agriculture, as promoted through 
neoliberal policies, can produce a number of global public bads; a situation that 
needs to be addressed if food security for all is to be achieved without causing 
detrimental and irreversible damage to the environment. This thesis has set out 
to determine whether the provision of GPGs aimed at alleviating food insecurity 
can offer an alternative to neoliberalism and as such contributes to the existing 
literature concerned with both the provision of GPGs and food security.  
 
Additionally, although the history of FAO has been well documented, especially 
in its foundational years (Abbott, 1992; Black, 1943; Boudreau, 1943; Boyd Orr, 
1949, 1966; Evan, 1943; Staples, 2006; Shaw, 2007) the recent reform of FAO 
offers an opportunity to examine the organisation during a time of extensive 
change; the most significant change in the organisations’ history since its 
creation seven decades ago. This moment in time also provides the perfect 
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opportunity to gauge its future potential in relation to its GPG provision taking 
into consideration its revised global goals and streamlined strategic objectives.  
 
This research makes a distinct contribution through its in-depth analysis of 
FAO’s reform process and an analysis of the GPGs that FAO provides; these 
areas have not investigated before. By connecting FAO’s reform with its GPG 
provision it may be possible to make the case for a shift towards a GPG 
approach, which takes a more holistic approach to the provision of food security, 
and away from the narrow market-driven neoliberal approach. 
20 
 
Chapter One: 
Food Security in the 21st Century 
Introduction 
Food is essential for life; without enough nutritious and nourishing food people 
cannot reach their full potential and in extreme cases of deprivation will die from 
starvation. This is an undisputed fact. However, from this central fact there are 
disagreements on every aspect of the food chain, from how and where it is 
produced, by whom and for whom, to its environmental impact. Despite these 
disagreements there is consensus on the need for action to address the 
problem of hunger.  
 
This chapter will start by highlighting the hunger challenge before examining the 
emergence of two concepts recognised in international agreements in relation to 
the alleviation of hunger; food security and the right to food. Both play a central 
role in a number of international agreements but they are distinct and separate. 
It will then consider the interlinked challenges to achieving food security in the 
twenty-first century, looking in particular at the liberalisation of markets, the 
promotion of industrial agricultural production techniques over small-scale 
traditional farming methods and issues of land tenure, as well as agriculture’s 
complex relationship with climate change, water and energy. And finally there 
will be an examination of the food price crisis of 2007-2008, its causes, impacts 
and the way in which it exacerbated existing challenges. 
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All these issues are significant areas of study in their own right. However in this 
thesis it is not possible to examine each in detail. Therefore a brief overview of 
the main points of each issue will be given to act as background information for 
the main points of the argument to be developed later. These areas have been 
selected in particular as they are relevant to the provision of global public goods, 
which will be examined in more detail in later chapters. The reasons for food 
insecurity are complex and wide-ranging; those to be discussed here are only 
some of the contributing factors.  
 
Among other factors that will not be discussed here despite their considerable 
impact, are the world’s increasing population, changing food consumption 
habits, food waste, intellectual property rights and the gendered dynamics of 
agricultural production. It also has to be acknowledged that agriculture is only 
one method of food production, with fisheries and forests also playing vital roles 
in the provision of food. These will not be discussed in this thesis but both offer 
excellent avenues for further research in regards to the provision of GPGs. 
The Hunger Challenge 
In recent years there has been some progress made on reducing the number of 
undernourished, from one billion in 1990-1992 to 795 million in 2015. This year 
marks the end of the monitoring period for the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), in which states made a commitment to halve the proportion of 
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undernourished from 1990 levels.1 The proportion of undernourished people in 
the total population has decreased from 23.3 percent to 12.9 percent in the 
developing regions as a whole but this overall figure does not reveal the uneven 
nature of the progress with some regions doing much better than others. Out of 
the 129 developing countries monitored 79 achieved the MDG target. (FAO, 
IFAD and WFP, 2015c) 
 
However, these figures are only based on calorie intake, and one which 
assumes a sedentary lifestyle, which is not the case for many working people. 
Olivier De Schutter (2014) argues that calorie intake alone is not a useful guide; 
investigating levels of nutrition gives a better account. Diets that have sufficient 
food intake can still be deficient in micronutrients, such as iodine, vitamins or 
iron. De Schutter (2014, p.4) highlights the fact that “Too little has been done to 
ensure adequate nutrition, despite the proven long-term impacts of adequate 
nutrition during pregnancy and before a child’s second birthday.”  
 
Micronutrient deficiencies affect approximately two billion people in the world, a 
result of inadequate diets. This has tragic consequences, for example, zinc 
deficiency contributes to growth failure and weakened immunity in young 
children and results in some 800,000 child deaths each year. (WFP, 2015a) 
Inappropriate or inadequate diets, often a result of poverty, also account for the 
large number of people who are overweight or obese. Between 1980 and 2008 
                                            
1
 The Millennium Development Goals will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8. 
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the prevalence of obesity doubled to 1.4 billion adults being overweight, 
including 400 million who were obese. This is in addition to the estimated 43 
million children who are overweight. (De Schutter, 2014; Scaling Up Nutrition, 
2015; Belhassen, 2015) Globally poor nutrition causes nearly half (45 percent) 
of all deaths in children under the age of five; that’s 3.1 million children each 
year; approximately 8,493 deaths a day; 354 an hour and nearly six every 
minute. (WFP, 2015b) 
 
Malnutrition has lifelong and devastating consequences.  There are 165 million 
children in the world who are stunted and too short for their age. This will impact 
on their health, educational attainment and future earnings; it will prevent them 
reaching their full physical and cognitive potential and in the wider society it will 
restrict economic development. (Scaling Up Nutrition, 2015) The ‘hidden hunger’ 
has now been recognised and there are a number of projects, such as the 
multilateral Scaling Up Nutrition initiative, now working to address these issues. 
There is a focus on the first 1,000 days of a child’s life, throughout gestation and 
up to their second birthday. Ensuring a well-balanced diet at this stage of life 
can have a significant impact on a person’s future health and well-being. 
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The Right to Food and Food Security 
The Right to Food 
The Right to Food is recognised in a range of human rights legal frameworks 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948) in 
which Article 11 (1) declares that States Parties “recognise the right of everyone 
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family including adequate 
food”.2 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was created soon after World War 
Two, at a time that also saw the establishment of the United Nations and many 
of its specialised agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO), as discussed in chapter four. This surge in international activity and 
institution building, in the aftermath of war, was an attempt to generate 
coordinated action to assist the millions of people in desperate need around the 
world. 
 
                                            
2
 States Parties: recognising the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take 
individually and through international co-operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which 
are needed: (a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full 
use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and 
by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development 
and utilization of natural resources; (b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and 
food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need. 
(United Nations, 1948) 
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Many of the founding principles of these organisations and international 
conventions can trace their origins back to President Roosevelt’s State of the 
Union Speech in 1941, in which he called for freedom from fear and freedom 
from want. These ideals were then incorporated into the Atlantic Charter (1941) 
signed by Roosevelt and Churchill.  
 
The right to food, as a human right, has reappeared in international conventions 
throughout the decades. For example the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989, Art 24) states that “States Parties recognise the right of the child to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health” and that States Parties 
would strive to ensure appropriate measures are taken to “combat disease and 
malnutrition...and through the provision of nutritious foods and clean drinking 
water”.  
 
FAO director general B. R. Sen was instrumental in promoting the right to food 
as part of his Freedom From Hunger Campaign, which reached its zenith at the 
World Food Congress in 1963, designed to be a showcase for FAO’s new 
approach to agricultural development. As part of this drive Sen convened a 
Special Assembly on Man’s Right to Freedom from Hunger, reconnecting with 
the founding principles of the organisation (FAO, 1963).  In 1974 the World 
Food Conference also reiterated the right to food, in the resolution agreed by 
the conference (UN, 1975, p1)  
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Every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to 
be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop 
fully and maintain their physical and mental faculties. 
Society today already possesses sufficient resources, 
organisational ability and technology and hence the 
competence to achieve this objective. 
In 1996 at the World Food Summit (FAO, 1996) in Rome the heads of state and 
government reaffirmed “the right of everyone to have access to safe and 
nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental 
right of everyone to be free from hunger.” This was based on the proclamation 
made at the World Food Conference in 1974, which will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter four.  
 
The international community has taken a number of approaches to addressing 
the hunger challenge, one of which was establishing a commitment to halve 
between 1990 and 2015 the number of undernourished people by 2015 (FAO, 
1996). This commitment was later revised to halving the proportion of people 
who suffer from hunger, through its incorporation into the first MDG (United 
Nations, 2000). The UN, its member states and many non-state actors are now 
in the process of finalising the aims and objectives of the next round of 
development goals, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter eight.  
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United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food 
In addition to these reaffirmations and MDG commitments the Human Rights 
Council of the United Nations appointed a Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food in 2000. The position was held by Professor Jean Zeigler until 2008 and 
then Professor Olivier De Schutter until 2014. The current Special Rapporteur is 
Ms Hilal Elver. The mandate of the Special Rapporteur (UN Human Rights 
Office, 2015) encompasses a wide range of elements that include the promotion 
of the right to food at every level of governance from national to international. 
 
The rapporteur’s mandate is wide ranging as are the issues covered, which 
include agriculture, children, the contribution of food aid, climate change, 
extraterritorial obligations, fisheries, indigenous people, nutrition, land, 
intellectual property rights, the contribution of the private sector, trade and 
water, all considered in relation with the right to food. 
 
By taking a rights-based approach the special rapporteur has been able to 
highlight the many different issues that relate directly to the individual’s ability to 
realise their right to adequate food. This is not interpreted in the narrow or 
restrictive sense which equates the term with a minimum package of calories, 
proteins and other specific nutrients; instead it is a more holistic view, which 
takes into consideration the inherent complexities of food production, distribution 
and consumption.  
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Olivier De Schutter (2014, 2013) has argued that the right to food is not just 
about production but instead the focus should be on promoting permanent and 
secure access to diets that are nutritionally adequate and culturally appropriate 
and which have been sustainably produced, with reference to the requirements 
of availability, accessibility, adequacy and sustainability. This could be achieved 
through three channels; by enabling systems of self production, creating greater 
access to income-generating activities and having better social protection. As 
such the right to food is closely related to the right to access to resources such 
as land, water and seeds.  
 
The special rapporteur also worked with FAO’s intergovernmental working 
group established at the World Food Summit 2002. After two years of intense 
and constructive negotiations with representatives of different stakeholder 
groups including civil society the Voluntary Guidelines to support the 
progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national 
food security, known as the Right to Food Guidelines, were adopted by member 
states of FAO on 23 November 2004. (FAO, 2005b) The guidelines are based 
on the four pillars of food security: availability, stability of supply, access and 
utilization. They take into consideration the commitments and legal obligations 
already in place but do not alter or add to them. Instead their aim is to guide 
states in the implementation of policies to achieve national food security. 
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Food Security 
Although the right to food and the concept of food security appear in the same 
international agreements they are two separate and distinct terms. It also has to 
be acknowledged that the concept of food security is wide-ranging and 
contested (Sneyd, 2014; Midgley, 2013). David Nally (2013, p.343) argues that 
the term food security is used to invoke debates on everything from famine relief 
to future climate change and in the process is “commonly presented as an 
ideologically neutral concept, a pre-political idea that is moreover a global 
good.” He disputes this claim, instead arguing that the term food security is 
being used to justify large scale land acquisitions and is therefore being used 
politically to ‘defend the indefensible’. 
 
Jane Midgley (2013, p.427) argues that the term’s only constant is its continuing 
“aspirational and strategic presence in policy and political debate.” With over 
200 definitions of food security, Midgley states (2013, p.427) that there are 
many disparate characteristics now associated with the term, including:  
issues of hunger, poverty, social assistance/safety nets, 
food safety, public health, nutrition, human right to food, 
human security, sustainability, improved crop yields, 
genetically modified foods, and agri-industry 
advancements, intellectual property rights, land rights, 
rural development – and its application to different scales 
of social organisation and governance, it is unsurprising 
30 
 
that a chaotic, contested and inconsistent concept has 
been created.  
However, Midgley argues that this all encompassing range has contributed to 
the concept of food security becoming a powerful organising tool to unify 
different groups and interests. 
 
Given that there are so many different definitions of food security it is necessary 
to select the most appropriate. This thesis will examine the work of FAO, and 
the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), therefore that committee’s 
definition is an appropriate starting point for discussion. According to the CFS 
(2015c), “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social 
and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” Although this 
definition is inclusive in regards to those that consume food it does not give 
everyone the right to food, which is a legally recognised right within the 
international human rights framework. Kerstin Mechlem (2004, p.631) argues 
that the right to food “must be seen as a wider, more encompassing, and distinct 
objective in itself” and it “complements food security considerations with dignity, 
rights acknowledgement, transparency, accountability and empowerment 
concerns”.  
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Food security also does not take into consideration the wider aspects of food, 
the ways in which it is produced and how this impacts upon people and the 
environment. There is a movement, driven by civil society organisations (CSOs), 
most notably La Via Campesina and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
which aims to have the concept of food sovereignty recognised in FAO and 
throughout the UN, in place of food security. Global Justice Now (formerly the 
World Development Movement) argues that food sovereignty offers a critical 
alternative to the concept of food security, which recognises that not all ways of 
attaining food security are equal. People’s right to choose what they eat, how it 
is produced and the relationships this entails are critical. “Food sovereignty 
looks at the political and economic power imbalances inherent in the global food 
system and challenges who controls how food is produced and distributed.” In 
addition it also “seeks to tackle some of the root causes which lead to hunger 
and poverty in a holistic way that avoids creating further problems.” (WDM, 
2012, p.2) 
 
Although the author recognises the merits of the term food sovereignty, which is 
more in line with the proposals put forward by the special rapporteur and offers 
a more holistic approach to the challenges of food insecurity, this thesis will 
continue to use the term food security as this is the term used by FAO and in 
the international agreements to be discussed here.  
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The concept of food security is also younger than that of the right to food, only 
appearing in the 1970s as part of the UN discourse surrounding the 1974 World 
Food Conference, as previously mentioned and which will be examined in more 
detail in chapter five. As the conference was a response to low levels of cereal 
stocks and high cereal prices there was a perception that the world was moving 
towards a situation of overall food shortages. Increased food production, a 
solution required by necessity at the end of World War Two, again appeared to 
be the solution required again. 
 
However, increased production is not necessarily the only answer to the 
complex challenges of food insecurity. At the time Nobel economist Amartya 
Sen (1980, 1981, 1986, 1989) moved the debate from one based solely on food 
production to one of access in his ‘entitlements’ approach. He argued that 
acquirement was central to questions of hunger and starvation in the modern 
world, in which people could starve in a world of plenty, and even in a country in 
which food is available for those with purchasing power. In his examination of 
famines (1980) Sen investigates the cause of famines, asking if there is the 
possibility of famine when there is no substantial decline in food availability per 
head, the existence of food exports when people are starving at home and the 
distinction between famine and starvation, the former being the “result of some 
kind of ‘natural’ occurrence involving genuine food shortage while the latter is 
the result of some deliberate action in starving people to death or to migrate.” 
(Sen, 1980, p.614)  
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He challenged the Food Availability Decline (FAD) theory used to explain the 
cause of famines and instead puts forward his ‘entitlements approach’, which 
“sees starvation as arising from failure on the part of groups of people to 
establish entitlement over a requisite amount of food.” (Sen, 1980, p.615) This 
entitlement, which can include an individual’s ability to produce his or her own 
food or exchange labour for wages, is constrained through a number of 
relationships between the individual and the legal and political systems, 
economic forces as well as social and cultural influences. External factors, many 
beyond the individual’s control, can negatively impact upon his or her ability to 
exchange labour for wages and then wages for food. For example, a fall in 
wages, rise in food prices or a drop in the price of the commodity she is selling 
will all have consequences.  
 
Sen argues (1986, p.6) that by concentrating on the availability of food, in what 
he terms ‘Malthusian optimism’ and not people’s ability to access it has 
contributed substantially to delays in policy response and “has been indirectly 
involved in millions of deaths, which have resulted from inaction and 
misdirection of public policy.”  
 
Having the ability to access food and ‘entitlements’ has been part of the food 
security discourse for decades, nevertheless there has been a continuing drive 
to increase food production almost at the expense of all other considerations. 
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This increased production model has exacerbated the inequalities within the 
food system and ignores the need for reform. This can be seen in the neoliberal 
market based strategies employed as part of the structural adjustment 
programmes of the 1980s and into the 1990s. These policies will be examined 
in more detail in chapter five however their consequences will be discussed 
here. 
Market Liberalisation  
There have been many different stages in agricultural development since the 
end of World War Two. These will be discussed in more detail in chapters four 
and five. However a brief overview here will be beneficial to give context to the 
challenges to food security.  
 
During the 1960s and 1970s many states, most notably in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), implemented pro-urban policies that were designed to feed growing 
urban populations, and through which farmers faced high rates of both explicit 
and implicit agricultural taxation (World Bank, 1997). This accelerated rural to 
urban migration and significantly reduced agricultural output. The World Bank 
(1981) highlighted the trends in agricultural development between 1960 and 
1980 in SSA, namely the decline in agricultural production per capita in the 
1970s, the stagnation of agricultural exports, an increase of commercial imports 
of food grain and a shift of consumption to wheat and rice. It accredited these 
changes in agricultural output to wars and civil strife, drought and poor rainfall, 
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rapid population growth, neglect of agriculture by governments and donors and 
a misallocation of investment, most notably into large-scale government 
operated schemes. The challenges faced in agriculture were exacerbated by the 
wider financial crisis of the early 1980s, described by Watkins (1995, pp.73-74): 
“The slowdown in the world economy and the lethal interaction of falling 
commodity prices and rising interest rates, caused by changes in US monetary 
policy, devastated one economy after another.” 
 
To combat this crisis the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were 
introduced through the lending mechanisms of the international financial 
institutions (IFIs), most notably the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (Fraser, 2005; Harvey, 2005). Structural adjustment included a wide 
range of policy reforms designed to reduce fiscal deficits and restore balance of 
payments; these took different forms in different areas. However, Watkins 
(1995) argues that although a response was needed to address the severe 
financial crisis of the early 1980s SAPs had been put forward as the only 
available option; there was no alternative.  
 
According to Thandika Mkandawire and Charles Soludo (1999) structural 
adjustment in the 1980s was just one phase of planning to be imposed on 
African countries. This was preceded by ‘development planning’ in the 1960s 
and ‘basic needs’ in the 1970s and followed by ‘good governance’ in the 1990s. 
Mkandawire and Soludo argue that when each new policy regime failed to 
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produce the desired results the Africans were blamed and new policies 
implemented. The authors (1999, p.37) argue that “Africa’s problem has not 
been its failure to learn but it’s learning too well from all and sundry.” 
 
The SAPs, which were replaced from 1999 by the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs), resulted in the retreat of the state from agricultural 
development and a reduction in state funding for the sector. It was assumed that 
through market liberalisation the private sector would fill the funding void 
vacated by the state. This did not happen. (De Schutter, 2014) 
 
The former special rapporteur on the right to food De Schutter argues (2014) 
that these policies had a number of consequences, such as placing downward 
pressure on global agricultural prices as highly subsidized farming sectors in 
developed countries, especially the US and EU, created incentives for 
overproduction of certain commodities. These conditions made private 
investment in agriculture in developing countries unattractive. Small-scale 
farming became untenable or extremely difficult; more people moved to the 
cities to find work and the remaining farmers became increasingly impoverished.  
 
Additionally, in order to repay foreign loans in hard currency developing 
countries grew and exported a narrow range of primary agricultural products for 
the developed countries at the expense of local food production. This made 
them more vulnerable to external market shocks and fluctuations and also made 
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it necessary to import food to feed their own populations. These conditions 
created an unbalanced food system. (Weis, 2007; De Schutter, 2014) 
 
The case of Mexico is just one example, from many, that demonstrates the 
impact of trade liberalisation, argues Tony Weis (2007). Through liberalisation 
import tariffs and quotas were cut and policies put in place favouring export 
growth. As commercialised farmers benefited from the growth in demand for 
luxury out-of-season fruit and vegetables, such as tomatoes, fewer basic crops 
were grown for home consumption and so food imports increased, especially 
following the signing of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) in 
1994. Weis argues that this had serious consequences for small-scale farming 
as state support for agriculture ended and privatization of the once protected 
communal ejidos was permitted through a constitutional amendment; a 
requirement of NAFTA. Trade liberalisation had enhanced openness to imports 
whilst reducing domestic price supports for farmers.  
 
With the significant increase in agro-imports, such as the tripling of imported 
maize, Mexico moved from a position of having an agricultural trade surplus to 
one with “a sizeable deficit, maize prices collapsed amid the flood of cheap, 
highly subsidized US imports”. This had a significant and devastating impact on 
the country’s food producers with “more than one million people were squeezed 
out of agriculture.” (Weis, 2007, p.111) This model has been replicated across 
the world causing hardship for small-scale farmers, driving rural to urban 
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migration and devaluing domestic food production systems, as well as eroding 
food security, especially for the rural poor. 
Multilateral Trade Agreements  
Mexico was seen as a test subject regarding the outcomes of multilateral trade 
discipline. Although international trade had been regulated through the 
multilateral trade agreement GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
since 1947 agriculture had been treated as a special case and not subjected to 
the same overall control. However, that changed when GATT was replaced by 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994 with the signing of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements.  
 
The GATT agreements form part of the WTO agreements but these now include 
additions, such as the Agreement on Agriculture (WTO-AoA), which, according 
to the WTO (2015a) is designed to address the loopholes contained in the 
original GATT. “The Uruguay Round produced the first multilateral agreement 
dedicated to the sector. It was a significant first step towards order, fair 
competition and a less distorted sector.” The aim is to improve predictability and 
security for importing and exporting countries with the new rules applying to 
market access, domestic support and export subsidies. Arguably there is some 
flexibility, however limited, as the WTO states: “The agreement does allow 
governments to support their rural economies but preferably through policies 
that cause less distortion to trade.” (WTO, 2015a)   
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Developing countries were disappointed by the results of the Uruguay Round, 
which continued to favour the developed countries’ agricultural production. 
Despite the free trade rhetoric subsidies in OECD countries continued to distort 
the international market. From 1986 to 1988 agricultural subsidies in OECD 
countries totalled US$ 271.2 billion; this actually increased to US$ 330.6 billion 
in the years from 1998 to 2000, after the introduction of the AoA as 60 percent 
of agricultural subsidies had been re-categorised under the tariff box system. 
Many subsidies had been moved from the Amber Box to the Blue Box or Green 
Box categories. (Clapp, 2006) Under the AoA system subsidies were permitted 
for agriculture that had limited trade distortion, as categorised in the Green Box, 
or its production was limited, as permitted in the Blue Box; subsidies in the 
Amber Box, which were seen as distorting trade, were to be phased out. These 
exceptions had been agreed through a bilateral agreement between the EU and 
US, known as the Blair House Accord (Clapp, 2006; WTO, 2000; Dunkley, 
2000).  
 
The subsidies were just one part of the unfair trading system. In addition, tariffs 
were also in place on products exported from developing countries to developed 
countries, including tariffs on groundnuts, sugar and some meats, which in 
some cases were up to 500 percent. Clapp (2006, p.7) argues that “The result is 
that developing countries are left much more vulnerable. Rather than level the 
playing field, the AoA made it more steeply stacked against developing 
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countries.” The way in which the international system was regulated, through 
subsidies, market liberalisation and punitive tariffs had made it impossible for 
farmers in developing countries to compete; the AoA did nothing to improve the 
situation. For example, in 2003 US agricultural exports were sold for between 10 
and 50 percent below the cost of production. (Clapp, 2006) 
 
The Doha Round, named the development round, was supposed to shift the 
emphasis from the agenda and interests of the developed countries to those of 
the developing countries and address the inequalities written into the AoA. 
However, these negotiations have proved difficult and inconclusive. The latest 
round of talks has been the Bali Package, agreed in December 2013. (WTO, 
2015b) This agreement has also proved problematic with no general consensus 
reached on public stockholding programmes for food security. However, despite 
their importance a detailed analysis of these trade negotiations is beyond the 
remit of this thesis. 
Agriculture and Free Trade 
International trade and markets are becoming more integrated and complex at 
every stage of the production and marketing chain, this includes the role played 
by transnational corporations, which are vertically and horizontally integrated 
through globalisation, allowing them increasing power over consumers and 
agricultural producers. In addition, states are ceding some of their sovereignty 
over their policies through multilateral trade agreements. This is having an 
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impact at all levels, for those in receipt of the benefits and those that are not. 
The IAASTD report (2009, p.8) argues that “Although most agricultural 
production is not traded internationally, national agricultural planning and AKST 
(agricultural knowledge, science and technology) investment is increasingly 
orientated towards exports markets and designed to comply with international 
trade rules.”  
 
By removing support for farmers, such as research and extension services, and 
dismantling mechanisms designed to help stabilise food prices, including grain 
reserves, as part of the SAPs, and then opening agricultural markets as 
required by multilateral trade agreements small-scale farmers in developing 
countries have suffered the consequences of these neoliberal market based 
policies. According to WDM (2012, p.3) this has had a serious impact on 
farmers around the world as “unable to compete with the low prices, millions of 
farmers have seen their livelihoods destroyed and then faced poverty as 
landless rural workers or urban slum dwellers.”  
 
Agriculture is inherently connected to so many different sections of society as 
agricultural producers and consumers, impacting upon rural livelihoods and 
urban overcrowding, the wider economy and the environment. Unlike any other 
sector agriculture has a number of distinctive features, which make it 
incompatible with free trade. For example, food as a basic requirement for life is 
too important to be treated as a mere commodity. Food production also impacts 
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upon so many different areas of importance, some of which are global public 
goods, and with such wide-ranging consequences.   
 
Wanki Moon (2011) argues that agriculture related problems are too diverse and 
complex to be left to free trade. Three features make it distinct from the 
production of other commodities. Firstly agriculture produces an array of 
nonmarket goods and services, in addition to its marketable products, which are 
collectively known as multifunctionality of agriculture. Secondly it is intimately 
connected to the provision of very important global public goods, such as 
sustainability, climate change mitigation and food security. Additionally, taking 
these two features into consideration, it plays distinctively different roles across 
different countries. He cites four underlying rationales for agricultural 
protectionism; the domestic promotion of food security, as a tool to mitigate 
excessive market fluctuations, to correct market failures associated with 
multifunctionality and the protection of farming interest groups; the first three 
reasons Wanki argues are legitimate but the fourth is not. 
 
Wanki argues that too much time and effort is being wasted on the unworkable 
liberalisation of agricultural trade and taking into consideration the important role 
that agriculture plays in the provision of a number of different goods and 
services at the national and global level a different approach to its governance 
should be taken. Wanki argues (2011, p.13)  
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When the global community is too much preoccupied with 
the illusive mission of agricultural trade liberalisation, the 
great danger is that such preoccupation may distract it 
from effectively addressing the agriculture-related 
problems of the 21st century in a timely manner that pose 
imperative challenges to humanity. 
Brian Elliot (2014, p.8) agrees with Wanki’s assessment of agriculture’s special 
status, arguing that “being sensitive to the sustainability dimensions of 
agriculture means that, at a minimum, economic profit making can only be one 
of a number of desirable outcomes.” However Elliot highlights the potential 
benefits of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU, which is criticised 
by many non-EU countries. He argues that rather than being “a subterfuge to 
maintain unfair domestic subsidization” the retention of subsidies through the 
CAP and their re-categorisation from Amber to Blue boxes can be seen as 
useful as the “EU rationale for continued CAP payments increasingly pertains to 
marginal agricultural practices” (2014, pp.8-9). The EU has argued that these 
subsidies are helping producers on the margins, such as those practising low-
intensity animal husbandry in the uplands or managing olive plantations in arid 
areas, which in turn help preserve the vitality of rural communities.  
 
Elliot argues against the pursuit of trade liberalisation to the neglect of all other 
considerations. In fact he maintains that if free trade was actually achieved most 
European farmers would be unable to provide many of the public goods they 
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currently do. This would lead to a situation in which “governmental institutions 
would almost certainly have to assume the more onerous task of deploying 
specialised land managers to maintain ecosystem services at optimal levels.” 
(Elliot, 2014, p.9) He concludes that instead of abandoning the CAP, a move 
that would impact negatively on social and environmental sustainability, the 
system should be made fairer to all by correcting the international agreements 
to “allow nations to direct revenue towards domestic agriculture provided there 
was a compelling and verifiable sustainability case.” In this manner the “EU 
agricultural policy, with its core recognition of the multiple functions of farming, 
has the potential to become a model for future international agreements.” (Elliot, 
2014, p.10) 
 
Undoubtedly agriculture produces many vital public goods that if managed 
properly could address some of the many challenges faced. The proper 
management of natural resources, such as land, soil, water, biodiversity and 
forestry, can be achieved through sustainable agricultural practices. This would 
not only assist in the protection of these depletable resources, but also allow for 
more sustainable production methods, which could increase food production, 
alleviate rural poverty and ensure food security. By using sustainable methods, 
such as agroecological production, it could also help this generation and future 
generations. The provision of global public goods will be discussed in more 
detail in chapters two and eight.  The complex relationship between agriculture 
and climate change will be discussed in the following section. 
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Industrialised Agriculture versus Small-Scale 
Farmers 
Food can be produced in many different ways from methods used by 
subsistence farmers in developing countries to highly mechanised industrial 
production methods used mainly in developed countries, with many variants in-
between. Food and its production has always been an environmental, economic 
and political force (Fraser and Rimas, 2011; McKeon, 2013; McMichael, 2013). 
People have always had disagreements about production methods, ownership 
and control; today is no different.  
 
In the twenty-first century there are many different types of agricultural 
production but their ideological differences can be viewed from two main 
perspectives: industrialised agricultural production, which relies on technology, 
mechanisation, oil-based inputs and high water consumption; and small-scale 
farmers, who typically use fewer inputs, whose methods are more labour 
intensive and more localised. The industrialised method has been promoted 
through many international mechanisms, including the IFIs through the SAPs 
and PRSPs as part of the neoliberal agenda. (Weis, 2007) In addition to its 
promotion in developing countries it is also the method most commonly used in 
developed countries, although even here there has recently been a 
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reawakening to the benefits of more sustainable production methods, such as 
those practised through organic farming.3 
 
Small-scale farmers, traditionally under-valued and often over-looked, especially 
at the national and international level, are now joining forces through civil 
society organisations like La Via Campesina. This international movement 
brings together more than 200 million small and medium-scale farmers, male 
and female, as well as indigenous peoples, agricultural workers, landless people 
and migrants from 70 countries. La Via Campesina was established in 1993 as 
a reaction to the imminent creation of the WTO to enable small-scale farmers to 
defend their interests at the global level. Through this movement they have 
campaigned for a just, democratic and sustainable food system, a concept now 
known as food sovereignty. (WDM, 2012; McKeon, 2013) Since the 1990s La 
Via Campesina has worked hard to gain recognition for its members and their 
concerns. It is now an active participant in international negotiations on the 
issues impacting on food production and food security, in FAO, most notably the 
Committee on World Food Security. This will be discussed in chapter eight.  
 
There are many interconnected challenges facing agriculture; arguably the most 
notable are climate change, the scarcity of water and ownership of land. The 
inequalities within the global system are demonstrated through the different 
                                            
3
 According to the Soil Association’s 2015 Organic Market Report sales of organic products in 
the UK increased by four percent in 2014, even in a market that saw food prices down by 1.9 
percent and food spending down by 1.1 percent. Shoppers spent an extra £1.4 million a week 
on organic products and the organic market exceeded £1.86 billion. (Soil Association, 2015) 
47 
 
ways in which people are affected by all three of these challenges. However, as 
the impacts of climate change extend across the globe more and more people 
will be affected in more complex and increasingly direct ways. There will now be 
a short examination of each of these three areas as it relates to the two main 
types of agricultural production. 
Agriculture and Climate Change 
It is now widely acknowledged that two of the main challenges facing humanity 
in the twenty-first century are food security and climate change. (FAO, 2011d; 
HLPE, 2012; De Schutter, 2014; Beddington, 2009; IAASTD, 2009) As these 
two challenges are interlinked they have to be addressed in a holistic way. In 
recent decades, and even in the last few years, climate change has moved up 
the international agenda. Its multidimensional impacts are being monitored in 
detail by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and it is 
discussed annually at the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was adopted at Rio in 1992. 
These bodies continue to investigate ways in which to mitigate climate change 
as well as find ways in which to adapt to its consequences, which can include 
adverse changes in precipitation, sea level rise and the occurrence of extreme 
climatic events including drought, floods and coastal storms.  
 
The High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE, 2012, 
p.11) argues that climate change will make it more difficult to address the 
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already huge challenges of food insecurity “as it reduces the productivity of the 
majority of existing food systems and harms the livelihoods of those already 
vulnerable to food insecurity.” Climate change impacts on agriculture, a situation 
that will become increasingly apparent, and agriculture, especially industrialised 
production methods, also impacts on climate change. It is part of the problem 
and must therefore form part of the solution. 
 
The drive to increase food production in the second half of the twentieth century 
has created a number of inter-related problems. For example, the ‘green 
revolution’ started in the 1960s was a technological package that “combined the 
use of high-yielding plant varieties with increased irrigation, the mechanisation 
of agricultural production and the use of nitrogen-based fertilizers and 
pesticides.” (De Schutter, 2014) This led to the extension of monocultures, loss 
of biodiversity, accelerated soil erosion, pollution of fresh water supplies and a 
flow of phosphorus into the oceans.  
 
However, despite the negative consequences there are advocates of the Asian 
‘green revolution’. Djurfeldt et al (2005, p2) argue that it has been largely 
successful in famine prevention with a number of previously food-deficit 
countries now exporting. In fact, the authors state that “comparing the first and 
last five-year annual averages during the entire period, 1961-2001, per capita 
output in Asia grew by 24 percent while it decreased by 13 percent in sub-
Saharan Africa.” Nevertheless it has to be noted that the authors then argue that 
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the ‘green revolution’ has been too narrowly defined when it is seen as a 
package of technology, instead they regard it as a “state-driven, market-
mediated and small-farmer based strategy to increase the national self-
sufficiency in food grains.” (Djurfeldt et al, 2005, p3) 
 
The ‘green revolution’ in Asia has tripled food production ensuring hundreds of 
millions are out of hunger, argue Keijiro Otsuka and Kaliappa Kalirajan (2006). 
In addition, the rice-based production and post harvest operations employ 
nearly one billion people in rural areas in developing countries. The authors call 
for a ‘green revolution’ in SSA but recommend taking account of African-specific 
production environments rather than a direct transfer of existing technology. 
 
However, Vandana Shiva (2000) is forthright in her condemnation of the Asian 
‘green revolution’ which she argues reduces the available food for farm-based 
families in developing countries, through the promotion of monocultures and 
loss of diversification. She argues that by having shorter stems the miracle 
varieties produce less straw to feed cattle and to feed back into the soil, creating 
an impoverished growing environment and affecting the farmers’ ability to grow 
other foods, such as beans, legumes, fruits and vegetables.   
 
Nevertheless, industrialised methods have been used as part of the ‘green 
revolution’, as well as in wider agricultural production, and have increased 
agriculture’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions. According to the HLPE 
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(2012) 15 percent of the total human-made greenhouse gas emissions are as a 
direct result of crop and livestock agriculture. This includes direct emissions 
from agriculture, such as methane (CH4) emissions from livestock and flooded 
rice fields, nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions from the use of organic and inorganic 
nitrogen fertilizers and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the loss of soil 
organic carbon. Agriculture is responsible for additional greenhouse gases 
through its contributing factors, including the production and transport of 
fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides and the energy consumed through tillage, 
irrigation, fertilization and harvest, as well as additional emissions associated 
with transportation and refrigeration as food is flown or shipped around the 
world. In addition, if land use change, including deforestation, is taken into 
consideration agriculture contributes a further 15 to 17 percent to the total global 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
The results of these multilayered issues are now being seen across the 
agricultural sector, from individual farms to international systems; the livelihoods 
of those in rural areas are affected directly and urban dwellers indirectly. 
Climate change affects plants, animals and natural systems through changes in 
temperature, rainfall and the impact it has on pests and diseases of crops, 
animals and fish. These changes are creating additional problems for already 
vulnerable people. For example, according to the HLPE (2012, p.12): “Dryland 
agriculture in arid and semi-arid regions, where over 40 percent of the world’s 
population and more than 650 million of the poorest and most food insecure 
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people live, is particularly vulnerable to the risks of climate change and 
variability, drought in particular.” In addition to the challenges posed by irregular 
precipitation, many people live and significant quantities of food is produced in 
low-lying coastal areas where climate change may also be responsible for saline 
intrusion, sea level rise and increased flooding. (HPLE, 2012; FAO, 2011d) 
 
Industrialised agricultural production methods require the use of oil-based 
pesticides and fertilizers and large quantities of water. Both oil and water are in 
increasingly short supply, especially in many vulnerable areas. As temperatures 
rise and more land becomes arid or semi-arid the pressures on land will become 
even more pronounced.  
 
John Beddington (2009) the UK’s chief scientific adviser, argues that because of 
the predicted population increase by as early as 2030 the world will need to 
produce around 50 percent more food and energy, together with a need for 30 
percent more fresh water, whilst mitigating and adapting to climate change; 
combined these drivers will create the ‘perfect storm’. He proposes the use of 
science and technology to meet these increasing demands but acknowledges 
this has to be achieved in a sustainable way. He proposes (2009, p.8) a 
‘greener revolution’ similar to that used in the 1960s but with a focus on 
important areas including: “crop improvement to increase yields and tolerance to 
stresses such as drought”, as well as the introduction of “new pesticides and 
their effective management to avoid resistance problems” and “novel non-
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chemical approaches to crop protection”. He predicts that “techniques and 
technologies from many disciplines, ranging from biotechnology and 
engineering to newer fields such as nanotechnology, will be needed.”  
 
This range of technological solutions is far removed from the agroecological 
solution endorsed by the former special rapporteur, De Schutter; the IAASTD 
team and food sovereignty movements. De Schutter (2014, p.8) calls for a shift 
to agroecological modes of production and argues that “as a way to improve the 
resilience and sustainability of food systems, agroecology is now supported by 
an increasingly broad part of the scientific community.” As part of this scientific 
community De Schutter cites the IAASTD team. In its report, which was based 
on the findings of 400 experts from across the world, the team argues (2009, 
p.67) that: 
better use of local resources in small scale agriculture can 
improve productivity and generate worthwhile innovations 
and agroecological/organic farming can achieve high 
production efficiencies on a per area basis and high 
energy use efficiencies and that on both these criteria they 
may outperform conventional industrial farming. 
The team found that although these types of production may be higher in labour 
intensity and may not offer the same level of economic efficiency across all 
areas, these agroecological forms of production have the “capability of 
producing enough food on a per capita basis to provide between 2,640 to 4,380 
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kilocalories/per person/per day (depending on the model used) to the current 
world population.” (IAASTD, 2009, p.67)  
 
By comparison the team found that industrial models potentially increase 
environmental risks through the promotion of monocultures, which in turn 
reduce biodiversity, ecosystem functions and ecological resilience; as a result 
they not only contribute to climate change but are themselves more vulnerable 
to it. This is in addition to their production of greenhouse gases, excessive 
consumption of energy and water, as well as the wide-spread pollution of fresh 
water. The report argues that “While industrial production systems yield large 
volumes of agricultural commodities with relatively small amounts of labour, they 
are often costly in terms of human health, have additional environmental 
impacts and are frequently inefficient in terms of energy use.” (IAASTD, 2009, 
p.10) 
 
Members of the food sovereignty movement see agroecological production as 
an integral part of food sovereignty as it mainly relies on renewable resources, 
often available to the farmers on their own farms, which removes the necessity 
for external inputs like chemical fertilizers.  This means small-scale farmers are 
more likely to be self-reliant and will not necessarily have to purchase, often 
through credit, expensive oil-based inputs. Agroecological production “involves 
conserving resources and biodiversity by working with local ecosystems and so 
is dependent on the specialist knowledge of small-scale producers. Agroecology 
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not only benefits the environment and makes farming more resilient, but can 
also increase productivity, particularly for small-scale farmers.” (WDM, 2012, 
p.2) 
 
The connections between agriculture and climate change are complex; 
agriculture is a major contributor to climate change and is in turn affected by it. 
Evidence linking industrial agricultural production with all levels of environmental 
damage, from greenhouse gas emissions to wide-scale pollution, has been 
growing for decades and is now irrefutable. All agriculture is now experiencing 
the consequences. Although there is no one size-fits-all solution to these 
complex issues there should be a greater acknowledgment of the role that 
small-scale agroecological production offers.   
Agriculture and Water 
Water scarcity has a direct impact on food production and food security, 
although the quantity and quality of the water available is also directly affected 
by agriculture. There is no doubt that food production, which is now slowing will 
have to improve significantly to feed the predicted increase in population. The 
FAO predicts that by 2050 another one billion tonnes of cereal will be required 
per year, as will 200 million extra tonnes of livestock products. (FAO, 2011d)  
 
All aspects of food production are already coming under increasing strain, most 
notably land and water. Of all the water on the planet only 2.5 percent is fresh 
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water and only 30 percent of this water is available for use as the rest is locked 
in glaciers or permafrost. Of all the water used from rivers, lakes and 
groundwater 68 percent is used for agriculture (ICA, 2012). Irrigated agriculture 
is by far the largest water user globally, with approximately 252 billion cubic 
meters of surface and groundwater withdrawals in 2013. This overuse is a 
concern as groundwater is not renewable in human timescales and climate 
change is adding uncertainty to the availability of water from precipitation. 
(HLPE, 2015)  
 
With water-intensive industrialised methods of agriculture this is now causing 
significant problems with water scarcity increasing. According to FAO (2011d) 
fresh water supplies are under strain and there are deeper structural problems 
in the natural resource base. Issues include: 
 Salinization and pollution of water courses and water bodies;  
 Degradation of water-related ecosystems; 
 Many large rivers’ volumes have dropped dramatically; 
 Some rivers, such as the Huang He, no longer reach the sea all year 
round; 
 Large lakes and inland seas have shrunk; 
 Half the wetlands of Europe and North America no longer exist;   
 Runoff from eroding soils is filling reservoirs, reducing hydropower and 
water supply; 
 Groundwater is being pumped intensively 
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 Aquifers are becoming increasingly polluted and salinized in some 
coastal areas. 
 
FAO (2009, p.5) argues that “large parts of all continents are experiencing high 
rates of ecosystem impairment, particularly reduced soil quality, biodiversity 
loss, and harm to amenity and cultural heritage values.” This of course, also 
impacts directly on food security.  
 
Although all agriculture consumes water industrialised methods not only 
consume more water they also impact negatively on water systems in a myriad 
of other ways too. The IAASTD (2009, p.10) argues that “Runoff and seepage of 
synthetic fertilizers and concentrated sources of livestock waste damage 
aquifers, rivers, lakes, and even oceans – with costly effects on drinking water 
quality, fish habitat, safety of aquatic food and recreational amenities.” Weis 
(2007, p.31) states that the cumulative impact of industrialised farming on water 
is most evident in the ‘dead zone’ of the Gulf of Mexico “where unnatural levels 
of nitrogen and phosphorus, stemming mostly from agricultural run-off in the 
Mississippi river basin, foster the growth of large algal blooms which choke the 
oxygen from (or eutrophy) thousands of square miles of coastal waters and 
make it uninhabitable for aquatic life.”  
 
As the population increases there will have to be a significant increase in the 
amount of food produced; and as more people are lifted from poverty they will 
57 
 
choose to eat meat, which will increase demand for food that is more 
environmentally costly to produce. According to FAO (2009a) by 2050 when the 
population is expected to reach nine billion, annual meat production will have to 
rise by over 200 million tonnes to reach 470 million tonnes. De Schutter (2014, 
p.6) argues that this is unsustainable as “continuing to feed cereals to growing 
numbers of livestock will aggravate poverty and environmental degradation.” 
Weis argues (2007) that dense livestock production is a major consumer and 
polluter of water. More than 3,000 litres of water goes into the production of just 
one kilogram of US beef. This is in addition to the huge amount of manure 
created by agricultural animals, approximately 1.4 billion tonnes each year in the 
US, most of which is concentrated on factory farms and feedlots. Animal 
agriculture has been recognised as the single largest threat to US waters. 
 
Industrial agricultural production methods are having a devastating impact on 
fresh water sources and oceans around the world. These externalities are not 
factored into the end price of the food produced with the final cost being borne 
by those least able to absorb the cost; often the poor and food insecure in 
developing countries. Therefore these issues have so far been ignored by those 
promoting industrial methods. However, the implications are now so serious and 
the impact felt by so many that actions will have to be taken. Sustainable 
agricultural methods will have to become the norm across all sectors if food 
security is to be achieved using only the limited resources available, especially 
water. 
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Agriculture and Land 
Land, like water, is essential for agricultural production. Ownership of land has 
always been a politically sensitive issue (Fraser and Rimas, 2011) but the 
situation has changed rapidly in the last two decades in response to the 
conditions enabled through neoliberal policies, the impact of globalisation and 
the fear of food, water and fuel scarcity. (McMichael, 2013; Murphy, 2013; 
Margulis and Porter, 2013) 
 
The twenty-first century has seen a significant increase in large scale 
investment in land; often there is an international dimension to this new surge of 
land acquisition. The media has labelled these large-scale land deals as ‘land 
grabs’ (Vidal, 2015). Although there is an urgent need for increased investment 
in agriculture the impact of these large deals has so far proved overwhelmingly 
negative. (HLPE, 2011; Murphy, 2013; Chavkin, 2015)  
 
Murphy (2012, p.3) argues that globalisation has played a crucial role with the 
“deregulation of trade and foreign investment laws, which has greatly eased 
cross-border capital flows, relaxed the limits on foreign land ownership and 
opened markets to agricultural imports.” A loss of confidence in the international 
trading system following the food price crisis of 2007-2008 also prompted many 
rich net-food importing countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to invest in 
growing food abroad. These pressures have been compounded by the impact of 
climate change, which is making domestic food supplies less certain. For 
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example, the US lost 40 percent of the acreage planted with maize to drought in 
2012. (Murphy, 2013) 
 
The HLPE (2011) investigated the impacts of large scale investment in land, 
whilst also acknowledging the role played by domestic investment. The 
international dimension is seen as particularly important because of the unequal 
access to resources enjoyed by different actors. The report argues that land is 
increasingly being seen as a global asset to be traded just as any other 
commodity; however land plays a more diverse, complex and important role. It 
provides a livelihood to more than two billion small-scale farmers, many of who 
are poor and food insecure; it provides valuable environmental services and it 
has strong social and cultural attributes. 
 
Despite its importance, including its role in providing a range of global public 
goods, governments in many states are prepared to allow private investors to 
purchase or lease common land. As these land deals are lucrative governments 
have been reluctant to acknowledge the importance of common property and 
local systems of management. In many states the “absence of clear markers in 
many collective lands often results in these areas being classified as 
unproductive or unused (Ethiopia), idle (Tanzania), degraded (Indonesia), or 
wasteland (India) (HLPE, 2011, p29). 
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The scale of these land deals is difficult to determine because there is secrecy 
from both the investors and the host governments about their scale and terms. 
However widely quoted figures assert that between 50 and 80 million hectares 
of land have been the subject of negotiations by international investors; much of 
this land is in developing countries (HLPE, 2011). This land has been acquired 
for a number of reasons from the production of biofuels, for the extractive 
industries, foreign states attempting to assure their own populations’ food 
security, farmers in neighbouring states seeking to expand their own 
enterprises, as well as financial institutions broadening their asset portfolio.  
 
There is also a range of environmental factors driving this increased interest in 
large-scale land investment. Access to water and productive agricultural land is 
behind many of these land deals. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries4 have used their own fossil water resources at an unsustainable rate 
and are still unable to produce enough food to feed their own people. Apart from 
Oman all the GCC countries have renewable water resources of less than 
1,0003/year per capita, the benchmark to identify chronic water scarcity. 
(Ambalam, 2013) Some of the GCC countries have implemented policies to 
preserve their own water reserves whilst securing enough food. For example, 
Saudi Arabia has phased out its domestic wheat production and established 
                                            
4
 The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council include all the states of the Persian Gulf except 
Iraq. Members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. (Global Security.org, 
2016) 
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new agricultural policies focused on preserving domestic water by investing in 
overseas agricultural projects. (Ambalam, 2013) 
 
Land acquisition has also been prompted by drought as people abandon their 
own land and move to compete with farmers in other areas, or even other 
states, as has happened in Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire, Punjab and China, for 
example. (HLPE, 2011) 
 
According to the Land Matrix Portal (2015)5 globally there are approximately 
38,488,648 ha (hectares) of land that have been the subject of concluded 
international land deals; there are approximately 16,845,757 ha that are the 
subject of negotiations for international land deals; and there are approximately 
6,498,829 ha that have been the subject of failed international land deals. This 
means that 78 percent of the proposed land deals (1,053 completed) have 
already been concluded. The top five countries that invest in land in other states 
are the US (8,326,469 ha); Malaysia (3,334,509 ha); Singapore (2,932,018 ha); 
Arab Emirates (2,999,749); and the UK (2,411,279).  
 
Some of the investments are made along former colonial lines, such as those 
made by the UK, with the majority of investments made in Western and Eastern 
Africa and South East Asia. Malaysia as the second largest investor in land 
                                            
5
 These figures were accessed on 12 September 2015. The figures are constantly being 
updated. The Land Matrix is “a global and independent land monitoring initiative that promotes 
transparency and accountability” (Land Matrix Portal, 2015)  
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outside its borders also had some investment by foreign interests within its 
borders, although to a lesser degree. Singapore, as the third largest investor, 
has significant interests in Central Africa with 1,498,348 ha the subject of just 
four land deals. India, Saudi Arabia and China all feature in the top ten of 
international investors. The top five countries that have international investors 
negotiating land deals in their countries are South Sudan (4,091,453 ha); Papua 
New Guinea (3,719,991 ha); Indonesia (3,603,248 ha); Democratic Republic of 
Congo (2,761,221 ha) and Congo (2,178,000 ha).  
 
Many of the countries targeted by investors are themselves food insecure with 
weak and/or corrupt governments. This power imbalance is exacerbated by the 
distortions in the international legal systems which are characterised by a “lack 
of investment law in the recipient countries, leaving the affected communities at 
a severe disadvantage in the contract negotiations” (Murphy, 2013, p.4). 
McMichael (2013, p.55) also highlights this imbalance which he argues has 
been promoted through the implementation of a new parallel infrastructure of 
private and voluntary rules that has in turn been “enabled by international legal 
protections that have deepened during the era of political-economic 
liberalisation.” He argues that in contrast “international conventions regarding 
land rights for indigenous peoples and communities are considerably weaker 
than investment law.” (McMichael, 2013, p.55) States are more vulnerable as 
their public capacity has been dismantled over several decades through the 
implementation of SAPs and other mechanisms of neoliberalism, as well as a 
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decrease in investment. This saw public expenditure on agriculture in 
developing countries fall by 50 percent from US$ 7.6 billion to just US$ 3.9 
billion between 1980 and 2006. (McMichael, 2013) 
 
Although attaining food security of domestic populations is one reason for land 
acquisition it is not the only reason, and in many cases not even the primary 
reason. The Land Matrix has also gathered information on the intended use for 
the land acquired for 77 percent of the overall deals, for approximately 
29,839,438 ha globally. Of this 77 percent only ten percent has been acquired to 
produce food; 32 percent will be used for non-food crops; 18 percent for flex 
crops6; and 40 percent for multiple-use crops, with several crops in different 
categories. This pattern across the world means that only 13 percent of the land 
will be dedicated to growing food crops in Africa; in America 18 percent; in Asia 
only four percent; Europe seven percent and Oceania only three percent. (Land 
Matrix Portal, 2015) Non-food crops and flex crops include the production of 
biofuels, which is a significant factor in eroding food production; however an 
investigation into biofuels is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Taking agricultural land out of food production is having serious consequences 
for those who have been displaced. Many projects supported financially by the 
World Bank are aimed at boosting electricity and water supplies and expanding 
                                            
6
 Flex crops have multiple and flexible uses across food, feed and fuel complexes and industrial 
commodities. For example corn can be eaten fresh, frozen or tinned; used to produce industrial 
sweeteners, processed into animal feed or milled to produce ethanol for fuel for vehicles. The 
most popular flex crops are maize, oil palm, soybean and sugarcane. (Borras, 2013)  
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transport networks in some of the world’s poorest countries. Despite having 
guidelines on land grabs in place an investigation has found that the bank is 
repeatedly violating its own policies by funding projects that have resulted in 
nearly 3.4 million slum-dwellers, farmers and villagers losing their land or having 
their livelihoods damaged in the last decade. For example, 1.2 million people 
were displaced economically or physically in Vietnam by projects to build dams 
and power plants funded by the World Bank. One million people in China have 
also been displaced by projects totalling about US$ 12 billion investment. In 
fact, the World Bank is funding more and more projects that require forced 
resettlement with only eight percent in 1993; a figure that had risen to 29 
percent by 2009. (Chavkin and Anderson, 2015) 
 
The issue of land tenure illustrates the tension between industrial agricultural 
production and small-scale methods most keenly. There are approximately 450 
million small-scale farmers worldwide who provide livelihoods for around two 
billion people. However, these small-scale producers, or smallholders, are 
politically weak and often ignored. The HLPE (2011, p.33) argues that “Most of 
the discussion about ‘modernising’ agriculture and encouraging international 
investment takes place in UN, G20 and World Bank circles, but not in the 
countries most concerned, nor with the people most affected.”  
 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the World Bank’s position on issues 
surrounding communal land has changed over the years, placing greater 
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emphasis on the rights of small-scale producers (World Bank, 1975; Deininger 
and Binswanger, 1999; Deininger, 2003). Reviewing the evolution of the World 
Bank’s land policy, from the mid-1970s to the turn of the century, Deininger and 
Binswanger (1999), found that although the three guiding principles: the 
desirability of owner-operated family farms, the need for markets to permit land 
to be transferred to more productive users and the importance of egalitarian 
asset distribution, had remained the same the World Bank now recognises the 
potential benefits of communal tenure systems, which could, in fact, be more 
cost-effective than formal titles. For example, communal land will not incur costs 
associated with protecting individual plots but will instead offer benefits such as 
the provision of public goods or advantages “in synergies that would be difficult 
to provide under individual cultivation, including risk reduction through 
diversification.” (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999, p.258) In addition, by the late 
1990s the World Bank recommended that titling programmes should be judged 
on their equity as well as their efficiency and the potential for land rental markets 
was also seen in more favourable terms.  
 
Despite the potential benefits of communal land tenure securing the land rights 
for communities can be complex and effective land governance, although 
desirable, may be difficult to achieve (Lavigne Delville, 2010; Deininger et al, 
2010). Through an analysis of the impact of Rural Land Maps in West Africa 
Philippe Lavigne Delville found that small elites were protected by the law and 
administration, whereas the vast majority of the population was not; this was 
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evident in the lack of land rights held by small-scale producers. However, 
despite the challenges presented by the complexity of registering communal 
land, there were benefits such as the avoidance of conflict, with a fairer balance 
between poor farmers and urban buyers; positive impacts on productivity and as 
a basis for fiscal revenue for local governments. He argues there needs to be a 
change “from a dual, exclusive legal framework to a plural, inclusive one, built 
on an articulated diversity of legal statuses” (Lavigne Delville, 2010, p66). 
 
In the World Bank report on land rights focused on recognition, administration 
and governance Deininger et al (2010) examine the multifaceted nature of land 
ownership. With a focus on land governance and the MDGs Deininger and 
Enemark (2010, p22) recognise the importance of good land governance for 
achieving sustainable development and the MDGs and argue that land policies 
should be implemented that reflect the needs of the society. They state that the 
formalised Western land registration systems “cannot adequately provide 
security of tenure to the vast majority of the world’s low income groups or deal 
quickly enough with the scale of urban problems.” Instead, in countries where 
tenures are predominantly social rather than legal, a new innovative approach 
maybe more applicable. They cite (2010, p22) the example of a system that 
uses a  
continuum of land rights (including piecemeal tenure, 
customary, occupancy, adverse possession, group tenure, 
leases, freehold) where the range of possible forms of 
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tenure is considered as a continuum from informal towards 
more formal land rights and where each step in the 
process of tenure can be formalised. 
Arguably by granting small-holder farmers land tenure, through whatever 
approach, they will be in a more secure position, which will have a positive 
impact on their ability to produce food. Good land governance is a critical 
precondition for sustainable economic development. Secure land rights provide 
a more secure environment to enable longer term investments, as well as the 
transfer of land through rental and sales, which in turn promotes better use of 
land and facilitates entrepreneurs.  
 
However, despite the growing consensus on the need for legal protection for 
small-scale producers not everyone is in agreement. Paul Collier (2008) in 
response to the food price crisis of 2007-08 calls for fewer peasants and more 
commercial farming, based on scientific advancements, including genetically 
modified foods. He berates the middle and upper classes for their “love affair 
with peasant agriculture”, in which “peasants, like pandas, are to be preserved” 
despite the fact “their mode of production is ill suited to modern agricultural 
production, in which scale is helpful.”  
 
This perspective is countered by the evidence, as revealed by the HLPE (2013) 
in its analysis of smallholder agriculture. The report’s dataset covered two thirds 
of the world’s population and 38 percent of the agricultural area, including 
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China. It found that the total number of smallholdings in the developing 
countries was approximately 500 million units. “China has close to 200 million 
smallholdings; they cover only ten percent of the agricultural land that is globally 
available and they produce 20 percent of all food in the world.” The HLPE 
(2013, p12) argues that: “This is an important indication of the productivity that 
can be achieved in smallholder agriculture relative to larger farms.” 
 
As previously discussed, the livelihoods of small-scale producers, especially 
those farming on communal land, are often threatened by the selling of large 
tracts of land. David Nally (2013) argues that these land grabs differ from 
‘ordinary’ land acquisitions in five ways.7 Additionally the food security discourse 
is being used to justify these land grabs, argues Nally, who cites the continuing 
calls to close the yield gaps by increasing production on ‘unutilised’ land in 
developing countries, especially in Africa. He challenges the focus on industrial 
agriculture as put forward by the multinational seed and fertilizer companies.  
 
Even with this limited examination of the issues it is evident there are 
disagreements on the best ways in which food should be produced. However 
there is an increasing body of evidence illustrating the damage caused by 
industrial agricultural production methods to the environment, water sources and 
                                            
7
 Land grabs do not entail the ‘free prior and informed consent’ of the dispossessed; investors 
seldom conduct impact assessments of the possible social, economic and environmental 
consequences; the contracts are either vague or non-binding; land deals often go hand in hand 
with human rights violations and most deals are secured without democratic participation or 
independent oversight. (Nally, 2013) 
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local populations. Agroecological farming, given the right support, can be highly 
productive. A study of agroecological farming covering 287 projects in 57 
countries found that yields increased by an average of 70 percent compared 
with conventional production methods. Currently 70 percent of the world’s 
population are fed without reliance on industrial food production, which 
demonstrates the method’s ability to help feed the world (WDM, 2012).  
The Food Price Crisis 
The Food Price Crisis of 2007-2008 and the additional price spikes of 2010-
2011 brought the challenges facing the global food system to the world’s 
attention as commodity prices more than doubled, the number of hungry 
reached over one billion and violent protests broke out in countries around the 
globe. For the poorest, those living on less than a dollar a day and who already 
spent 80 percent of their income on food, the doubling of food prices caused 
even greater suffering as they faced hunger and malnutrition. (FAO, 2009a; 
Mittal, 2009; Rogers, 2008b; ESA, 2011; Wise and Murphy, 2012; Oxfam, 2010)  
 
The increase in prices was sudden and significant: in the three years from 2005 
to 2008 food prices increased 75 percent, with nearly every commodity affected. 
The prices of wheat, butter and milk had tripled from 2000 prices, and the prices 
of maize, rice and poultry nearly doubled. In fact, the food price index rose by 
nearly 40 percent in just 2007. (IFPRI, 2008) At the World Food Summit (2009b, 
p.1) member states recognised the situation as “an unacceptable blight on the 
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lives, livelihoods and dignity of one-sixth of the world’s population.” However, 
with the arrival of the global financial crisis attention soon turned to other 
matters and the hungry were all but forgotten by world leaders and the general 
public. 
 
From 2010 to 2011 there was a second price spike, which drove the global food 
import bill for 2011 to US$ 1.3 trillion. (Wise and Murphy, 2012) Although food 
prices have fallen from their peak it is expected that they will remain significantly 
higher than pre-crisis levels for years to come as agricultural production is 
placed under increasing strain. Projections for future food prices have 
demonstrated that if governments take a business-as-usual stance to climate 
change and many of the other challenges facing the food system that world 
cereal prices will rise by 30 to 40 percent and meat prices will rise by 20 to 30 
percent by 2050. (IFPRI, 2008) 
 
There were a number of reasons for the sudden and significant increases in 
food prices. Some changes in the global situation were recent, such as the 
pressure on land use with the introduction of biofuel production. Subsidies in the 
EU and US had made the growing of crops for biofuel increasingly attractive to 
farmers. For example, by 2008 the US government was providing US$ 7 billion 
a year in federal subsidies to its farmers for growing crops for fuel (Rogers, 
2008b). Biofuels were not only grown on land previously used for food 
production but they also “tightened the correlation between oil and agricultural 
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commodity prices creating new pricing signals that have little to do with food 
security or demand for food.” (Murphy, 2013, p.7) This increased price volatility 
and created a less stable distribution system, especially for food imports into 
poor net-food importing countries.  
 
High oil prices, which by February 2008 were up by 19 percent at an all-time 
high of US$ 100 a barrel, increased the cost of oil-based inputs, such as 
fertilizers and fuel used in industrial agricultural production methods. This had a 
significant impact on US production prices and therefore the export prices of US 
commodities, which rose by 15 to 20 percent between 2002 and 2007 (Mittal, 
2009). High oil prices also made the diversion of agricultural land to fuel 
production even more attractive. In 2007 the US produced a record maize 
harvest but one third of this went to produce ethanol. Globally this had serious 
implications, especially for the poorest and most food insecure. Staple grains 
such as maize and rice are the main food source for people in low-income 
countries. For example in low-income countries in Asia they account for 63 
percent of the calories consumed and 50 percent in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
production of biofuels demonstrates the power imbalance in the food system. As 
IFPRI (2008, p.5) argues “450 pounds of maize can be converted into enough 
ethanol to fill the 25-gallon tank of an SUV with pure ethanol one time – or used 
to provide enough calories to feed one person for a year.” In fact, the quantity of 
cereals diverted to biofuels is equivalent to the annual cereal consumption of 
about 800 million people. (Jarvis, 2009) 
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Nevertheless, many developing countries are implementing pro-biofuel national 
strategies to improve their own energy security and to increase their exports, 
among them Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. Many have joined the Pan-African Non-Petroleum Producers 
Association. Molony and Smith (2010), through an investigation into the likely 
impact of biofuel production on local food security, have found there are many 
different approaches. For example, political unrest has followed an agreement 
between the government in Madagascar and Daewoo Logistics of South Korea, 
which has agreed to lease 1.3 million ha of land. Approximately the size of 
Belgium, the land will be used to produce maize and palm oil. However, in 
Mozambique the government has partnered with a research institute and a 
private company in an initiative to boost the livelihoods of 5,000 smallholders, 
whilst producing 100,000 litres of sorghum ethanol annually. Molony and Smith 
(2010, p.494) argue that if developed properly the “cultivation of biofuels may be 
instrumental in long-term poverty reduction in developing countries that have a 
high dependence on agricultural commodities, with benefits in the form of 
employment, skills development and the nurturing of secondary industries.” 
However, to ensure this happens there will need to be “strong and thoughtful 
state regulation if biofuels are truly to be pro-poor.” (Molony and Smith, 2010, 
p.495) The authors predict that without strong leadership the temptation to scale 
up production to maximise profits will soon displace any meaningful pro-poor 
initiatives. 
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Additional strain has been placed on the food system with increased demand for 
high-value products like meat, dairy, fish, fruits and vegetables in the new 
middle classes in the emerging economies, most notably China and India. 
(IFPRI, 2008; Beddington, 2009) However, Mittal (2009) disputes this claim 
arguing that although there has been some increase in demand for high-value 
products in China and India this has been met by an increase in domestic 
production and has therefore not had a significant impact on the global situation. 
 
Climate change also continued to play a part with the world’s largest wheat 
producer, Australia, caught in the worst drought for a century, which lasted for 
six years and reduced the country’s rice crop by 98 percent. Agricultural 
production was also reduced by other extreme weather conditions, such as 
floods in West Africa and Mozambique, and adverse conditions in Northern 
Europe, the Russian Federation and Ukraine in 2007. (IFPRI, 2008; Beddington, 
2009; Mittal, 2009)  
 
Combined with these poor harvests the world’s grain stocks had reached the 
lowest levels for decades with the US wheat stocks at their lowest for sixty 
years. Mittal (2009) argued that the private sector and IFIs viewed public stocks 
as costly and inefficient; there was a rise in the ‘just-in-time’ style of 
management of inventory and market liberalisation had created a general 
perception that individual countries did not need to hold public grain reserves as 
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the market would provide if necessary. This proved incorrect; instead 
speculation drove hyperinflation with greater participation of hedge funds, index 
funds and sovereign wealth funds, especially after the sub-prime problems in 
the US market. Fund money invested in commodity indexes climbed from US$ 
13 billion in 2003 to US$ 260 billion in 2008. This level of interest in the 
deregulated market created extreme volatility with wheat prices rising by 46 
percent between January 10 and February 26 in 2008; in just seven weeks. 
(Mittal, 2009)  
 
There were some who benefited from the food price crisis. With the 
concentration of ownership of the agri-businesses those few large multinational 
corporations that remained dominated marketing, production and agricultural 
inputs, and continue to do so. For example, “Monsanto’s net income more than 
doubled from US$ 543 million to US$ 1.12 billion in the three months up to the 
end of February 2008, compared to the same period in 2007, as its profits 
increased from US$ 1.44 billion to US$ 2.22 billion.” (UN, 2011, p.69) In the 
same period Cargill’s net earnings also soared by 86 percent to US$ 1.030 
billion; Archer Daniels Midland increased its net earnings by 42 percent and 
Mosaic Company, one of the world’s largest fertilizer companies, enjoyed a 12-
fold increase in its income. (UN, 2011) Although the relationship between these 
agri-businesses, industrial agricultural production methods and the overall 
impact on world food security is an area worthy of further investigation it is 
nevertheless beyond the remit of this thesis. 
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The problems associated with extreme price volatility were exacerbated by 
export restrictions imposed by a number of countries, including those in the 
Russian Federation, as panic spread. Murphy (2013, pp.6-7) argues that the 
crisis “marked a watershed in our understanding of the world’s food systems” 
and highlighted the flaws inherent in relying on the open markets to ensure food 
security. In fact the open market imperfectly regulated and with its inherent 
power imbalances, was part of the problem. She argues (2013, p.6-7) the  
panic was largely misplaced, exacerbated by the failings of 
the WTO’s trade rules, which had successfully reined in 
import tariffs but failed to discipline export taxes, allowing 
food exporting countries to restrict or even ban exports just 
when food markets were short on supply. 
 
The new challenges of biofuel production and increased demand for high-value 
foodstuffs were added to the inter-connected and multi-layered stresses already 
apparent in the food system through market liberalisation, climate change, water 
scarcity and pressure on land, as previously discussed. Mittal (2009) argues 
that although most attention has been focused on the role of higher energy 
costs, the decline in the growth of agricultural production and the increased 
demand from emerging economies there also has to be an evaluation of the 
structural causes of the crisis, including the decline in investment in agricultural 
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productivity, the states’ reduced role in agriculture and the indiscriminate 
opening of agricultural markets.  
 
The food price crisis brought the challenges faced by millions of people to the 
top of the political agenda, at least for a short time. With over one billion people 
hungry and social unrest in dozens of countries political leaders were forced to 
listen. (FAO, 2009a; Mittal, 2009; Rogers, 2008b; ESA, 2011; Wise and Murphy, 
2012; Oxfam, 2010) However, the financial crisis has since taken precedence, 
especially in developed countries, but many of the problems remain. 
 
Increased biofuel production actively promoted through government subsidies 
(Rogers, 2008b; Murphy, 2013) along with damaging price volatility driven by 
fund managers who took advantage of the deregulated markets were two new 
and interlinked challenges that had a significant impact on an already struggling 
and unbalanced food system. (Weis, 2007; De Schutter, 2014) These additional 
challenges exacerbated the problems of climate change, water scarcity and 
competition for land; problems that were aggravated by industrial agricultural 
productions methods. (ICA, 2012; HLPE, 2015; FAO, 2011d; FAO, 2009; Weis, 
2007) In addition, the systemic decline in agricultural investment, which reduced 
the resilience of small-scale farmers, and the low cereal stocks that removed the 
safety net that should have protected the poor, were both as a direct result of 
neoliberal policies that had been implemented for decades. (De Schutter, 2014; 
Mittal, 2009) 
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Conclusion 
Food is essential for life; it is vital to human health and is not a discretionary 
commodity. Furthermore the right to food is a human right that is enshrined in 
international law. (United Nations, 1948) Therefore food production should be 
given high priority at all levels, local, national and international. In addition, it 
also plays a significant role in the provision of a number of GPGs. However, not 
all types of agriculture provide the same level of GPGs. In fact industrialised 
methods, not only fail to provide many GPGs but they are also directly 
responsible for a wide range of public bads, from greenhouse gas emissions to 
extensive pollution, which have significant negative impacts. (IAASTD, 2009; 
Weis, 2007; HLPE, 2015) These externalities are not reflected in the monetary 
cost of production but instead borne by others, often those least able to bear the 
additional cost. (Weis, 2007) Moreover, industrial agriculture does not provide 
the level or breadth of GPGs that sustainable agricultural methods, such as 
agroecology, have the capacity to provide, including social cohesion and rural 
development. (Wanki, 2011; Elliot, 2014; WDM, 2012; IAASTD, 2009; HLPE, 
2013) 
 
Industrial agriculture creates a wide range of problems especially in relation to 
climate change (De Schutter, 2014; HLPE, 2012) through its emissions, reliance 
on mechanisation and oil-based inputs; water scarcity through its over-
consumption and pollution of freshwater and oceans, as well as its intensive use 
of land, promotion of monocultures and degradation of biodiversity. (IAASTD, 
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2009; ICA, 2012; HLPE, 2015; FAO, 2009; Weis, 2007) These problems are 
exacerbated by the inclusion of agriculture in the world trading system (Clapp, 
2006), which is presented as free trade, but which is in actual fact an 
unbalanced system (Weis, 2007; De Schutter, 2014; Tansey and Rajotte, 2005) 
that benefits developed countries at the expense of developing countries and 
the world’s poorest people.   
 
Industrial agriculture has been promoted as part of the neoliberal agenda (Weis, 
2007) for decades, being manifested in many different ways in different 
locations, through increased mechanisation, especially in developed countries; 
through the ‘green revolution’ in Asia; and through the removal of state support 
for agriculture, most notably in developing countries. (De Schutter, 2014) Profit 
is paramount with economies of scale and a distorted system of state subsidies 
for industrial methods giving unfair advantages to such methods. The 
introduction of subsidies for biofuel production and the deregulation of the 
financial markets that create opportunities for highly damaging price volatility 
exacerbate the existing situation. (Murphy, 2012, 2013; HLPE, 2011; 
McMichael, 2013; Land Matrix Portal, 2015; Mittal, 2009; IFPRI, 2008; Rogers, 
2008b)  
 
There is a growing consensus that recognises the challenges facing the world in 
relation to food production and the problems inherent in the present system, 
which fails to provide food security whilst at the same time adding to the 
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deteriorating global situation. (Oxfam, 2010; WDM, 2012; Wise and Murphy, 
2012) Within this group, which includes the special rapporteur on the right to 
food, different organisations within the UN system such as FAO, and the 
millions of farmers in La Via Campesina movement, there is recognition that the 
planet cannot sustain a business-as-usual approach. (De Schutter, 2014; FAO, 
2011d; WDM, 2012; McKeon, 2013) This approach is not working now and it will 
continue to fail in the future.  
 
There needs to be a move away from the market-based neoliberal agenda 
focussed primarily on profit and instead put in place a system that recognises 
the vital role that agriculture plays in the provision of food and also a wide range 
of GPGs. Agriculture is part of the problem; it has to be part of the solution. 
 
The next chapter will examine the role of international organisations in the 
provision of global public goods. In later chapters the role of FAO in the 
provision of these goods will be examined in relation to its ability to help create a 
food secure world. 
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Chapter Two: 
International Organisations and the 
Provision of Global Public Goods 
Introduction 
The provision of public goods, traditionally recognised as non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous, has always been difficult to achieve, and increasingly so with the 
shift in mainstream political ideology from the presumption of state provision of 
goods and services, most notably in the European setting, to the increased 
privatisation of their provision. The end of the Cold War and subsequent 
dismantling of much of the former soviet state infrastructure as well as the rise 
of neoliberalism accelerated this move towards privatisation. However, despite 
this political shift there have been efforts made to extend the concept of public 
goods into the global sphere with the examination of the role of international 
organisations in delivering public goods, such as control over epidemics and 
global warming, which are beyond the capabilities and borders of states. But as 
the individual state comes under political and financial pressure in its attempts 
to provide public goods so do the international organisations, which in reality 
have relatively fewer resources and less legitimacy in the still state-centric 
global system, even taking into consideration the impact of globalisation on 
state sovereignty.  
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As societies have evolved so has the provision of public goods to the general 
populace, from the foundation and maintenance of hospitals, poor houses and 
sanitation systems in the Middle Ages to the fully-functioning societal structures 
now seen in many parts of the world in the twenty-first century. The earliest 
forms of public goods were not necessarily delivered by the state, however, but 
rather through voluntary or private actions, many through the church, and not 
always for purely altruistic intentions but often in an attempt to stop the spread 
of disease or to prevent civil unrest. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution 
in Britain and the political revolutions in France and the US the role of the state 
changed considerably as did the composition of society as a whole; mass 
urbanisation in industrial towns helped to create the notion of the citizen, with 
political power, whose approval was required by the state for legitimacy (Desai, 
2002).  
 
This chapter will examine public goods theory, from its inception with the work of 
Samuelson to its extension into the global sphere as championed by Kaul and 
her colleagues. The criteria first established by Samuelson have been adapted 
to suit the global setting but there are many that challenge this development 
arguing that the complexity of the international arena is not conducive to the 
provision of Global Public Goods (GPGs). The different aspects of GPGs 
including the problem of free riding and the balance between public and private 
will be discussed as well as a number of issues associated with their provision 
such as state sovereignty, the weakest link, aggregate efforts, externalities and 
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the principle of additionality. Food security and the Millennium Development 
Goals are examined for their suitability as examples of GPGs. Finally 
international organisations, from their early incarnations to the creation of the 
UN and now their role in the ever changing international arena in the twenty-first 
century will then be examined.  
Public Goods Theory 
It wasn’t until the mid twentieth century that Paul Samuelson (1954) provided 
the analytical foundation for public goods. By concentrating his attention on the 
theory of optimal public expenditure he assumed the existence of two categories 
of goods; private consumption goods, “which can be parcelled out among 
different individuals”, and collective consumption goods, “which all enjoy in 
common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a good leads 
to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good” 
(Samuelson, 1954, p.387).  
 
Samuelson’s ‘private consumption goods’ and ‘collective consumption goods’ 
are now more simply defined as ‘private goods’ and ‘public goods’ as part of 
public goods theory. Two core principles of public goods; non-excludability and 
non-rivalry in their consumption, have remained central to the debate, defined 
by Severine Deneulin and Nicholas Townsend (2007, p.20) as “a good is non-
excludable if a person’s consumption of it cannot practically be excluded” and a 
good “is non-rival if a person’s consumption does not reduce the benefits of 
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someone else’s consumption of the good”. The lighthouse is an example often 
cited as a pure public good, as it fulfils both principles. Once in place, a 
lighthouse will provide guidance to all seafarers within its geographical scope 
and its functionality will not diminish with the number of seafarers benefiting 
from its light. These benefits can be enjoyed by all regardless of the individual’s 
contribution to their provision. Street lighting, traffic control systems and national 
security are all also seen as pure public goods. 
 
Fulfilling these two core principles is not straightforward, a fact which limits the 
number of goods that are in fact pure public goods, many are seen as impure. 
James M. Buchanan examines what he termed the ‘awesome Samuelson gap’ 
between the private and the public, as originally defined by Samuelson. In 
Buchanan’s (1965, p.2) ‘theory of clubs’ he examines the best way to determine 
the “size of the most desirable cost and consumption sharing arrangement” in 
situations in which exclusion is possible. He argues that this can, in theory, be 
relevant in most cases, and therefore most public goods are in fact club goods, 
those that are excludable but non-rivalrous, rather than situated at one polar 
extreme of the spectrum or the other. The balance between private and public is 
the reoccurring central theme in public goods theory.  
 
Health services are an impure public good as only a finite number of people can 
use the services at any one time, with resources stretched if the optimum 
number is exceeded. In this respect health services are not non-rivalrous, in 
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other words rivalrous. However, the provision of health services delivered 
through Britain’s National Health Service, as initially conceived in the 1940s, 
was idealistically non-excludable, as everyone was entitled to use the service 
regardless of their contribution to its provision, even if in reality they could have 
been prevented access. Arguably the NHS in this original form was a common 
good as it was established as non-excludable but by its nature was rivalrous. 
Since its creation the provision of health services through the NHS has altered 
immeasurably under successive British governments. Its provision, by public 
and now private actors, the way in which the service is funded and the way in 
which it can be accessed and by whom, have all changed in recent years (BBC, 
2013). The NHS continues to be central to most public and political debates 
concerning the provision of public goods in the UK. 
The Problem of Free Riding  
If an individual may benefit from a good even if they have not contributed to its 
provision it is argued that the incentive to provide for it is absent. This is one of 
the issues arising from the principle of non-excludability and which creates 
challenges for the provision of public goods, most notably the good being under-
produced, over-used or degraded. Peter Drahos (2005) argues that there are a 
number of dilemmas and each requires a different regulatory approach. Game 
theory forms part of the reasoning behind the self interested preferences, in 
which individuals have to choose between social cooperation and self interest. 
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For instance, as seen in the prisoner’s dilemma, if the individual selects self 
interest it prevents the possibility of cooperating for better gains for all.  
 
In the public goods dilemma, also known as the free-rider problem, an individual 
will gain more by not contributing to the good as they will be able to access it 
anyway, as by its nature it is difficult to exclude anyone. The commons dilemma 
creates a situation in which individuals gain by taking from the commons and 
not contributing to its provision, and in doing so the commons, for example 
forests or fisheries, are depleted or destroyed impacting negatively on everyone. 
The intellectual commons is similar to the commons dilemma but it is the 
exclusion from use that creates the gain for a small number of individuals and 
leads to the underuse of the good.  
 
All these dilemmas pose different regulatory challenges in terms of 
effectiveness and responsiveness, for example the standard solution for 
problems in the physical commons is to grant private property rights. However 
Drahos (2005) argues that by using property rights to regulate the intellectual 
commons, as increasingly seen through the use of intellectual property rights
8
, 
there will be considerable resistance to exclusion from this knowledge. 
                                            
8
 As enshrined in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 
5, 1994, in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation 
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The use of coercion to prevent free riding 
As there is a presumption to take but not contribute there will be at the very 
least an under-provision of the public good, unless there is in place a form of 
coercion. The prevention of free-riding “creates the need for a public authority 
and legitimises coercion, most notably taxation, to finance the production of the 
good” (Coussy, 2005, p.182). Mancur Olson (1971a) examined the common 
assumption held by many economists in the post-war era, ranging from Marxist 
theories of class action to US research on pressure groups, that groups of 
individuals with common interests will act on behalf of their common interests in 
a similar fashion as individuals will to secure their own personal interests. 
Instead, Olson (1971a, p.2, author’s emphasis) argues that “unless there is 
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common 
or group interests.” Olson argues that even if there is unanimous agreement 
within the group about the need for the provision of a common good and even 
the methods of how to achieve it individuals will still not voluntarily contribute to 
its provision. 
 
Taking Olson as their starting point Bruce Russett and John Sullivan (1971) 
examine the conditions for the achievement of public goods, in their terms 
collective goods, in ten propositions ranging from coercion, “in which members 
delegate to some authority the right to coerce them, freely accepting the 
coercion on the condition that it be applied equally to all members” (p.850) to a 
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strand of political integration theory in which individuals, because they include 
the interests of others in their own self image, will willing make sacrifices for the 
greater good. One of the best examples of this selfless behaviour can be seen 
exhibited by family members, especially parents.  
Public Goods and Global Public Goods 
Russett and Sullivan (1971) extend their theory to examine the potential for the 
provision of public goods at an international level, known as international or 
transnational public goods, or the term to be used here, Global Public Goods 
(GPGs). At this level GPGs are non-excludable, non-rivalrous and operate 
across national boundaries, across regions and in some instances, globally. 
These goods are assumed to have a positive impact. However there is a range 
of goods, which are arguably consequences of certain detrimental actions, such 
as food production by industrial methods, which produce global public bads. 
These have a negative impact that can also be felt across national borders and 
in some cases globally, for example the impact of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
The role of international organisations is central to this line of enquiry, as Olson 
(1971b) recognises in his response to their article. Russett and Sullivan explore 
the different levels of coercion available to international organisations operating 
within the international realm and the impact that this has on their ability to 
deliver the public goods under their remit. With fewer coercive powers an 
organisation is likely to achieve less, however coercion may not be possible or 
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desirable and so more non-coercive methods need to be employed. Strong 
leadership at the level of the state and at the head of international organisations 
is required to help deliver public goods. 
 
Work by Inge Kaul and her associates at the United Nations Development 
Programme (1999, 2002a, 2005, 2006) has been instrumental in expanding the 
theory of public goods into the international realm. According to Kaul et al 
(2002a, p.61) a public good becomes global “if its benefits (or costs) cut across 
countries in several regions and across current and future generations, and do 
not discriminate against any population”. They argue that the privateness and 
publicness of goods are social constructs and in light of this propose “an 
expanded two-tier definition of public goods that distinguishes between a good’s 
potential for publicness and its being de facto non-exclusive and available for all 
people to consume” (Kaul et al, 2002a, p.61). And they offer a new tool to 
analyse public goods, the ‘triangle of publicness’, which incorporates the 
publicness in consumption, to determine whether the good is consumed by all; 
the publicness in net benefits, to determine if the net benefits are equitably 
distributed and the publicness of decision-making, to ascertain who decides to 
place the good in the public domain. 
 
Despite the attempts by Kaul et al to justify the different levels of publicness 
David Long and Frances Woolley (2009, p.108) are not convinced by the 
argument. They maintain that “the attempted manipulation of the concept 
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ignores its fundamental incoherence, its mixing together of the distinct concepts 
of nonrivalness and nonexcludability.” Instead the authors suggest the concept 
of GPGs would be better understood as a rhetorical device rather than an 
analytical tool. Time would be better spent using the theory of externalities and 
by advancing “the specific analysis of nonexcludable and nonrival goods in the 
international system without the distraction of the rhetorically attractive, but 
practically marginal, example of global public goods.” (Long and Woolley, 2009, 
p.119) 
A wider remit for Global Public Goods 
Nonetheless work has continued to ascertain the usefulness of the GPG 
concept. In addition to the work completed by Kaul at the UNDP and in 
response to concerns for the environment, security, health and governance, 
France and Sweden, with financial assistance from Germany, the UK and 
Norway, established and funded the International Task Force on Global Public 
Goods, which delivered its report in 2006.  
 
The task force identified five priority GPGs; preventing the emergence and 
spread of communicable diseases, tackling climate change, enhancing 
international financial stability, strengthening the international trading system 
and achieving peace and security, which it argued underlies and is essential to 
all the others. In addition, it examined the cross cutting issue of knowledge.  
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All these issues, even taken individually, are complex and challenging. 
Nonetheless the task force called for the creation of a Global 25 forum, of heads 
of state and government from developed and developing states, to show 
catalytic leadership. However, without such a forum, which has not to date been 
established, it was recognised that “it will be extremely hard to achieve the 
reforms to international policies, institutions and financing necessary to achieve 
common goals.” (International Task Force on Global Public Goods, 2006b, p.14)  
Intergenerational dimension of Global Public Goods 
It may be difficult to argue for the financing of GPGs if they are seen as 
benefiting people in other parts of the world, especially for democratically 
elected politicians concerned with short-term electoral gains at home. Therefore 
the case to be made for funds to provide GPGs to support generations yet to be 
born is even more problematic. Yet, this is the argument put forward by Todd 
Sandler (1999, 2001, 2009) as he examines the provision of transnational 
intergenerational public goods (TIPGs). In relation to climate change 
negotiations he argues that there has been a lack of progress because “action 
taken and paid for today is unlikely to have a noticeable consequence until 
many decades into the future. Most policymakers are not sufficiently farsighted 
or altruistic towards future generations to worry about the long run.” (Sandler, 
2001, p.16)  
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Actions taken through treaties or other collective action mechanisms can 
generate benefits into the distant future (Sandler, 2009). This is relevant in a 
range of areas, including climate change negotiations and also in preserving 
natural habitats and cultures, accumulating knowledge and eradicating pests 
and diseases. However to argue against short-term gains in favour of long-term 
benefits is challenging. In the provision of some public goods there may be 
short-term losers, who will argue against legislation to limit their actions now in 
favour of later generations. For example business people profiteering from 
logging in the Amazonian rainforest would argue against legislation to protect 
the habitat or farmers at higher latitudes benefitting from longer growing 
seasons may not favour of strong action on climate change. 
 
Francisco Sagasti and Keith Bazanson (2001) argue that the growing 
prominence of issues that can potentially affect most of humanity and future 
generations is changing the manner in which development co-operation is 
achieved and financed. However, they recognise that this is one of the most 
contentious aspects of GPGs. It can often be difficult for a good, which may be 
seen as desirable, to make the transition to recognition as a GPG. Initially the 
benefits and costs have to be calculated, and this may depend upon who is to 
benefit and who is to pay, and then collective agreement and action taken within 
the international community. Those living in poverty, although large in number 
are limited in influence, and those yet to be born have no voice at all, making 
them even easier to ignore. 
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The balance between public and private 
The diverse range of actors now operating in the international development 
arena is a key consideration in the provision of goods as highlighted by Alula 
Berhe Kidani (2015). With this proliferation of actors, state and non-state, from 
emerging economies to well-financed philanthropic foundations and 
international non-government organisations to multinational corporations, the 
balance between public and private is shifting. 
 
Kaul and Mendoza (2002d) argue that the definition of public and private cannot 
automatically be made based on the original properties of a good. No longer can 
it be assumed that private goods are provided by the markets and public goods 
by the state. Increased privatisation, economic liberalisation and technological 
advances have all helped the markets expand and become more integrated 
across national borders. This has created a more complex situation between the 
public and private sphere, blurring the lines as some goods straddle the 
boundaries, or shift from one category to the other.  
 
As both private and public goods are required there needs to be a balance 
between states and markets; two of society’s principle mechanisms for co-
ordinating economic activity, and also themselves public goods. And as both 
states and markets provide both private and public goods there needs to be a 
new expanded definition of public goods to “those that are nonexclusive – that 
is, de facto public in consumption” (Kaul and Mendoza, 2002d, p.80). They 
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argue that the general public, engaged through the political process, should be 
involved in making the decisions on what should be private and what should be 
public and how to pay for the goods provided, rather than leaving it to the 
markets. 
 
Private goods also often rely on the provision of public goods. Drahos (2005) 
argues that rules, regulations and institutions such as the rule of law, contract 
law, recognition of property rights, secure banking structures and functioning 
stock exchanges are all required. “A flourishing capitalism equipped with such 
institutions allows entrepreneurs the freedom to act and to create the 
spontaneous ordering that is said to characterise markets.” (Drahos, 2005, p.58) 
If capacity is limited, for example as seen in developing countries, which may 
lack sufficient levels of the primary public goods required, such as rule of law, 
educational standards or scientists, this will impact on their ability to generate 
the private goods.  
 
In addition to their inability to provide the public goods in the domestic setting, 
which in turn inhibits the provision of private goods, developing countries may 
also lack the capacity to represent their best interests at the international level 
and thus limit themselves further. Drahos argues that mechanisms of power and 
coercion are fundamental to understanding the provision of public goods. This is 
demonstrated in the concerted effort made by businesses in the US and the EU 
to lobby for the introduction of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
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Rights (TRIPS) into international trade agreements under the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Through the implementation of TRIPS states have had 
their ability to provide public goods eroded. TRIPS have also shifted the balance 
between public and private, arguably placing many elements of what was once 
public property, such as seeds and knowledge, into private ownership on a 
larger scale than ever before.  
 
Many have raised concerns over the long-term impact this will have on 
developing countries and their people (Tansey and Rajotte, 2008; Maskus and 
Reichman, 2005; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002). Maskus 
and Reichman, (2005, p.xiii) argue that the strengthening and harmonisation of 
intellectual property protection has created a globalised regime of private rights 
that “will have profound implications for the nature of such processes as 
innovation, technology transfer, market competition and economic 
development.” They also argue that “It also raises essential and sometimes 
disturbing questions about potential impacts on the ability of governments to 
provide critical public goods, both within and across countries.” The impact that 
TRIPS may have on food security, through the control of seeds and knowledge, 
is of particular interest in this thesis and will be examined further in a later 
chapter. 
 
Despite concerns centred on TRIPS some argue that there are benefits to the 
implementation of public-private-partnerships (PPPs) as tools of international 
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governance (Borzel and Risse, 2002). The authors examine the potential for 
such partnerships to strengthen overall governance by solving many of its 
deficiencies, most notably by increasing effectiveness and legitimacy, through 
rule and standard setting, rule implementation and service provision.  
The provision of Global Public Goods 
GPGs can be provided in a number of different ways, each dependent upon the 
type of good required. Each different method faces its own challenges; in 
addition to the problem of free riders states may be reluctant to relinquish some 
of their sovereignty, as well as specific problems with the provision of GPGs, 
such as that of the weakest link, externalities, additionality and the need for 
aggregate efforts. International organisations can play a role in providing an 
arena in which to discuss the provision of GPGs and how this is financed and 
the burden shared. Nevertheless international cooperation is difficult to achieve 
for a number of reasons. 
State Sovereignty 
The anarchic state system creates a situation in which there is no overarching 
authority to coerce individual states to take action. Governments, especially 
those in democratic states, have an immediate responsibility to their electorate 
but not necessarily people beyond their borders. However many actions taken 
by individual states can impact on other states and their people. These 
externalities may be positive or negative; goods or bads.  
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The International Taskforce on Global Public Goods (2006a, p.3) argues that 
state sovereignty is the main obstacle to a co-ordinated approach to many 
challenges facing the international community as it “weakens the prospects for 
cooperation by adding a degree of uncertainty to most international agreements. 
This basic problem underlies all the others.” States have differing preferences 
and priorities, with short-term interests driving many decisions and contributing 
to a lack of political will at the domestic level to cooperate at the international 
level. Even if the overall long-term benefits of a public good may be recognised 
the short-term actions to be taken may be disputed, especially if a state has 
higher short-term preferences and priorities. This is most evident when there is 
a financial cost to its provision.  
 
The Weakest Link 
Some GPGs can only be provided if all states play their part and fully comply 
with the common approach. Success can be eroded by a single act of non-
compliance, which means that the overall action is only as strong as ‘the 
weakest link’. This creates problems for long-term cooperation as states have to 
be persuaded to provide the necessary investment in the good, through a clear 
understanding of the risk of failure through non-compliance, but each state also 
has to have reassurance that all other states will also play their part in its 
provision too. For example, a combined effort to eradicate a communicable 
disease is required across borders, and if one state fails to fulfil its commitment 
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the actions of all the other states, however successful on an individual level, will 
be compromised.  
 
In contrast to the weakest link scenario there are some GPGs that can be 
financed by one country, or one country aided by others but with one country 
taking the lead. The example given by Barrett (2007) for this ‘single best effort’ 
is the defence of the world against an asteroid strike. Even if only one country 
were to finance the expedition the whole world would benefit from that effort.  
 
Aggregate Efforts 
The combined efforts by all states are required to combat some challenges. The 
implementation of the Montreal Protocol (UNEP, 1987) is an example of the 
successful provision of a GPG through ‘aggregate efforts’. The Montreal 
Protocol came into force in January 1989, with the worldwide ambition of 
eliminating the consumption of ozone depleting substances. By 2006 the 191 
parties that had ratified the treaty had, in aggregate, reduced their consumption 
of these substances by 95 per cent (UNEP, 2007). By 2009 it was the first 
United Nations treaty to achieve universal ratification and consumption of 98 per 
cent of all controlled substances had been phased out (UNEP, 2009). It was 
successful for a number of reasons, including the trade provisions it contained, 
which limited signatories to trade only with other signatories, a sense of 
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common threat that established a common purpose, and the implementation of 
a non-punitive compliance procedure.  
 
In addition, the Montreal Protocol introduced a number of innovative principles, 
which are now common practice in international treaties, such as the 
‘precautionary principle’,9 which allows for action to be taken even when the 
science is not yet conclusive. It also introduces the concept of common but 
differentiated responsibilities (CBDR),10 which is particularly relevant in climate 
change negotiations as it allows for developed countries to bear the bulk of the 
responsibility for tackling climate change due to their historic emissions and 
greater financial resources.  
 
Enshrined as Principle 7 in the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (UNEP, 1992) the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities (CBDR) has been used in the Kyoto Protocol (IPCC, 1997) and 
has been included in the Rio+20 outcome document, The Future We Want 
(UNGA, 2012) designed to be the mandate for the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). The Group of 77 and China have advocated for it to become an 
‘overarching principle’ in the SDG framework. However, despite its success in 
                                            
9
 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was agreed on 16 
September 1987 and came into force in 1 January 1989. It featured a unique adjustment 
provision that enabled it to respond to new scientific information quickly with the use of 
adjustments which when agreed were automatically applicable to all countries that had signed 
the original agreement. (UNEP, 1987)  
10
 The principle was used to strike a political compromise in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in 1992 (UNEP, 1992) 
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the Montreal Protocol, this move has not been universally welcomed. Alvin 
Leong (2014, p.1) argues “many developed countries object to such inclusion 
and take the position that CBDR is a principle that is limited to the field of 
environmental protection, and thus cannot be an ‘overarching principle’ for goals 
that seek to integrate the economic, social and environmental dimensions of 
sustainable development.”  
 
Nonetheless the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities was seen 
as a major contributor to the success of the Montreal Protocol as by agreeing to 
take on a larger proportion of the financial burden the developed countries were 
able to assist developing countries through the implementation of the 
Multilateral Fund. Financial assistance was made available to developing 
countries to assist in the removal of ozone depleting substances from use and 
enabled all 142 developing countries to meet the 100 per cent phase out mark 
for ozone depleting substances by 2010 (Rae and Gabriel, 2012).  
 
Notwithstanding the success of the Montreal Protocol this level of cooperation 
and commitment is unprecedented. This level of success can, in part, be 
attributed to the fact that there were clear achievable goals set as part of the 
protocol; the phasing out of ozone depleting substances created a 
straightforward objective, whereas agreeing and then implementing policies to 
address climate change is very complex and politically sensitive. It is difficult to 
reach agreement on what should be included in an international treaty, 
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especially those concerned with climate change mitigation. Barrett (2007) 
argues this is because different countries are affected by climate change in 
different ways, with the poorest countries likely to be worst hit. Unfortunately it is 
these countries that can least afford the financial burden of mitigation measures. 
However, it is through the aggregate effort of all countries that climate change 
will have to be addressed.  
 
Externalities 
The impact of climate change demonstrates the challenges posed by 
externalities in the production of a good if the costs or benefits are not reflected 
in the price. In this instance the direct cost of the good is transferred away from 
the organisations responsible for creating them and so there is no incentive to 
address the situation or add this calculation into the final cost of the good. 
These externalities can be good or bad. Christopher Stone (1994) highlights the 
fact that even if goods, or services, have been privatised the external effects 
may still be displayed far from the geographical area in which they were 
produced, in a negative or positive way. For example a negative impact of 
warmer wetter weather, as a result of climate change, maybe the spread across 
borders of malaria carrying mosquitoes. Whereas, trees planted in one area 
may prevent flooding elsewhere. He argues that environmental inputs are 
incorrectly priced and therefore not valued, such as water, which is generally 
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underpriced and as a consequence over-consumed and waste storage not 
priced correctly and thus often contributing to pollution. 
 
The creation of the Multilateral Fund in the Montreal Protocol is an example of a 
situation where the externalities have been taken into consideration. It 
demonstrates an acknowledgement by the developed states that they had 
disproportionately benefitted from producing harmful greenhouse gases through 
their processes of industrialisation and the developing states had in many 
respects borne the consequences but been unable to mitigate them.  
 
Despite this positive example the majority of externalities are not taken into 
consideration. Francisco Sagasti and Keith Bezanson (2001) argue that the 
fractured global order created through globalisation has increased the speed 
and broad reach of cross border externalities. The authors maintain (2001, p.iii) 
that an international response is required: “As the actions of one or more agents 
(governments, corporations, association and even individuals) create costs or 
benefits for other agents not party to the transaction and located far beyond 
national, institutional boundaries – and even across generations – narrowly 
construed domestic and local policy responses are clearly insufficient.” 
 
It is this concerted effort that is required to address the wide-reaching 
challenges created by externalities, of which climate change is only one 
example. Kaul (2005, p.8) argues that extreme poverty may create “direct 
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externalities such as the risk of failing states, exacerbated political turmoil and 
conflict, spread of communicable diseases, or interruption of commerce and 
investment flows.” The aggregate efforts of the international community will be 
required to address poverty in all its complexity, and thus prevent these public 
bads from spilling over borders and across generations. How to achieve the 
eradication of poverty has been at the centre of the development agenda for 
decades, with different policies implemented in different areas achieving mixed 
levels of success. 
 
The problem of free riding is closely linked to externalities and is a problem 
inherent in the concept of GPGs according to Daniel Bodansky (2012). He 
argues that if states cannot be excluded from receiving the benefits of a GPG, 
then that good will be under-provided. Conversely, if a GPG is bad and 
produces negative rather than positive externalities, it tends to be over-provided. 
 
The complex nature of externalities, even if a clear link can be made between 
an action and a consequence, means that they are serious challenges to the 
provision of GPGs. In addition the lack of incentive to remedy an issue, whether 
that’s the provision of a good, such as healthcare to stop the spread of a 
communicable disease, or a bad, such as a reduction in pollution that has 
crossed a state’s border, acts as a further disincentive for action, especially 
when that action requires financial commitment.  
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The Principle of Additionality  
Resources for the financing of GPGs can come from a number of different 
sources, both public and private. Not-for-profit organisations, such as 
foundations, large International Non Government Organisations (INGOs), and 
academic institutions can all provide private resources. Government agencies, 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and funds from other international 
organisations can also provide funds.  
 
All these organisations are accountable to someone, whether that is an 
electorate or donors, and the financial support they give to provide GPGs has to 
be generated in some way. The concern raised by Sagasti and Bezanson 
(2001) is the issue of additionality; the source of the funds. The authors ask if 
the funds are going to be additional funds to the development aid already 
provided or merely redirected funds. They argue that: “Advocacy of financial 
resources for global public goods may end up reducing the amount of ODA 
[Official Development Aid] available for the national development priorities of 
developing countries.” (2001, p.17) The authors argue that to prevent this from 
happening there will have to be clear identification of the separate resource 
streams, differentiating GPGs from those for traditional development assistance 
programmes. This would create information reporting and statistical challenges, 
which in turn would require public funding to address. 
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Maurizio Carbone (2007, p.179) also highlighted problems with additionality 
arguing that: “Resistance has come both from developed countries, which 
question the issue of additionality, and from developing countries, which raise 
the issues of diversion of resources and the international decision-making 
process.” These are serious concerns, which highlight the difficulties in the 
provision of GPGs. The question of who will pay for the GPG is central to the 
debate. 
Food Security as a Public Good 
The production and distribution of food is, arguably, an entirely private 
enterprise. However, some elements of the food system do come under the 
auspices of public goods theory, and are indeed global public goods. Food is 
grown on land, which in many places, is in private ownership; but this is not 
always the case. Many tribes in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, still operate a 
communal land system which allows for communal grazing of livestock. This 
traditional method of farming is now increasingly under threat as land is being 
taken over by agribusinesses and the original inhabitants are being removed. 
(Pearce, 2012) 
 
The production of food may originate from private means but the end result, a 
well fed population, which includes people who have benefited from adequate 
nutrition to optimise their physical and mental development, is a public good. As 
individuals and as members of society, well fed people are more active and 
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more productive. Research has shown that poor nutrition leads to stunting 
(FAO, 2013h; UNICEF, 2013; Grantham-McGregor et al, 2007). This leads 
affected children to be smaller than their non-stunted peers, susceptible to 
sickness, achieve lower attainment levels at school, have lower incomes in 
adulthood, and be more likely to become overweight as adults as well as more 
prone to non-communicable diseases. UNICEF (2013, p.iv) argues that stunted 
children cannot reach their full potential and that “stunting is associated with 
suboptimal brain development, which is likely to have long-lasting harmful 
consequences for cognitive ability, school performance and future earnings. 
This in turn affects the development potential of nations.” In response to this 
issue there is now a move to Scale Up Nutrition in the first 1,000 days of a 
child’s development, which includes the nine months before the child is born 
and its first two years of life. 
 
According to Sally Grantham-McGregor et al (2007) there are over 200 million 
children under the age of five years that are not fulfilling their development 
potential due to poverty, poor health and nutrition and deficient care. As a 
consequence they are likely to do poorly in school, subsequently have low 
incomes, high fertility and in turn provide poor care for their own children and 
thus contribute further to the intergenerational transmission of poverty. The 
authors argue that in countries in which a large proportion of children are in this 
situation the development of the state as a whole will be detrimentally affected.  
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The main thrust of their argument is that disadvantaged children in developing 
countries are less likely to be productive adults. As a result of their research, 
looking at stunted and non stunted children both in poverty and not, the authors 
estimate that “the loss in adult income from being stunted but not in poverty is 
22.2%, the loss from living in poverty but not being stunted is 5.9% and from 
being both stunted and in poverty is 30.1%.” (Grantham-McGregor et al, 2007, 
p.4) For all the 219 million estimated disadvantaged children in the world the 
authors calculate that the average deficit in adult annual income will be 19.8%.  
 
Stunting is a major contributing factor to an individual’s limited life chances. This 
not only impacts upon the individual but also their community and the state as a 
whole in terms of productivity, the need for additional resources from the state, 
such as healthcare, and the transmission of poverty and poor nutrition to the 
next generation. Therefore, a well-fed population is clearly a public good. 
 
To ensure the provision of a well-fed population there has to be enough food, 
which is of sufficient quality to ensure good health. However, the provision of 
such is complex. Food and agriculture are too important with too many diverse 
challenges to be left to the markets, argues Wanki Moon (2011). The author 
examines the relationship between free trade and agriculture, taking into 
consideration agriculture’s distinctive features of multifunctionality, its different 
roles across different countries and its association with the provision of three 
vital GPGs; mitigation of climate change, sustainability and food security.  
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He argues that free trade is incompatible with food and agriculture, as “farm 
policies designed to address the nature of agricultural public goods will affect 
comparative advantages and liberalised trade has implications for sustainable 
use of natural resources (land/soil, water), food security in LDCs [Less 
Developed Countries] and mitigations of and adaptations to climate change.” 
(Wanki, 2011, p.14) He argues for a global system that rewards states that 
regulate farmers to ensure the practice of sustainable agriculture as at the 
present time there is no incentive for farmers to voluntarily internalise the 
externalities associated with unsustainable production techniques, which may 
have a negative impact on the land for future generations. 
 
The reduction of trade barriers can also raise the risks of marginalisation for 
countries, which due to many different reasons, such as resource endowment, 
location, size or lack of skills, may not be as competitive in the global market. 
The FAO has noted additional risks and argues that through globalisation 
“instability in the international financing systems and fluctuations in the 
performance of the major world economies have knock-on effects in countries 
that have become heavily dependent on external trade and investment.” (FAO, 
2002b) Written at the beginning of the twenty-first century this became all too 
apparent during the 2007-08 global financial and food price crises. 
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Agriculture produces both public goods, most notably food, but also public bads, 
including greenhouse gases (Wanki, 2011; Romstad, 2002). The balance 
between the two depends on the production methods used. Industrialised 
agriculture is characterised by high usage of both energy and chemicals, 
intensive management and promotion of monocultures, which limit product and 
environment diversity. These methods can lead to many problems, including but 
not confined to the depletion of non-renewable resources, soil degradation, and 
overuse of scarce water supplies, as well as negative consequences of 
chemical usage for human and animal health and the environment.  
 
Sustainable agricultural methods are more likely to lead to the provision of 
public goods, which may be highly valued by society but which cannot be 
secured by the markets, and are therefore either over-exploited or under-
provided. Tamsin Cooper et al (2009) highlight a wide range of environmental 
public goods associated with agriculture, including agricultural landscapes, 
farmland biodiversity, water quality and availability, soil functionality, climate 
stability in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and carbon storage, air 
quality and resilience to flooding and fire. They also highlight more social public 
goods such as food security, rural vitality and farm animal welfare and health. 
The authors (2009, p.2-3) argue that food security is a public good with distinct 
private characteristics and “although markets are the best regulators of food 
supply, there are hazards arising from a potential shortfall in supply that do not 
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arise with other commodities less central to human welfare.” This means that 
government action is needed to ensure access to affordable and safe food. 
 
The FAO recognises “the importance of ensuring an adequate supply of global 
public goods to safeguard long-term global food security and the sustainable 
use of natural resources.” (FAO, 2002b) The organisation calls for the 
conservation of global common goods, including genetic resources and oceanic 
fish stocks, whilst bringing attention to the global nature of the many challenges 
facing agriculture, forestry and fisheries. For example, pests and diseases do 
not respect national boundaries or oceans and cross both; actions in one area, 
such as high-intensity livestock systems and deforestation, can contribute to 
climate change; and over-fishing can have an impact on the livelihoods of fisher 
folk many miles away, as well as the impact felt by farmers in one region if 
agriculture is subsidised in another. (Weis, 2007; Murphy, 2013; Rogers, 2008b) 
The creation in 2001 of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture is an example of an international agreement designed to 
manage and conserve genetic resources in a sustainable way and as a GPG. 
This treaty will be examined in more detail in chapter seven. 
 
Although the production of food is mostly a private enterprise there are 
significant elements within the realm of food and agriculture, and the provision 
of food security, which are GPGs. Agriculture produces both public goods and 
public bads, depending upon the type of agricultural methods used. (IAASTD, 
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2009; HLPE, 2015; De Schutter, 2014) Mechanisms that encourage the 
adoption of production methods that produce public goods, rather than bads, 
should be implemented to ensure enough good quality and nutritious food is 
grown in a sustainable manner. This is the only way to make sure there will be 
enough food to feed the world’s growing population and to ensure this 
generation and those to come will benefit from nourishing and nutritious food so 
they can be active, useful and productive members of society. 
 
A well-fed population is not only more productive and less likely to need as 
many health care services but it is also likely to be more stable, leading to less 
migration and less potential conflict. The provision of food security is morally 
sound and ties in with the founding of the United Nations, as the world emerged 
from the chaos of World War Two into a more ordered and just world. It is also 
in line with the foundational principles of the FAO, including the freedom from 
want, as inspired by Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms (1941). This will be discussed 
further in chapter four. 
Millennium Development Goals as Global Public 
Goods 
The establishment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the United 
Nations in 2000-01 can be seen as a commitment by the international 
community to work together to help provide GPGs, such as the prevention and 
treatment of communicable diseases. Kaul (2005) argued the best way of 
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achieving the MDGs was to use the available resources as efficiently as 
possible, promoting an adequate mix of private and public goods. Taking steps 
of a re-regulatory nature to reshape and modernise current international 
regimes, most notably those concerning multilateral trade, official development 
assistance and international financial institutions, would be cost-effective and 
deliver positive results, especially in meeting MDG 8, to develop a global 
partnership for development. It has to be noted that since Kaul’s paper was 
written in 2005, when debt forgiveness was high on the international political 
agenda,11 there have been significant and dramatic changes in the international 
financial system as a result of the global financial crisis. These have, in many 
cases, exposed the fragility of this interconnected system. 
 
Richard D. Smith and Landis MacKellar (2007) argued that the use of the GPG 
framework was not the best way in which to approach MDG analysis; instead 
the MDGs should be interpreted in the context of traditional development 
assistance. In relation to the global health agenda there are only two areas in 
which the GPG concept can be used, according to Smith and MacKellar; health 
research and development
12
 and communicable disease control. The authors 
                                            
11
 The Make Poverty History Campaign was at its height in 2005 as campaigners attempted to 
persuade the G8 leaders at the Gleneagles Summit to forgive developing countries’ debt 
(Longbottom, 2008) 
12
 The authors argue that private for profit companies should be encouraged to engage in health 
research and development to benefit poor countries, rather than concentrating all their energies 
and resources on developing health products for the wealthiest people; the ubiquitous 90-10 
problem, in which 90% of global R&D spending in health is targeted at diseases affecting only 
10% of the world’s population (Smith and MacKellar, 2007) 
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argue that the GPG concept has been over-used and therefore over-stretched 
and devalued.  
 
Smith and Mackellar, argue that because the MDGs emerged from a profound 
dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of aid it was a response to a crisis in 
traditional development assistance and not a move towards collective action to 
supply GPGs. This difference in approach can be seen through the 
encouragement of country ownership, similar to that taken in the implementation 
of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Smith and MacKellar argue (2007, p.6) 
that “far from encouraging donor-country voters to support generous foreign aid 
programmes because they are in their own interest, these discourage them from 
doing so.” Instead the GPG concept should be used to generate additional and 
innovative sources of funding to achieve the MDGs to which the label is 
relevant, such as communicable disease control, to mobilise rational self 
interest. 
 
The dissatisfaction with aid effectiveness was not seen as the driving force 
behind the MDG framework, according to Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and David Hulme 
(2011, p.17), who argue that the creation of the MDGs was “the emergence of a 
broad consensus on ending poverty as the overarching objective of 
development.” The authors argue (2011, p.18) that each individual goal is its 
own norm and when brought together as a single package these goals were the 
“strategic components of the broader supernorm that extreme, dehumanising 
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poverty is morally unacceptable and should be eradicated.” This evolution in 
development thinking had started in the 1990s, when both academic and policy 
instruments, were taking the idea of poverty as multidimensional, and which 
therefore required action on different dimensions simultaneously. 
 
Some of the MDGs, such as creating global development partnerships, can be 
argued to be GPGs whilst others, including those relating to maternal mortality 
and child mortality, are not. Although it is desirable for ethical and moral reasons 
to combat mortality rates it cannot be argued to fulfil the GPG criteria, as there 
are no cross boundary implications if these issues are not addressed. However, 
a country or even a region’s peace and stability may be jeopardised by a 
population unable to feed itself or generate sufficient income on which to 
survive. Despite the debate on the validity of the GPG concept in the analysis of 
the MDGs the efforts that have been made to achieve the targets have had a 
positive impact on millions.  
 
Although the MDGs have faced criticism (Harris and Provost, 2013; Clegg, 
2015; Saith, 2006; Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, 2011; Gabay, 2011), which will be 
discussed in chapter five, and not all targets have been met, UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon argued that the measurable time-bound targets have 
established a blueprint for tackling the most pressing development challenges 
and have made a profound difference in people’s lives. Targets have been met 
on global poverty reduction, access to primary education, communicable 
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disease control and infant mortality. This has meant that “[t]he likelihood of a 
child dying before age five has been nearly cut in half over the last two decades. 
That means that about 17,000 children are saved every day.” (Ban quoted in 
UN, 2014a, p.3)  
 
The MDGs are also being used to pave the way for the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), first proposed at the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, 
which will cover a broad range of sustainable development issues (United 
Nations, 2015). Kidani (2015) argues that the setting of the SDGs is an 
opportunity to broaden the ‘locus of change’ to track development progress in 
industrialised countries with greater expectations placed upon them to deliver on 
sustainability within their own countries as well as supporting global 
development and securing GPGs.  
 
Kidani, however, recognises the difficulties facing the international community in 
reaching agreement on the post-2015 framework. There are more actors 
engaged in the international development arena now than when the MDGs were 
created, with aid donors from a more diverse set of countries, philanthropic 
foundations playing a much larger financing role and increased participation 
from the private sector. In addition emerging economies are playing a more 
assertive role in global politics and many developing countries are in stronger 
positions of growth. Arguably this explosion in the number of different actors, 
and the diversity of their origins, interests and constituents, has created 
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additional obstacles to reaching agreement, both in the specific goals and 
objectives, and the methods to be used to achieve them. 
 
Despite the potential difficulties in reaching agreement and buy-in from this 
diverse group of actors Kidani (2015, p2) argues that “[b]ased on the experience 
of the MDGs, the framework will likely play an important role in framing national 
and global policy and decision making for decades to come.” To achieve 
success the goals have to be simple and limited in nature, have a robust 
monitoring mechanism, play a norm-setting role, respond to the changing global 
context and numerous long term challenges and be structured in such a way as 
to generate buy-in from a diverse range of countries and stakeholders. 
International Organisations in the provision of 
Global Public Goods 
 
As global public goods, by their very nature, transcend national boundaries 
there is a need for some type of organisation to coordinate efforts to provide 
these goods. The different types of goods require different types of responses 
from states and therefore the creation of different types of organisations. For 
example, the United Nations has many different types of bodies and specialised 
agencies, including the Security Council, which is designed to assist states in 
the provision of the GPG of international peace and security; the World Health 
Organisation to prevent the spread of infectious diseases and the UN 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change, to address climate stabilisation. 
(Shaffer, 2012) 
 
Recent developments in the global economy, following the financial crisis and 
the rise of China as an economic power, have seen a change in the origin of 
financial assistance to development projects. According to Andrew Sheng and 
Xiao Geng (2015) China has taken the lead in establishing the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The authors argue that this will enable 
China to have a larger global leadership role and reflects its provision of GPGs. 
Infrastructure investment is seen as a major contributor to increased economic 
growth and as such China will, through various organisations including the AIIB, 
be investing an estimated $232 billion in two trade routes, the Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road. This figure is 
comparative to two thirds of the World Bank’s budget for 2014. However, it may 
be argued that these investments have less to do with the provision of GPGs as 
they do with ensuring China’s economic supremacy, especially in Asia. 
 
There is much debate, in the field of international relations, as well as the wider 
public as to the need for, remit of and the success of international organisations, 
such as international financial institutions, in the provision of GPGs. A short 
examination of the historical context of international organisations gives a brief 
overview of their emergence in the international arena. 
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International Organisations and their Historical 
Context 
International treaties have been instrumental in establishing the relations 
between kingdoms, principalities and states for centuries. For example, the 
Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, ended the Thirty Years War, and created 
the basis for the concept of state sovereignty (The Avalon Project, 2015). 
International organisations, however, did not make an appearance until the 
1800s. Early examples include the Central Commission for the Navigation on 
the Rhine, which was established in 1815 to regulate shipping on the river, a 
vital trading route, between France and Germany (Klemann, 2013).  
 
The second oldest international organisation is the Universal Postal Union 
(UPU, 2015), which was created at the Treaty of Bern in 1874 to address the 
complexity generated through the numerous bilateral agreements regulating 
postal services in place. “The 1874 Treaty of Bern succeeded in unifying a 
confusing international maze of postal services and regulations into a single 
postal territory for the reciprocal exchange of letters.” (UPU, 2015) Initially 
named the General Postal Union it was renamed the Universal Postal Union 
only four years later due to its large membership. It is now a specialised agency 
of the United Nations. 
 
Clive Archer (1994) argues that the change in the political landscape, with the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814-15 and the revolutions in France and US, in 
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addition to economic and social developments, through industrialisation, 
internationalisation of commerce and improvements in communications, were all 
contributing factors to the introduction of international organisations. These 
developments had allowed the state to evolve as an entity, ensuring it was no 
longer completely tied to the monarchy. In the case of the UPU there was a 
clear need for the creation of an organisation to coordinate postal policies and 
services between countries, and so an organisation was established. 
 
However it was in the twentieth century that the formation of international 
organisations became more widespread, most notably with the creation of the 
League of Nations after the First World War, and then the United Nations 
following the Second World War.  
The League of Nations 
Now remembered for its ultimate failure to prevent war the League of Nations 
was a multipurpose inter-governmental organisation with universal membership. 
It had three bodies, which had similarities to the bodies of the United Nations 
today; the Council, the Assembly and the Secretariat. Its main objective was to 
maintain universal peace, based on the fundamental principles accepted by its 
members to develop cooperation among nations and to guarantee them peace 
and security. (UNOG, 2015)  
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The Covenant of the League of Nations became part of the Treaty of Versailles 
and outlined several basic objectives that have since been assumed by the 
United Nations, such as the requirement to ensure collective security, which is 
directly tied to the security of member states; peaceful settlement of disputes 
through mediation, negotiation, arbitration and adjudication; and to foster 
international co-operation in economic and social realms. It was heavily 
influenced by the values of the US, with President Woodrow Wilson one of its 
champions and principal architects; and yet the US did not become a member of 
the League. (Allied Powers, 1920; Pease, 2003)  
 
Initially the League of Nations was successful with the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts between Sweden and Finland and between Greece and Bulgaria. 
Despite these early successes it increasingly faced a number of serious 
challenges to its authority, most notably Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, 
Italy’s annexation of Ethiopia in 1935 and also with the annexation of Austria by 
Hitler in 1938 (UNOG, 2015). The start of World War Two in 1939 saw the 
beginning of end for the League, which officially ceased to exist in 1946 when 
the United Nations inherited some of its agencies, including the International 
Labour Organisation. There are many reasons for the League’s failure. 
However, these are beyond the remit of this thesis. 
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The United Nations 
As a successor to the League of Nations the United Nations has similar aims: to 
maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among 
nations, to address economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems and to 
promote respect for universal human rights (UN, 1945). Alongside its six 
principle organisations; the General Assembly, Security Council, International 
Court of Justice, Economic and Social Council, Secretariat and Trusteeship 
Council, there are several specialised agencies, which include among others the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation, the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Health Organisation, which form part of the overall system.  
 
In addition to the UN there are other international organisations that fulfil a 
number of roles, such as the European Union, which is a comprehensive, 
multipurpose regional organisation. Like the United Nations it was created 
following the devastation of World War Two and has the overall objective of 
ensuring a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe. Since its creation it has 
grown in strength, size and remit. (Europa, 2015b) 
 
Alongside these large bodies there is a plethora of other international 
organisations, both intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs). According to the Union of 
International Associations (2015) there are over 37,000 active and 30,000 
dormant international organisations in 300 countries and territories with 
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approximately 1,200 being added every year. This creates a diverse and ever-
expanding array of actors operating in the international arena, which has 
implications for the ability to reach agreement and take action on international 
issues. 
The ever changing International Arena 
Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945 the international arena has 
undergone a number of substantial changes. In many instances these have 
been either multi-regional or global in scale and profound in nature. Since the 
end of World War Two the number of states has more than tripled through 
decolonisation and then with the break-up of the Soviet Union. (Jordan et al, 
2001) The emergence of these nascent states has had a significant impact on 
the system of global governance and the United Nations itself, which now has 
193 members (United Nations, 2015b.)  
 
The world’s population has also increased significantly, from 2.5 billion in 1945 
to seven billion in 2013 (Trueba and MacMillan, 2013). And the level of 
integration and interdependence, through advances in technology, 
communications and transport, has created a globalised world. Operating within 
this world there has been an increase in the number and type of different 
entities; states, IGOs, INGOs, civil society associations and multinational 
corporations, which all vie for position. This has created a very dynamic and 
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complex international environment, which can be examined from numerous 
different theoretical perspectives, which will be examined in the next chapter.  
 
Political, economic and social factors have also played their part. The Cold War 
saw the division of states between the ideologies of East and West, creating a 
situation in which new weak states aligned themselves with the US or the USSR 
to gain financial support. Thomas Weiss (2000) argued that this helped to 
maintain the state-centric status quo. However, following the financial shock of 
the 1973-74 oil price crisis, the subsequent structural adjustment programmes 
of the 1980s and the ideological shift towards market liberalisation, the concept 
of state sovereignty faced numerous challenges. Financial aid, made available 
through the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, was granted with 
conditions based on externally imposed changes to domestic policies. This 
erosion of the sanctity of state sovereignty became accepted and the norm as 
illegitimate regimes were challenged and developing countries and former 
Soviet Bloc states underwent waves of political reform, in addition to the 
emergence of a proliferation of non-state actors and through a number of 
humanitarian interventions. (Weiss, 2000) However, despite these challenges to 
state sovereignty many theorists argue that states still remain the primary units 
within the international system. This will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
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The Role of International Organisations within the 
International Arena 
Within the international arena there has emerged a vast array of different actors, 
international organisations being just one type. It is only by examining the 
complex relationships between these different actors that an understanding of 
the changing role of international organisations can be gained. 
 
Thomas G. Weiss and Annelies Kamran (2009) have examined the different 
roles that the many different actors play in the international arena, all of which 
are organised to achieve goals, all with different levels of legitimacy. The 
potential role of each actor depends on how an issue may be framed; how it’s 
conceptualised. The authors (2009, p.70-71) examine this complex international 
arena through the lens of global governance, which they perceive to be “the 
complex of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships and 
processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organisations, both 
inter and non-governmental, through which collective interests on the global 
plane are articulated, rights and obligations are established and differences 
mediated.” Five different components are emphasised by the authors; a 
transnational level of analysis, issues, non-state actors, dynamics of 
governance and the interdependent, yet loosely coupled complex international 
system.  
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The role of international organisations, however weak or inadequate, is integral 
to global governance. However the dynamics of the international system, with 
the complex relationships between states, international organisations, NGOs 
and other actors constantly being revised in response to changing global, 
economic, social and political circumstances creates a potential problem of 
remit for international organisations. 
When most international organisations were created by 
member states it was not foreseen that they would be 
interacting with so many different kinds of actors at so 
many different levels in so many essential ways – so, 
oftentimes, there is only the vaguest of provisions in many 
of their charters and statutes for the range of interactions 
that global governance implies. (Weiss and Kamran, 2009, 
p.76) 
Although member states have established these international organisations 
there remains the need for ad hoc developments and co-operation between the 
various international organisations in pursuit of shared goals. This may pose 
potential statute problems, as the ever-changing dynamics of the international 
system demand flexibility within and among international organisations, but the 
authors argue it is crucial for problem solving.  
 
The position of the state, as always, is central to any debate. There are two 
opposing views of international organisations, according to Robert Jordan 
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(2001), either the proliferation of international organisations is seen as a 
challenge to state sovereignty, a manifestation of the hopes of Wilsonian 
idealism and a paradoxical occurrence as states instigated their creation in the 
first place, or the power of the state is largely unaffected. The creation of an 
incipient global governance that may be seen as a “transformation in world 
politics, from the primacy of the national state to one in which international 
institutions provide the arena for conducting relations between states, urged on 
by necessity, design and desire (or some combination of the three)” (Jordan, 
2001, p.1) has not emerged as the process is incomplete and there is a lack of 
clarity. Instead Jordan argues that the existing system based on distinct 
territorial units is not even questioned as the foundation for governance. 
 
As states are viewed by many as the undisputed primary actors the legitimacy 
of international organisations to override the sovereignty of states may be open 
to challenge. Daniel Bodansky argues that the issue of legitimacy has not often 
arisen until relatively recently because the international organisations in 
question have been too weak to exercise any significant authority. However, 
there are a number of exceptions, most notably the creation of the WTO, with 
powers to penalise non-compliance, and the Montreal Protocol, with its ability to 
upgrade binding legislation when new scientific evidence becomes available 
without the need for further agreement from the signatories, as discussed 
earlier. Bodansky (1999, p.599) argues: “It is hard to imagine how problems 
such as global climate change will be successfully addressed, without the 
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eventual establishment of more authoritative international institutions to set 
standards and oversee compliance.”  
 
International organisations have to possess legitimacy and authority to be able 
to provide public goods according to Gregory Shaffer (2012, p.675) who argues 
that: “The most salient challenge internationally is that we lack legitimate, 
centralised institutions with general taxing and regulatory powers.” International 
institutions, or organisations, can help to overcome collective action challenges, 
which naturally arise from a reliance on national decision-making, and problems 
associated with free riders. However, it is the remoteness from affected 
constituencies, which raise legitimacy concerns and in turn constitute a major 
challenge to the success of international organisations. Shaffer examines the 
provision of GPGs through three mainstream analytical frameworks in 
international law scholarship; constitutionalism, global administrative law and 
legal pluralism, each with attributes and deficiencies. He argues that there is no 
one single best approach but rather legal policy should be tailored to the type of 
GPG required. 
 
Despite the significant increase in the number of international organisations in 
recent decades Olson (1971b. p.876) argued forty years ago that there were 
probably enough international organisations in existence then and that 
emphasis should placed on the level of co-operation given by national 
governments to the international organisations already in existence. He 
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suggested that “we should ask under what conditions independent countries will 
do what is needed to carry informal cooperation or formal organisation to a more 
optimal point.” However, even if international organisations were to acquire 
powers of compulsion these powers will have originated from the states in the 
first place; again placing states in the position of primacy. 
 
States are arguably the primary actors but there is no one state in control. There 
is also no world government in place. It is this overall state of anarchy that 
creates even greater challenges for the provision of GPGs, Weiss (2000) 
argues. States are not in control, international organisations are not in control 
and the proliferation of NGOs and other organisations that have gained authority 
and legitimacy has undermined the already weak state-based collective action. 
Weiss argues that within this context the “problems associated with the 
provision of global public goods have become even more of a challenge, 
conceptual and practical, than in their provision in the national setting.” (Weiss, 
2005, p.81) The difficulty in assessing the different relationships between these 
different actors will be examined further in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
Since Samuelson’s examination of public expenditure the concept of public 
goods and the role of the state, in its domestic realm and within the international 
structure, has become more complex; a situation exacerbated as power 
between the public and private spheres has shifted through political balancing, 
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with the rise of neoliberalism, a subject to be discussed in the next chapter. 
Public goods theory is itself contested, as well as being intimately bound to the 
state, and so the move to expand the concept to the global level faces the 
challenges that public goods theory faces, including the categorisation of both 
pure and impure public goods, as well as the additional challenges of legitimacy 
in a globalised world.  
 
If people are challenging the need for the provision of public goods in a national 
setting, in which there is a clear connection between the individual and the 
democratic government, there is little hope of securing a clear mandate for 
action at the global level. The legitimacy challenges already faced by 
international organisations, which arguably are not accountable to individuals, 
makes it even more difficult for them when making the case for extra funding for 
the provision of GPGs.  
 
However, this is only one obstacle in many that needs to be overcome for their 
successful provision. Prior to this there has to be agreement as to the existence 
of the need, agreement on the categorisation of this need as a GPG and then 
agreement on the best way to provide it. It may be decided that there is a need 
but a belief that the markets are in a position to address it; this may not be the 
opinion of all. International organisations have to put forward a convincing 
argument that there is a need, that this need is a GPG and that they, as an 
international organisation, are in the best position to address the issue. Once 
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this level of agreement has been achieved the international organisation then 
has to create the best arena for its members and other bodies to reach 
agreement on how to tackle the issue and who will fund it. 
 
When the UN was established in 1945, in the post-war world, there was a strong 
faith in the ability of states to protect their citizens and to improve their lives, the 
world economy was not as integrated, global corporations were only just 
emerging and the huge global capital market had not been foreseen. Since then 
the world has become more integrated, technology has quickened the pace of 
interaction and deregulation has created a more integrated global market. The 
provision of GPGs in this diverse and complex world is an even greater 
challenge than it was seven decades ago. 
 
The next chapter will investigate the underlying theories of international 
relations; realism, neo-realism, liberalism, neoliberalism, constructivism and 
cognitivism with particular reference to the creation of international regimes, 
their scope and remit, as well as the sources of power during their creation and 
throughout their existence. The relationship between regimes and international 
organisations will be examined before an investigation into the changing 
international system within which they operate.  
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Chapter Three: 
International Organisations within the 
International System 
Introduction 
International organisations, such as FAO, operate within an international system 
that comprises political, economic and social spheres. There are a number of 
theories that attempt to explain the interaction between the different actors, 
including states, international organisations, non-state actors and individuals, 
within this international system. These theories can be incredibly influential if 
they are accepted and then implemented through policies at the national and 
international levels. For example, the ideology behind neoliberalism, which 
promotes liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation, has been dominant since 
the 1980s and has changed the world in many different ways.  
 
This chapter will begin by briefly considering the six main theories of 
international relations, realism, neo-realism, liberalism, neoliberalism, 
constructivism and cognitivism, as related to regime theory. From these six it is 
possible to draw out four key themes addressed by them all; the identity of the 
main actors, their level of autonomy, the interdependence within the 
international system and the importance of information and its providers. These 
four key themes will be used in later chapters to examine the roles that FAO 
performs. This chapter will then conclude with an examination of the wider 
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international context within which FAO operates, from the era of regulated 
capitalism from post-war to the early 1970s and from the early 1980s until the 
present, the neoliberal era. 
Main Theoretical Approaches 
The main theories developed to explain the actions of states, including their 
creation of and then interaction with, international organisations; realism, neo-
realism, liberalism, neoliberalism, constructivism and cognitivism, have 
developed over decades. Many agree on certain aspects of the international 
system, such as the concept of anarchy, but differ on the motivations, sources 
of influence and level of analysis. 
 
Realists believe that states are the principle actors in an anarchic system, and 
as such act as rational autonomous actors in pursuit of their own self interests 
with the primary goal of maintaining their own security. The balance of power 
keeps order. John Mearscheimer (2001) has investigated the behaviour of 
states within the international system, and in doing so has outlined five 
assumptions: the anarchic nature of the system, great powers inherently 
possess offensive military capabilities, states can never be certain about other 
states’ intentions, survival is the primary goal of great powers and they are 
rational actors aware of their external environment and as such act accordingly.  
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Any one of these assumptions taken in isolation may not be enough to promote 
aggression, “taken together, however, they depict a world in which states have 
considerable reason to think and sometimes behave aggressively.” 
(Mearscheimer, 2001, p.54) As all states are striving for hegemony and taking 
these five assumptions together Mearscheimer argues three general patterns of 
behaviour result: fear, self-help and power maximisation.  As a state level 
theory, realism focuses on the need for states to seek power, in a military 
sense, and relative to other actors in the international system. 
 
Neo-realism develops the core principles of realism, states as the principle 
actors operating in an anarchic system, but argues that the cause of all power 
struggles and rivalries is as a result of the nature of the international system, not 
the nature of the state. Kenneth Waltz (1979, 1993) takes this systemic 
approach and also challenges the traditional realists’ emphasis on military 
power; instead he recognises that power can be seen in terms of combined 
capabilities. Waltz defines a system as, at one level consisting of a structure 
and at another level consisting of interacting units, with the aim of systems 
theory to show how the two levels operate and interact. 
 
With its foundations in idealism, liberalism is a state level theory that 
acknowledges economic and cultural aspects of relations between states, and 
not just those concerned with politics and security. Instead of seeing the system 
as completely anarchic theorists cite the number of interconnections, the 
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interdependence and the co-operation that exists between states, international 
organisations and other actors, which creates a web of connections. It also 
brings into the equation the concept of values.  
 
Taking Immanuel Kant (1795) as his starting point Michael Doyle (1983, p.213) 
sets out his democratic peace theory, which argues that “there exists a 
significant predisposition against warfare between liberal states.” As citizens of 
liberal states enjoy the three liberal rights; freedom from arbitrary authority, 
social and economic rights and the right to democratic participation or 
representation, this is then translated to the international level. It then holds that 
state sovereignty is a basic tenet of liberal international theory. It also has 
implications for wider exchanges between individuals, beyond the mere political 
or security levels. Doyle (1983, p.213) argues that “when states respect each 
other’s rights, individuals are free to establish private international ties without 
state interference.”  This applies across a wide range of activities from trade 
relations to educational provision. 
 
However, Markus Fischer (2000, p. 1) argues that although “war is almost 
unthinkable among the democratic nations of the west” this is more to do with 
democracy than liberalism, as there is a clear distinction between the two 
concepts. Fischer does acknowledge the significance of the democratic peace 
argument for “it suggests nothing less than suspension of anarchic constraint – 
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the fact that fear induces every state to perceive all others at least as potential 
enemies.” (Fischer, 2000, p.1) 
 
As a system level analysis neoliberalism focuses on the way in which 
institutions influence the behaviour of states by championing values and 
promoting certain behaviour through the implementation of rules. The system is 
still perceived as anarchic and state-centric but rather than pursuing relative 
gains to other states, in a zero-sum game, states should instead be concerned 
with absolute gains. Robert Keohane (1984, 1994, 1998, 2005) investigates the 
roles that international institutions play. He argues that “institutions create the 
capability for states to co-operate in mutually beneficial ways by reducing the 
costs of making and enforcing agreement.” (Keohane, 1998, p.86) Institutions 
can reinforce practices or reciprocity and provide incentives for governments to 
keep their commitments to ensure others do. Even superpowers need general 
rules as the cost of attempting to exert their influence bilaterally would be too 
great. However, the US, even as a superpower, does not necessarily rely on the 
UN system to gain its influence; instead organisations such as NATO are used 
to great effect.  The rise of neoliberalism as an economic and political system 
will be discussed in the second part of this chapter. 
 
Through the concept of ‘structure of identity and interest’ Alexander Wendt 
(1992) develops the notion that states will act towards other states on the basis 
of the meaning that an object, in this case another state, will have for the state. 
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This is similar to how individuals act towards external objects. This is highlighted 
by a state’s behaviour towards another state, as a friend or enemy. He argues 
that the concepts of anarchy or the distribution of power do not explain this 
distinction but a ‘distribution of knowledge’ that depends on inter-subjective 
understandings and expectations, does offer an explanation. Wendt calls for a 
constructivist approach as he sets out his argument for the social construction of 
power. 
 
Norms play an important part in constructivist theory, as Martha Finnemore 
(1996) argues through her examination of the reasons for humanitarian 
intervention. Her examples include military actions to deliver humanitarian 
assistance in Bosnia, Cambodia and Somalia; however the international political 
landscape has changed since September 2001. Nonetheless her argument is 
still valid as she recognises that actions have to be understood in a changing 
normative context. This constructivist approach does not deny the importance of 
power or interest, the central principles of realists and neoliberalists, but instead 
argues for a more in-depth analysis of these two principles, to determine the 
actual interests involved, and the ends to which and the means by which power 
will be used. 
 
The realist heritage of both realist and neoliberal theories are criticised by 
cognitivists that challenge the assumption that states are rational actors, which 
are inherently static entities that do not learn. Instead cognitivists, both weak 
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and strong, believe that the positivist methodology of the realist-based theories 
do not take into consideration how social norms work. Both strands of 
cognitivists are knowledge-based theories with their attention “focussed on the 
origins of interests as perceived by states, accentuating the role of the 
normative and causal beliefs of decision-makers.” (Hasenclever, Mayer and 
Rittberger, 1996, p.206)  
 
Weak cognitivists have three assumptions that form the foundation of their 
theory: interpretation based on knowledge that shapes perceptions of reality, the 
importance of intersubjectively shared meanings and the growing demand from 
decision-makers for scientific or alternative authoritative information to reduce 
uncertainty. Peter Haas (1993) argues that actors’ interests cannot be taken as 
a ‘given’ as interpretation, based on the knowledge held by actors, shapes their 
perception of reality. Interests should be treated analytically, taking into 
consideration the actors’ understanding of the natural and social world. This will 
allow for the establishment of share meanings. Haas (1992, p.29) argues that: 
“Before states can agree on whether and how to deal collectively with a specific 
problem, they must reach some consensus about the nature and scope of the 
problem and also about the manner in which the problem relates to other 
concerns in the same and additional areas.” This is essential for any progress to 
be made on collective action, including the work of an international organisation. 
 
137 
 
To assist decision-makers in finding an intersubjectively shared meaning 
scientific or another source of assumed authoritative knowledge is required. 
This can be provided by the epistemic communities. These networks of 
professionals offer expertise in policy-relevant knowledge, they share a common 
understanding of particular problems and potential solutions and they often 
operate trans-nationally.  
 
Strong cognitivists offer a more radical critique of mainstream rationalist 
theorists and embrace a more profound institutionalism/institution-centric 
approach. They challenge the basic assumptions of both the realists and 
neoliberals that the interests and powers of state actors should be the starting 
point for analysis. Instead they focus their attention on the analysis of normative 
structures in their own right.  
Regime Theory as a Framework of Analysis to 
Examine FAO 
FAO is an ideal candidate to be the subject of an analysis using regime theory, 
as an international institution working within the international system, and as a 
specialised agency of the United Nations. Regime theory can be used to 
critically examine its evolving role and changing relationships with its member 
states.  
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Analysing the behaviour of states within the international system has been the 
mainstay of many scholarly endeavours, from Krasner (1983) and Keohane 
(1993) to the twenty-first century with the examination of the complexities of the 
regime system (Davis, 2009; Alter and Meunier, 2009; Ward, 2006; Skjaerseth 
and Wettestad, 2002). Initially it can be argued that there are a number of 
similarities between the three main schools of thought: interest-based, mainly 
neoliberal theories; power-based, realist theories; and knowledge-based, 
cognitivists, both weak and strong. All take the state, admittedly in varying 
degrees, as the main actor, and accept that regimes and institutions are 
important in formulating behaviour; and yet there are differing opinions on 
actors’ specific roles and motivations or the nature or level of the influence of 
institutions. 
 
The mainstream in this field are those concerned with interest-based theories, 
both neoliberal and institutionalists. It can be argued that these theorists place 
their liberal ideals, including their belief in common interests and that institutions 
are able to facilitate co-operation between states, upon realist assumptions, 
such as the supremacy of the state within an anarchic international system in 
which states act rationally driven by their own interests (Hasenclever, Mayer 
and Rittberger, 1997). This acceptance of realist assumptions has drawn 
criticism from cognitivists. 
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Unlike the interest-based theorists and cognitivists, realists do not accept the 
complete autonomous nature of regimes or institutions; however institutions are 
seen as potential sources of power. Realists are concerned with the distribution 
of power, arguing that states care about relative gains, thus making co-
operation more difficult. Even so weaker states may gain from co-operation, and 
therefore enjoy increased levels of power and influence within institutions, 
depending on the circumstances. For example, the voting system in FAO is 
based upon a one member one vote system, rather than weighted voting as 
implemented by the international financial institutions.  
 
Nonetheless the predominant traditional realist model, hegemonic stability 
theory (Kindleberger, [1973] 1986), argues that there is no substitute for a 
strong hegemon within the system. It can be argued that the role that the United 
States played, especially in the early development of FAO, was that of a 
hegemon keen to protect its own autonomy and position. This will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. Krasner (1993) offers an alternative realist model to 
counter hegemonic stability theory when he calls for a power-orientated 
research programme to examine the relative gains and losses of actors. 
Regimes are seen as distributors of power and interests, through which the 
players, game rules and pay-offs are decided by those with power.  
 
Although states will not allow institutions to become significant autonomous 
actors they are not viewed as empty vessels. Koremenos, Lipson and Snidel 
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(2001, p.762) argue that: “states spend significant amounts of time and effort 
constructing institutions precisely because they can advance or impede state 
goals in the international economy, the environment and national security. 
States fight over institutional design because it affects outcomes.” As far as 
realists are concerned regimes may not be powerful in their own right but 
instead can be instruments used to distribute power and influence, especially if 
designed by the powerful in a way to suit their own needs. 
 
As a sociological-based theory cognitivism sets itself apart from the rational 
theorists in a number of ways, from challenging the assumed pre-eminence of 
the state-centric model to the level of autonomy regimes and institutions are 
regarded to possess. Strong cognitivists also go so far as to challenge the 
foundational positivist methodology used by both rationalists’ theories. 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996) Interpretation based on knowledge, 
which shapes perceptions of reality; the importance of intersubjectively shared 
meanings, based on a minimum of collective understanding; and the demand for 
scientific or other authoritative information required by decision-makers, are the 
three assumptions that form the foundation of the weak cognitivists’ theory 
(Haas, 1993). All three assumptions are interlinked and highlight the crucial role 
played by networks of professionals, termed epistemic communities, which 
provide expertise in policy relevant areas. 
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Key Themes and their impact on FAO 
All three schools of thought within regime theory are concerned with four 
interlinked key themes: the identity of the main actors, whether state or non-
state entities; the level of autonomy enjoyed by regimes or institutions; the 
interdependence of states and other actors within the international system; and 
the level of importance granted to information, and communities that provide it.  
 
Main Actor Identity 
In the first of the four key themes addressed all the theorists identify states as 
the main actors within regimes and institutions. This realist assumption is 
accepted readily by interest-based theorists but is at least partially challenged 
by cognitivists, who recognise other actors as players, such as epistemic 
communities, and argue that different interests are difficult to assess within the 
complex international system (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997).  
 
In the traditional theories a number of influential non-state actors that operate 
within the international system are not sufficiently taken into account, from 
multinational corporations and hedge-fund managers to civil society and non-
government organisations. These non-state actors can be easily identified within 
the food and agriculture sphere. Although not members of FAO, they 
nonetheless exert influence on the global food system, be this through the 
provision of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides to the world’s farmers, speculation 
in food commodities on the global markets, or organised action by farmers or on 
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behalf of farmers, or other interest groups, such as consumers or environmental 
activists. These non-state actors, although influential, have existed on the 
periphery of the global governance system but this situation is changing through 
the reform, which started in 2009, of the FAO’s Committee on World Food 
Security. This will be examined in more detail in the final chapters. 
Level of Autonomy 
There is a higher level of disagreement in relation to the second key theme; the 
level of autonomy enjoyed by regimes. Although realists recognise regimes as 
sources of power they question their real influence within a state-centric 
anarchic system, in which states act rationally with their own interests as their 
driving force. Interest-based theorists may agree that states are rational actors 
but argue that there exists a higher level of co-operation between states through 
regimes. The cognitivists, especially those adherents of strong cognitivism, take 
this a step further by arguing that states comply with rules set down by regimes 
through a ‘sense of obligation’ (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). As 
will be argued below the autonomy of a regime, or institution, may be 
undermined by powerful states when their national interest is seen to be 
threatened, as demonstrated by the United States on numerous occasions 
throughout FAO’s history (Staples, 2006). 
Interdependence within the International System 
The second key theme is closely linked to the third; the level of interdependence 
within the international system. Realists argue that there is little 
143 
 
interdependence and that the system comprises of independent rational states. 
Interest-based theorists believe that institutions facilitate co-operation within an 
increasingly interdependent world, in which there are common interests. These 
common interests may be brought into focus through external shocks or crises 
forcing co-operation in establishing and maintaining a regime or institution; itself 
a costly enterprise (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). For example, the 
desperate situation endured by millions of people following the Second World 
War and the Great Depression of the 1930s, including widespread hunger, with 
half of the world’s population malnourished, (Mayne, 1947) acted as the catalyst 
for the world to establish, not only FAO, but the United Nations itself; a move 
driven by a number of interconnected crises in a world far more interdependent 
than at any previous time (Staples, 2006). 
Importance of Information 
The founders of the FAO, John Boyd Orr, Frank McDougall and Stanley Bruce, 
were keen advocates of internationalism, a concept that links the key themes of 
interdependence and the importance of information, the fourth theme to be 
addressed by regime theorists. During the twentieth century there emerged a 
body of international experts within various fields working across international 
boundaries to promote the well-being of the world’s people, and with it 
developed the concept of internationalism. This proved to be a critical element 
in the foundation of the United Nations, and its specialised agencies. Amy 
Staples (2006, p.2) argues that:  
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[T]hey actively and consciously constructed for themselves and 
their organisations an international identity that animated their 
revolutionary work around the globe. That international identity 
grew out of their faith in progressive ideals, their own 
professional ideology, and their commitment to building 
networks of co-operation that included a broad range of 
organisations.  
The founders of FAO were driven by these ideals of internationalism and the 
belief that equipped with the best facts and figures relating to harvests, 
population numbers and malnutrition levels they would be able to solve the 
world’s food production and distribution failings. They believed that information 
was the first step towards this aim. 
 
All scholars of regimes place high regard on information, to monitor state 
behaviour, as neoliberals believe; to establish stability through co-ordination, as 
the realists argue; or to limit uncertainty, a stance taken by the cognitivists 
(Hasenclever, Meyers and Rittberger, 1996). As previously stated the weak 
cognitivists build their theories on three assumptions: interpretation, which 
shapes perceptions of reality; intersubjectively shared meanings, based on 
collective understanding; and increased demand for authoritative knowledge, all 
of which spur the necessity for epistemic communities.  
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By supplying knowledge to those making decisions the epistemic communities 
exert influence within the system, a fact that has become increasingly apparent 
as interest groups, NGOs and multinational corporations all vie to lobby 
decision-makers at global gatherings. This is especially evident in the 
governance of food and agriculture, which has a number of epistemic 
communities, from the international research institutes of CGIAR (Consultative 
Group International Agriculture Research) to the grassroots organisations of the 
peasant farmers, who have first-hand knowledge of agriculture, not to mention 
FAO itself. Serving different interest groups these communities may often 
supply contradictory information to decision-makers.  
 
It can be argued that all three schools of thought offer elements relevant to the 
analysis of the FAO. The interest-based theories offer insight into the co-
operation given by the organisation’s member states, especially necessary for 
its creation and evolution; realists’ interpretation of the actions of rational and 
self-interested states explain the actions of states aiming to protect their own 
agricultural sectors within the global system; and the cognitivists’ stance on 
epistemic communities is very relevant to the various communities of experts 
operating in and around the agricultural sector. At the heart of these key issues 
are the four themes examined by regime theory: the identity of the main actors; 
level of autonomy of institutions; interdependence within the system and the 
importance granted to information. 
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All the main theories have some elements to recommend them for the analysis 
of international institutions however the knowledge-based theories of 
cognitivism offer the most logical framework. Taking knowledge as the starting 
point, rather than the power of the state, gives more scope for understanding 
the role of FAO as a knowledge-based and knowledge-creating organisation 
endeavouring to inform, set norms and standards and achieve food security 
through greater understanding. This may be far from the ideal envisaged by its 
founders, who wanted an organisation that could regulate as well as advise, 
nevertheless it is a role that FAO should attempt to perform well. 
FAO’s Epistemic Community 
The founders of FAO envisaged an organisation that would enable the states of 
the world to co-ordinate their actions to increase food production and aid its 
distribution to those who needed it to ensure everyone received a well-balanced 
and nutritious diet. They believed that to achieve this goal FAO would need to 
be an activist regulatory organisation with authority; an organisation that could 
manage the world’s resources rather than merely conduct studies to monitor the 
situation. However key questions were raised as to how much power FAO 
would possess and how much sovereignty member governments would be 
required to sacrifice for the greater good. (Staples, 2006) Would FAO have the 
power to regulate the global supply of agricultural commodities in order to 
support world prices? And would the organisation have the authority to distribute 
subsidised food to developing countries; to people who needed it? In other 
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words would FAO be an activist regulatory organisation, or merely an advisory 
body? 
 
Before World War Two the champions of nutrition Frank McDougall, Stanley 
Bruce and John Boyd Orr, were conducting research into the importance of 
nutrition. (Their work and the history of FAO will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter). They provided scientific evidence to support the emerging 
concept of nutrition and were acknowledged as the experts on food and nutrition 
within the international sphere; they formed the epistemic community at the 
heart of FAO’s creation. They were believers in an interdependent world in 
which institutions would work for the good of all people, above narrow 
nationalistic concerns.  
 
Peter Haas (1993) argues that networks of professionals can influence 
international policy to aid the creation and maintenance of international regimes 
and organisations, if there is uncertainty, aided by a crisis or shock; a high 
degree of consensual knowledge among the experts and if the epistemic 
community gains political power.  
 
In the case of FAO all these conditions were met, with World War Two, following 
the Great Depression, acting as the biggest shock ever experienced by the 
international community; the members of the epistemic community were in 
agreement on the value of nutrition for health. These champions of nutrition 
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gained political power, as they actively lobbied politicians, going so far as 
approaching President Roosevelt himself, for an international organisation and 
were key figures in its creation (O’Brien, 2000). They envisaged an organisation 
with more political autonomy and authority than the International Institute of 
Agriculture, which had been set up in 1905 and later taken under the League of 
Nation’s umbrella, to conduct surveys of agricultural production (Staples, 2006). 
In fact the epistemic community was fighting for the creation of an activist 
regulatory, rather than advisory, organisation to manage the world’s resources; 
an organisation that would challenge the autonomy of states within the system 
in relation to food and agriculture. 
Changes in the International System 
Capitalism in the Post War Era  
Despite the hopes of its founders FAO has always been limited by the 
international system in which it was only one small component. By the end of 
the war the US had half the world’s wealth and commanded a position of power 
not seen before; only the USSR offered any balance. (Chomsky, 1999) The 
principal architects of the new global institutions wanted to use this power to 
design a system that served their interests. Diplomatic historian Gerald Haines 
(quoted in Chomsky, [1998] 1998, p.20) argued: “Following World War Two the 
United States assumed, out of self-interest, responsibility for the welfare of the 
world capitalist system.” This can be seen in the creation of the Bretton Woods 
institutional architecture, most notably the IMF and World Bank, which was 
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designed to oversee the global financial system, arguably based largely on US 
ideology. This ideology posed problems for the champions of nutrition and their 
ideas of creating an organisation to regulate global food production and 
distribution. The efforts of FAO’s first directors general to promote policies to 
ensure food security and the obstacles they faced within the system will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy (2011) referred to this phase of capitalism 
as the ‘post war compromise’ that had followed the ‘first financial hegemony’. 
This post-war capitalism was designed to promote the free flow of trade through 
a system of fixed exchange rates. However, it was not a system of unregulated 
free trade, but instead based on Keynesian policies that allowed for greater 
state intervention in the economy, helped to increase purchasing power, and 
with policies to promote full employment and the creation of some form of 
welfare state with health, education and retirement provision, as well as 
containment of financial; that is capital, interests. David Kotz (2015) argues that 
the state was seen as an important actor in the economy during this stage of 
‘regulated capitalism’ as it provided an expanded supply of public goods, 
including social services and infrastructure, as well as pursuing other goals to 
correct market failures. Overall this dominant Keynesian economic orthodoxy 
promoted policies aimed at stabilizing the business cycle.  
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As part of this regulated capitalism the Bretton Woods institutions were created 
to fulfil Keynesian objectives. The prime responsibility of the IMF was to assist 
countries suffering from short-term trade imbalances; the World Bank had been 
established to create longer-term conditions of expansion. (Watkins, 1995) The 
system encouraged trade in goods with a gradual reduction of barriers. 
Nevertheless significant tariffs were still allowed in certain circumstances and 
states were still able to control capital movements in a variety of ways. This 
system started to break down in the late 1960s and then completely in 1973 
when the US government announced unilaterally the dollar would be allowed to 
float, to rise and fall based on market forces, in the international currency 
markets. Prior to this the system had operated on fixed interest rates with the 
major powers’ currencies tied to the US dollar, which was backed by gold. (Kotz, 
2015) Chaos followed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system until a new 
system emerged in the 1980s. 
The Rise of Neoliberalism 
Capitalism has evolved through different stages throughout history culminating 
in its latest incarnation, neoliberalism. Initially associated with US President 
Ronald Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, neoliberalism has 
become the dominant global political economic trend adopted by political parties 
of the centre, as well as those of the left and right (Chomsky, 1999). Since the 
1970s when there was an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism almost all states 
have embraced some form of neoliberal theory, some voluntarily and some by 
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coercion through structural adjustment (Harvey, 2005). As this new system was 
implemented through the 1980s and 1990s free movement of goods, services, 
capital and money were emphasised, the IMF, World Bank and WTO became 
the system’s enforcers and Keynesianism was renounced. (Kotz, 2015) 
 
Also known as the Washington Consensus, due to its close association with US 
economic ideology, neoliberalism comprises an array of market orientated 
principles, often implemented in developing countries through SAPs, as 
discussed in chapter one. There are three basic tenets of neoliberalism: the 
liberalisation of trade and finance to allow the markets to set the price, the 
promotion of macroeconomic stability by ending inflation and the implementation 
of wide-spread privatisation (Chomsky, 1999). As an economic theory it is 
simply liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation; through its implementation, 
however, it has also become a political and social system. 
 
Neoliberalism values individualism, with the market seen as the mechanism 
through which individual choice can drive the economy. “The state, by contrast, 
is seen as an enemy of individual liberty, a threat to private property and a 
parasite living off the hard work of individuals” (Kotz, 2015, p.11). The system 
has been designed to benefit the wealthy. This is not surprising; McChesney 
argues that the principle architects of the neoliberal Washington Consensus are 
the masters of the private economy and as such want governments to stay out 
of important decision-making processes. Governments are portrayed as 
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“incompetent, bureaucratic and parasitic” and hinder the “free policies that 
encourage private enterprise and consumer choice, reward personal 
responsibility and entrepreneurial initiative.” To ensure this message is accepted 
“a generation of corporate-financed public relations efforts has given these 
terms and ideas a near sacred aura” (1998, p.7).  
 
This link between individual economic freedom and democracy was made by 
Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman (2002 [1962], p.9) when he 
argued that the “historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation 
between political freedom and a free market.” In his 1962 book Capitalism and 
Freedom in which he puts forward the case for capitalism he advocated the end 
of the Bretton Woods system and the introduction of a floating exchange rate; 
two developments that would follow within a decade. 
 
Chomsky (1998, p.7) argues neoliberalism refers to “the policies and processes 
whereby a handful of private interests are permitted to control as much as 
possible of social life in order to maximise their personal profit.” It has been 
adopted by political parties, from across the centre ground, which represent the 
immediate interests of extremely wealthy investors and has been instrumental in 
changing four main types of institutions: the global economy, the role of 
government in the economy, the relationship between capital and labour and the 
corporate sector. (Chomsky, 1998; Kotz, 2015) Harvey (2005, p.3) argues that 
the implementation of neoliberal policies has “entailed much ‘creative 
153 
 
destruction’, not only of institutional frameworks and powers (even challenging 
traditional forms of state sovereignty) but also the division of labour, social 
relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, 
reproductive activities, attachments to land and habits of the heart.”  
 
Neoliberalism has been described as “capitalism with the gloves off” in which 
“business forces are stronger and more aggressive and face less organised 
opposition than ever before.” (McChesney, 1998, p.9) As it has evolved since its 
initial introduction in the early 1980s neoliberalism has been associated with two 
related developments; globalisation and financialisation. Gerald A. Epstein 
(2005, p.3) describes financialisation as “the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of 
the domestic and international economies.” Dumenil and Levy argue (2011, p.8) 
that the increased financialisation has enabled large income flows “from the 
growing indebtedness of households and government” and that “extreme 
degrees of sophistication and expansion of financial mechanisms were reached 
after 2000, allowing for tremendous incomes in the financial sector and in rich 
households.” This created even greater inequality. The removal of safety nets 
has only made the situation worse for the poor. 
 
According to Richard Higgot and Eva Erman (2010) this integration of the global 
economy through liberalisation of the trade regime, deregulation of the financial 
markets and the privatisation of state assets led to globalisation. Higgot and 
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Erman (2010, p449) argue that along with this deregulation there has to be the 
“development of norms, institutions and processes to manage globalisation” 
otherwise “many of the advantages it has brought the world could be undone by 
a failure to mitigate the excesses and negative consequences that emanate 
from it, especially for large sections of the world’s poor.” 
 
Joseph Stiglitz (2002) highlights the benefits of globalisation but concedes that 
many of these benefits have been enjoyed by just a few. Written before the 
global financial crisis of 2008 he bases his analysis on the economies of East 
Asia following the 1997-1998 economic crisis in the region. He argues that 
globalisation has worked most effectively when government takes an active role 
in managing the economy. Taking South Korea and Taiwan as examples of the 
most successful globalising countries Stiglitz argues (2002, p.1) that this was 
possible because each country “determined its own pace of change; each made 
sure as it grew that the benefits were shared equitably; each rejected the basic 
tenets of the Washington Consensus, which argued for a minimalist role of 
government and rapid privatisation and liberalisation.” These countries had 
been successful by making globalisation work for them and it was only “when 
they succumbed to the pressures from the outside that they ran into problems 
that were beyond their own capacity to manage well.” (Stiglitz, 2002, p.2) 
 
Bayliss et al (2011, p.6) argue that the World Bank “was instrumental in 
promoting the neoliberal perspectives on development that came to dominate 
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the agenda of many international development actors during the 1980s.” 
However, by the late 1990s the World Bank, at least in principal, was moving 
towards a more comprehensive approach to development. (World Bank, 2001) 
Despite this broadening of the definitions of poverty to include, among others, 
low achievement in education, health and nutrition, as well as powerlessness 
and vulnerability Bayliss et al (2011) argue that this was not a fundamental 
departure from neoliberalism but instead the start of the second phase. The first 
phase, Washington Consensus, had seen the extension of the markets and 
maximum privatisation, and the Post Washington Consensus (PWC) second 
phase, saw the state used to correct market imperfections, through initiatives 
such as public-private partnerships. As part of this shift the World Bank looked 
for complementarities between its private and public sector arms by mobilising 
private finance for development projects. The authors (2011, p.8) argue that 
neoliberalism “has always been a contradictory and shifting amalgam of 
ideology, scholarship and policy in practice. In particular, neoliberalism has 
never been short of state intervention. Indeed, it has positively deployed it to 
promote not so much the amorphous market as the interests of private capital.” 
The World Bank’s moves to support institution and capacity building activities to 
aid the expansion of the private sector into non-traditional areas of development 
including health and education highlight this objective. (Bayliss et al, 2011) 
 
The World Bank’s rhetoric on pro-poor policies is clearly stated in its report on 
agriculture for development (2008), which calls for support for smallholder 
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farmers to help increase productivity, stimulate growth, overcome poverty and 
increase food security. It recognises the vital role agriculture must play in the 
achievement of the MDGs and focuses on ways to generate rural jobs by 
diversifying into labour-intensive, high value agriculture linked to a dynamic rural 
non-farm sector. However, Henry Veltmeyer (2009) argues that the report does 
nothing to move the World Bank’s position forward; instead it remains securely 
rooted in neoliberalism and is still anti-smallholder farming and anti-peasant. He 
states (2009, p.394) that it does nothing to “critically examine the development 
dynamics of the post-Washington Consensus on the need for a more inclusive 
form of neoliberalism and a more participatory and equitable form of 
development.” He also challenges its assumption that “the most practical and 
advisable solution to the problem of rural poverty is for many of the 
‘economically inefficient’ rural poor to abandon farming and exit the 
countryside.” (Veltmeyer, 2009, p.394) 
 
Neoliberalism, in both its phases, has become the dominant economic and 
political belief system of the last three decades. The impact of neoliberal policies 
has been clear to see in the agricultural sector, as described in chapter one, 
from significantly increasing food insecurity to placing additional strain on the 
environment. (Rogers, 2008b; Clapp, 2006; Weis, 2007; De Schutter, 2014)  
 
The financialisation, deregulation and privatisation have promoted a series of 
economic expansions, but have also created the conditions for the system’s 
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eventual collapse. Kotz (2015, p.5) argues that the crisis that started in 2008 
was not just a financial crisis but instead “a structural crisis of the neoliberal 
form of capitalism.” As the crisis was unfolding Kotz (2008) argued that 
neoliberal capitalism would have to be replaced by some other form of 
capitalism as state bailouts and imposition of new regulations would not be 
enough to allow the system to return to a business-as-usual model. It may have 
promoted high profits and economic expansion for a time but he predicted 
(2008, p.2) that “eventually the contradictions of that form of capitalism 
undermine its continuing operation, leading to systemic crisis.” An examination 
of the effects of the 2008 global crisis is beyond the remit of this thesis. 
Conclusion 
The main theories of international relations, realism, neo-realism, liberalism, 
neoliberalism, constructivism and cognitivism are all concerned with the identity 
of the actors within the international system, the ways in which they interact with 
each other, and the role that information plays in these relationships. As a 
knowledge-based organisation FAO has a vital role as a provider of information, 
through its own epistemic community and its ability to bring together other 
actors. This will be examined in greater detail in later chapters. 
 
FAO does not operate in a vacuum and therefore an understanding of the 
system within which the organisation is situated is essential. FAO was 
established at the end of World War Two as part of an international system 
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balanced between regulated capitalism and communism; as the communist 
states only partially engaged with the UN agencies the greatest influence on 
these agencies was the US and regulated capitalism. This was replaced after 
the economic crisis in the 1970s with a system of unregulated capitalism, 
neoliberalism. Both exerted their influence on FAO as well as the wider 
international system in many different ways. 
 
In the next two chapters the history of FAO from its post-war creation to the 
World Food Conference in 1974, and then from 1974 until 2007, the date of 
FAO’s reform, will be examined in detail.  
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Chapter Four: 
FAO from Idealism to Reality (1945 – 
1974) 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the emerging concept of nutrition during the pre-war 
years, as championed by the League of Nations’ Mixed Committee and 
individuals working within the field, such as Frank McDougall, Stanley Bruce 
and John Boyd Orr. This work led directly to the Hot Springs Conference and its 
recommendation to create a permanent organisation, the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), through the work of an Interim 
Commission. The sequence of developments  will be followed from the Final Act 
of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture,13 the outcome of the 
Hot Springs Conference (1943); the work of the Interim Commission (from July 
1943 to October 1945), and the final constitution as accepted at the Quebec 
Conference on 16 October 1945, which formally established FAO. An 
examination of the founding principles of FAO, as first proposed at Hot Springs 
and then enacted in the constitution will be made, followed by a review of FAO’s 
organisational structure and early history up until 1974 and the World Food 
Conference, held in Rome. Highlighted will be Boyd Orr’s World Food Board 
proposal, Dodd’s vision for an International Commodities Clearing House and 
Sen’s ambitious Freedom From Hunger Campaign. 
                                            
13
 The term United Nations referred to the Allied Nations that participated in this conference, not 
the United Nations organisation, which was not established until October 24, 1945 (UN, 2012). 
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As different actors arrived at the negotiating table with their own agendas, a 
number of themes and issues emerged: the strong desire for a better post-war 
world; the evolving concept of nutrition and the scope of its applicability; visions 
of a shift in production and distribution methods that required massive 
population upheaval and adjustment; belief in science to deliver results; and the 
reconstruction and restructuring of the economic landscape. However, despite 
the common desire to create a better world, there had always been a struggle at 
the heart of FAO, between those who worked towards the creation of a 
proactive organisation with authority to regulate production and distribution of 
food and those who wished to curb its influence and instead establish an 
organisation to act as an advisory body with limited jurisdiction over sovereign 
states. These issues were debated even as the Allied armies fought for victory. 
 
Delegates at the Hot Springs Conference envisaged a better post-war world; 
one in which all peoples would be free from the horrors of want and fear – an 
ideal captured by President Roosevelt in his State of the Union Address in 1941, 
in which he called for freedom from want and fear
14
 (Roosevelt, 1941). This was 
the first of a number of conferences15 to bring together delegates from the Allied 
                                            
14
 Roosevelt’s drive for freedom from fear and want was later enshrined in the Atlantic Charter, 
signed in August 1941 by Roosevelt and Churchill (NATO, 1941) 
15
 For example there were several meetings and conferences, most notably the Quebec 
Conference in August 1943 and the San Francisco Conference in 1945 at which the concept 
and then the charter of the United Nations were established (US Department of State). Between 
July 1 and 22, 1944 the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods 
agreed  the new rules for the international monetary system and established the International 
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Nations as they started to plan for the world after hostilities and it was no 
accident that the theme of the first was food. Food was widely seen as a non-
political and unifying issue, since food - or more accurately the lack of it - had 
long been the focus of much international attention. During the 1930s, as the 
Great Depression illustrated the unconscionable condition, hunger in the midst 
plenty, the work of the Mixed Committee of the League of Nations had drawn 
attention to the plight of millions around the world. In the United States and 
Western Europe it was estimated that between 20 percent and 30 percent of the 
population were malnourished; and although shocking in their own right, these 
figures pale in comparison to those of Asia, in which an estimated 75 percent of 
the 1150 million inhabitants consumed diets far below the standard necessary 
for health (Boudreau, 1943). The Second World War made a dire situation even 
worse. 
The Champions of Nutrition 
Even before war broke out millions lacked the basic level of food required for 
health. In the 1930s around one third of the population in the United States were 
poorly fed. (Hambidge, 1955) Pre war poor nutritional standards were 
highlighted by the League, as part of what John Black (1943) termed the 
International Food Movement. Although the need for adequate quantities of food 
was widely recognised the importance of the “recent discoveries of the newer 
                                                                                                                               
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (US 
Department of State) 
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knowledge of nutrition” (Black, 1943, p792) were only understood within a 
narrow scientific context16.  
 
Therefore despite work being carried out on nutrition as a factor for human 
health, by the Health Organisation of the League and the International Labour 
Organisation, it was only when, Stanley Bruce, the High Commissioner and 
former Australian Prime Minister, expounded its virtues that it gained wider 
political acknowledgement. In a 1935 speech to the League, Bruce advocated 
the “marrying health and agriculture” (O’Brien, 2000). In addition he proposed 
the setting up of a Mixed Committee on Nutrition, to which national nutrition 
committees would report their findings of studies into issues and policies relating 
to food and nutrition in the national context, including the compilation of dietary 
surveys. The model, which would be adopted by FAO, proved successful, with 
the establishment of national nutrition committees in 23 countries and 26 British 
dependencies before the interruption of war (Boudreau, 1943). 
 
Throughout the 1930s there had been an emerging consensus on the need not 
just for enough food but for nutritious food; this link between nutrition and health 
had been a huge leap forward in understanding. In addition, the connection 
between poverty and malnutrition (Boyd Orr, 1936) had also been made, as 
                                            
16
 The discovery of vitamins had only been made twenty years previously by Casimir Funk, who 
through his research into beri beri, scurvy, pellagra and rickets came to the conclusion, in 1912, 
that these conditions were caused by a deficiency in a special substance, which he called 
vitamine but later the ‘e’ was dropped.  
(Jones, 1992) Elmer Vernon McCollum through his work into rickets discovered Vitamin A and B 
between 1912 and 1915 and Vitamin D in the early 1920s (Holt, 1968)  
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adequate amounts of food remained out of reach of those in need because they 
lacked the purchasing power to buy it while at the same time farmers faced 
bankruptcy with no market for their surplus produce. Boudreau (1943) argued 
that this waste and injustice was viewed as a threat to civilisation itself.   
 
During the inter-war years Frank McDougall shifted his thinking from one based 
on Empire Trade, described by O’Brien (2000, p165) as “narrowly focussed, 
restrictive, combative and essentially pandered to xenophobic nationalistic 
instincts and pursuits that could best be realised within the limits of a confined 
section of the world and to hell with the rest” to the ideologically opposed 
position of support for nutrition, which he argued was “world embracing, hostile 
to institutional barriers, national or otherwise, favoured movements of people 
and produce and ultimately championed a redistribution of wealth that would 
provide a well balanced nutritional diet for the greatest possible number.” In his 
1935 memorandum entitled ‘The Agricultural and the Health Problems’  
McDougall would “argue a bankruptcy of statesmanship if it should prove 
impossible to bring together a great unsatisfied need for highly nutritious food 
and the immense potential production of modern agriculture.” (McDougall; F.L. 
1972)  In a move away from empire trade, McDougall proposed a lowering of 
tariff barriers as one component in the fight against malnutrition and argued for 
nutritional standards to be raised.  
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McDougall was not the only voice calling for a different approach to production 
and trade that was not centred on tariff barriers, focusing instead on the needs 
of consumers rather than just those of producers. John Boyd Orr (1943) had 
also called for the increased production of protective foods17, offering better 
nutritional value than cereals. And H. R. Tolley, head of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration in the United States, attempted to shift agricultural 
production from cereals and cotton to protective foods, but with little success 
(Black, 1943).  
 
Another influential figure, who worked closely with McDougall on promoting the 
issue of nutrition, was the High Commissioner and former Australian Prime 
Minister, Stanley Bruce. He expounded its virtues in his phrase “marrying health 
and agriculture” in his speech to the League in 1935 (O’Brien, 2000). He called 
for a world food plan based on human needs co-ordinated through the League, 
which would, he argued, bring prosperity to agriculture and to the wider 
economy (Shaw, 2007). In the following year Boyd Orr, along with his 
colleagues at the Rowlett Institute, published Food, Health and Income which 
provided evidence that at least one third of the UK population was malnourished 
(Boyd Orr, 1936). However during the war Britain was forced to introduce a 
system of food rationing. Boyd Orr’s research was used to plan the 
                                            
17
 The idea of protective foods was introduced in World War Two, building on the work of Boyd 
Orr and other nutrition experts. By the 1930s the importance of a well-balanced diet of dairy 
foods, fruit and vegetables, whole grains and pulses had been recognised and the rations 
system was based upon this understanding. In Britain mortality rates from malnutrition fell. 
(Jones, 1992) 
165 
 
management of food based on the nutritional needs of the whole population and 
of particular groups, including children, nursing mothers and workers in war 
industries. Rationing “was so effective that in spite of food shortages, bombing, 
difficulties of transport and the monotony of the wartime diet, the poorer people 
were fed better than they had ever been.” (Hambidge, 1955, p.48) Rationing, 
although unpopular, had proved a success and given Boyd Orr further evidence 
to support his argument for improved nutritional standards. 
 
McDougall, Boyd Orr and Bruce, known as ‘the men from Geneva’ because of 
their work at the Geneva-based League of Nations, continued to work together. 
McDougall (1943) summarized their conclusions18 and highlighted the 
importance of the quality and quantity of food for national health improvements, 
the benefits of science as a tool to produce sufficient food, the positive effect 
that adopting sound nutritional standards around the world would have on 
agriculture and world trade, as well as the belief that to achieve these ends 
required international coordination of national action and international 
assistance to many countries (Black, 1943).  
 
These aims had developed through years of work studying malnutrition and the 
international system of food and agriculture during the depression. The 
advocates of these aims believed that the advances in technology and science 
                                            
18
 McDougall, F.L. (1943) International Aspects of Postwar Food and Agriculture in The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 1943 225 pp. 122-127 
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would enable the world to produce enough food, of sufficient quality, to feed a 
growing population; and changes in the economic system would allow people to 
purchase these agricultural products.  
 
To achieve these aims they believed in an interdependent world in which 
institutions would work for the good of all people, above narrow nationalistic 
concerns. They actively lobbied for an institution to govern the production and 
distribution of food, going so far as approaching President Roosevelt (O’Brien, 
2000) to argue their case. They were fighting for the creation of an activist and 
regulatory, rather than advisory, organisation to manage the world’s resources; 
an organisation that would challenge the autonomy of states within the 
international system in relation to food and agriculture. 
 
The champions of nutrition, in calling for the creation of an international 
organisation, were an active epistemic community, with a shared understanding 
of the importance of good nutrition. Congnitivists such as Haas (1993) argue 
that shared meanings, based on an understanding of the natural and social 
world, need to be established before consensus can be reached on the best 
course of action. The epistemic community were in agreement on the type of 
organisation they wanted for the world, however, although the other actors, 
namely states, agreed on the need for an international organisation to operate in 
the realm of food and agriculture, the ultimate purpose of this organisation was 
contested. Agreement was not gained on the level of authority the organisation 
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should possess, as states sought to protect their own sovereignty. Doyle (1983) 
argues that state sovereignty is a basic tenet of liberal international theory and 
throughout the history and development of FAO there is a reoccurrence of the 
conflict between states protecting their sovereignty and the epistemic 
community striving for a strong international organisation to operate in an 
interconnected world. 
Hot Springs Conference, 1943 
The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, known as the Hot 
Springs Conference, was a momentous event; taking place even before the end 
of hostilities it demonstrated the desire to build consensus and develop a 
framework for co-ordinated action to build a better world for the post-war 
population. Held in Virginia, in the United States, between 18 May and 3 June 
1943, it brought together representatives from 44 countries, and an observer 
from Denmark, between them representing about 75 percent of the world’s total 
population (Evang, 1943). Despite the fact only representatives from Allied 
Nations were present, delegates at the conference recognised the need to bring 
in other nations, even former enemies, once the war was over: the need to 
create a better post-war world was conceived from the start as an all-inclusive 
one. Frank Boudreau (1943, p324) captured the mood of the conference when 
he said:  
The delegates appreciated that they were meeting in wartime; that 
the war would not be won with the collapse of the Axis powers but 
must be won also in the economic, social and political fields. 
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Something of the urgency of war crept into their deliberations; they 
demanded immediate action and they left nothing to chance. 
At the conference experts within the field of food, agriculture and nutrition, 
joined government representatives to discuss the creation of an organisation for 
food and agriculture; bringing together state and non-state actors. Boyd Orr did 
not appear at the conference, since the British government had been angered 
by his study highlighting malnutrition in pre-war Britain, (Boyd Orr, 1966). 
However, he made a presentation via film, and received a standing ovation 
when he called on those present to join the war on want, taking his lead from 
President Roosevelt.  
 
In the opening declaration issued at Hot Springs, delegates outlined their hopes 
for the future and their proposed steps to achieve them, and in the process 
started the discussion on FAO’s founding principles. Through seven succinct 
points the conference outlined the steps to achieve freedom from want, initially 
by winning the war and then feeding people in its aftermath, before attention 
could be paid to maintaining freedom from fear and freedom from want in the 
longer term. The two concepts, the two freedoms, were explicitly linked as the 
conference acknowledged that one could not be achieved without the other.   
 
The connection between food, health and science was made as the conference 
admitted that there had never been enough food for the health of all people: a 
situation argued to be unjustifiable as the world possessed the knowledge to 
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produce enough food for everyone. This argument promoted the view of the 
nutritionists McDougall and Boyd Orr, who, pre-war had called for an expansion 
of production rather than restriction. However, apart from the wording in the 
initial statement: “food, suitable and adequate for the health and strengths of all 
people,” (United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, 1943, p.13), the 
declaration does not mention the need for nutritious food: the emphasis is on 
the quantity rather than the quality of food provision. Despite this omission from 
the declaration, nutrition is a key component in the remainder of the document, 
which calls for the improvement of national diets and links malnutrition, 
deficiency and disease. 
 
The declaration made the bold statement: “the first cause of hunger and 
malnutrition is poverty” (ibid) acknowledging the stance taken by Boyd Orr and 
McDougall, who had long argued that people needed purchasing power to avoid 
a recurrence of hunger in the midst of plenty. The declaration called for an 
expansion of the whole world economy and with it envisaged an idealistic future:  
With full employment in all countries, enlarged industrial production, 
the absence of exploitation, an increasing flow of trade within and 
between countries, an orderly management of domestic and 
international investment and currencies, and sustained internal and 
international economic equilibrium, the food which is produced can 
be made available to all people. (United Nations Conference on Food 
and Agriculture, 1943, p.13) 
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Unfortunately this state of balance has not yet been achieved even in the 
twenty-first century, and the answer as to why this has not occurred may have 
its roots in the fact that the declaration shies away from confronting the anarchic 
nature of the international order. Instead it states: “The primary responsibility 
lies with each nation for seeing that its own people have the food needed for life 
and health; steps to this end are for national determination. But each nation can 
fully achieve its goal only if all work together” (ibid). There was a small token 
towards co-operative working at the end of this statement but primarily state 
sovereignty was acknowledged and unchallenged leaving little room for 
manoeuvre for the proposed permanent organisation, which would become the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation eighteen months later.  
 
To achieve freedom from want the conference called for “concerted action 
among all like-minded nations to expand and improve production, to increase 
employment, to raise levels of consumption and to establish greater freedom in 
international commerce.” (United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, 
1943, p.14) It recommended that nations should collaborate and report to one 
another their progress; and create a permanent organisation to assist them in 
these aims. An Interim Commission was to be established within six weeks of 
the Conference to carry out the recommendations. 
 
A number of themes run through The Final Act of the United Nations 
Conference on Food and Agriculture. The long shadow of the war was clearly 
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visible throughout the document in the urgency of the language, as the 
document called for immediate action. In addition, the concept of nutrition and 
its connection with health, a relatively new understanding, had been accepted 
as the norm as seen throughout, but most prominently in the first section of the 
report, which advocated actions to improve national diets, take positive 
measures to improve the diets of vulnerable people and investigate the links 
between malnutrition and disease in each nation. And the understanding that 
science had the capability of assisting the human race in its quest for sufficient 
food had also gained traction.  
 
However radical these ideas may have seemed at the time, the document’s 
most potentially ground-breaking recommendations could be found in the 
sections concerning its vision for the long-term production of food, and the 
financing of such a system. Change in production, with increased 
mechanisation, would require a shift in populations from rural to urban and from 
agricultural production to industry and even from one country to another. The 
document envisaged occupational adjustments in rural populations and 
recommended a restructuring of population employment opportunities, through 
education, so that people could achieve sufficient purchasing power to meet 
their food requirements. The document viewed production in a global context 
and proposed organising it on such a basis, with implications for state 
sovereignty. 
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To achieve “an economy of abundance” the conference also advocated a 
reduction of trade barriers, and a removal of all types of obstacles, both 
regulatory and physical, to the production and distribution of food. Extreme 
fluctuations in the price of food were seen as damaging to producers and 
consumers alike and calls were made to establish international commodity 
arrangements with which to control them. Although the conference envisaged 
widespread decrease in the number of small farmers due to increased 
mechanisation of production it did advocate the availability of affordable credit 
for the remaining small farmers. Despite the optimistic view of the benefits of a 
restructuring of the systems of production and international trade there was an 
acknowledgement that, especially in the short term, there would be some 
sections of the population unable to purchase food (ibid). It called on 
governments to ensure measures were in place to feed their people through the 
use of reserves. 
 
As the conference was the first to be held to discuss the post-war world some of 
its recommendations were speculative in nature. For example, 
recommendations were made for the permanent organisation to work with other 
organisations, which did not at the time exist. In addition the conference did not 
specify the origins of the agricultural credit to be used for small farmers, or the 
source of authority for the commodity arrangements; issues that the Interim 
Commission was forced to confront and with the impact of its decisions still felt 
today. 
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Throughout the report, recommendations were made for the permanent 
organisation to gather information, either through the nation states or through its 
own initiative, on all aspects of food and nutrition. This was a practical 
necessity, as not enough was known of the state of the world’s food and 
agriculture provision at that time, which was FAO’s primary function; however, 
the gathering and dissemination of information, also had a formative effect on 
the shaping of FAO as an advisory body, much to the disappointment of its 
champions (Boyd Orr, 1966). 
 
Despite the efforts of people working within the governance of food and 
agriculture since the Hot Springs Conference there are still issues that were 
raised then that are still relevant in the twenty-first century. The most obvious is 
that despite improved efficiency in production and distribution of food 
approximately 15 percent of the world’s population is without access to an 
adequate diet19. The conference also highlighted the vulnerability of the world’s 
soil and water sources and advocated the diversification of production and 
balanced mixed rotational farming methods; recommendations still being made, 
and in many cases ignored, today.  
 
                                            
19
 This figure is based on food production and consumption data referring to 2008, at the height 
of the food price crisis of 2007-08 and the financial crisis. (United Nations Development 
Programme, (2012) Millennium Development Report) 
When Jose Graziano da Silva became the Director General of FAO on January 1, 2012 he 
stated that there were an estimated 925 million people who suffer from chronic hunger in the 
world, approximately one in seven (FAO, 2012b) 
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There have been hundreds of reports produced and information disseminated 
but there are still problems, illustrating the fact that information alone is 
insufficient for the practical business of fulfilling FAO’s remit. Issues of 
agricultural commodity arrangements, agricultural credit and land tenure are still 
very prominent as is the level of poverty in both urban and rural settings. 
However these are just some of the issues in the twenty-first century at the 
global level, at which there now operates a very complex network of 
organisations, rules and regulations that create inequitable trade agreements 
and sustain a system of high agricultural tariffs and subsidies; and at the same 
time allow transnational corporations to wield immense political and economic 
power (Murphy et al, 2012).  
 
Four months later, a meeting of the Nutrition Society, convened in Edinburgh to 
discuss the Hot Springs recommendations. Karl Evang argued that the 
conference’s recognition that it was the duty of governments to take 
responsibility for the welfare of their own people and to report their progress 
regularly to one another had proved to be an important turning point as it 
“created a sort of world conscience in regard to the food supply of the world.” 
(Evang, 1943, p.165) However, from a twenty-first century perspective, after 
numerous conferences, at which leaders and experts have declared their horror 
at the scale of global malnutrition, their unstinting support for actions to remedy 
the situation and calls for more reports to assess the problem, it may seem 
obvious that Evang was being too optimistic. Nevertheless hindsight should not 
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diminish the progress made at Hot Springs at a time when the concept of a 
United Nations was still at the theoretical stage. 
 
Although the desperate need to feed the world’s people was reason in itself to 
succeed, Boyd Orr saw the creation of FAO in a wider context: its place in 
halting the cycle of unfulfilled promises leading to world war, as played out in the 
first half of the twentieth century, and the first step towards the realisation of a 
world government (Boyd Orr, 1949). 
The Interim Commission 
The Interim Commission created to draft a constitution for FAO and constructed 
its organisational framework. It began its work on July 15, 1943, just six weeks 
after the Hot Springs Conference, and ceased to exist once its remit had been 
fulfilled, at the creation of FAO on October 16, 1945. It had 61 representatives 
from 15 countries working on five technical committees, advised by two panels 
of experts, on economic and scientific matters. L. B. Pearson was its chairman. 
 
As part of its work the Interim Commission published its first report to member 
governments in August 1944 in which it expanded on the recommendations 
outlined at the Hot Springs Conference and laid out its proposals for the new 
organisation. In the report, the inevitability of starvation was not only challenged 
but the potential for a better world was proposed, one in which “the way is open 
to move toward new levels of well-being which men have hitherto thought 
unattainable” (Interim Commission, 1944, p.9). 
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The Commission acknowledged the predictions for a better world, based on 
discoveries and developments, already introduced at the Conference, such as 
the advances in scientific knowledge to increase production and combat 
diseases and pests, as well as those for agricultural mechanisation and the 
handling, processing, storing and transportation, which would combine to 
ensure increased production and better distribution of food. Also, advancements 
in an understanding of nutrition, malnutrition and disease would enable 
producers to grow the foods needed for human health, arguably what would 
now be termed a Global Public Good.  
 
The Commission (1944, p10) argued: “We know what foods the human body 
needs not only to prevent these diseases but to build resistance to many others, 
lengthen the span of life, favour the birth of healthy children and raise the power 
of many individuals to do physical and mental work formerly thought to be 
beyond their innate capacity.” Similar to the Conference, the Commission was 
optimistic in its outlook, envisaging a world of cooperation to benefit all; 
however, there was recognition that there might be some resistance to the 
changes proposed, especially the adjustment from traditional practices to those 
under discussion.   
 
In addition to building on the Conference’s recommendations, the Commission 
also expanded certain areas, such as bringing fisheries and forests (barely 
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mentioned at the Conference) under the remit of FAO. Its approach to financial 
considerations was also extended. Agricultural credit affordable for smallholder 
farmers had been declared a necessity by the Conference, but despite vague 
recommendations calling for credit with low interest rates, the details for 
implementation were omitted, leaving the planning to the Commission. The 
Commission recognised the essential role of agricultural credit and declared that 
the basic purposes of FAO would not be achieved without it: not only would 
agricultural production be limited but so would the expanding world economy. 
Nevertheless, the Commission did not assign agricultural credit, or for that 
matter food, special status. It argued that credit, for agriculture or any other 
purpose, should be administered by a single international authority, and not by 
FAO (Interim Commission, 1944). FAO would have some authority in matters 
relating to agricultural credit but not ultimate control. This was a huge 
disappointment for those championing nutrition, including Boyd Orr, who fought 
for the creation of a World Food Board 1966), during his short time as FAO 
director general. 
 
For those wanting an independent activist organisation to stimulate food 
production and stabilise prices there were similar unsatisfactory results when 
the Commission considered commodity arrangements20. It recognised their vital 
                                            
20
 Agricultural commodity arrangements could potentially have a wide ranging impact on all 
aspects of food production and distribution and the Interim Commission recognised the role “that 
they could play in a) coordinating internationally diverse or conflicting national price and 
marketing policies and programmes; b) eliminating excessive fluctuations in prices; c) mitigating 
some of the effects of trade cycles; d) maintaining adequate supplies for consumers; and e) 
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role but recommended that “international commodity arrangements for both 
agricultural and non-agricultural products be coordinated under the supervision 
and direction of a single international authority.” (Interim Commission, 1944, 
p.24) It was recommended that FAO should be involved but its authority was 
diluted with phrases such as “where appropriate” and “should be entitled to 
propose” (ibid).  
Founding Principles, Aims and Roles 
In the preamble of the constitution (Interim Commission, 1944, p.41) the 
founding principles of the proposed permanent organisation were laid out: 
The Nations accepting this Constitution, being determined to 
promote the common welfare by furthering separate and 
collective action on their part for the purposes of 
o raising levels of nutrition and standards of living of the 
peoples under their jurisdictions, 
o securing improvements in the efficiency of the production 
and distribution of all food and agricultural products,  
o bettering the condition of rural populations, 
o and thus contributing toward an expanding world 
economy, 
hereby establish the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations. 
                                                                                                                               
ensuring markets for producers while promoting desirable adjustments in agricultural production” 
(Interim Commission, 1944, p.24) 
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The Commission did not adequately address the tension between the two 
opposing standpoints: FAO as advisory body, as promoted by Britain and the 
US; or FAO as active regulatory body, as championed by Boyd Orr, McDougall 
and their fellow nutritionists. Staples (2006, p.78) argues that FAO’s constitution 
was watered down by the Commission from the ideals expressed in the Hot 
Springs Declaration and “instead of calling for freedom from hunger, it merely 
called on all signatories to better standards of living and nutrition in areas under 
their jurisdiction, improve systems of production and distribution of food, elevate 
rural standards of living and contribute to an expanding world economy.”  
 
The core functions were set out in article 1, which stated: “the organisation shall 
collect, analyse, interpret and disseminate information relating to nutrition, food 
and agriculture” and “shall promote and, where appropriate, shall recommend 
national and international action” in relation to six principle areas21 (Interim 
Commission, 1944, p.41). Although both agricultural credit and agricultural 
commodity arrangements were specifically mentioned FAO was only asked to 
adopt and not draw up policies related to them. 
 
                                            
21
 a) scientific, technological, social and economic research relating to nutrition, food and 
agriculture; b) the improvement of education and administration relating to nutrition, food and 
agriculture, and the spread of public knowledge of nutritional and agricultural science and 
practice; c) the conservation of natural resources and the adoption of improved methods of 
agricultural production; d) the improvement of the processing, marketing and distribution of food 
and agricultural products; e) the adoption of policies for the provision of adequate agricultural 
credit, national and international; f) the adoption of international policies with respect to 
agricultural commodity arrangements (Interim Commission, 1944, p.41) 
180 
 
For those wanting to establish a regulatory organisation, with authority and 
funding to implement structural change, the Commission had proved incapable 
of delivering a strong FAO. Instead, it was to be an advisory organisation 
promoting research in the areas of natural sciences, technology, economic 
organisation of agriculture, social factors, and public measures of regulation and 
assistance, and establishing a reputation for its excellence in such work. It was 
also to coordinate the gathering of information from member countries and the 
dissemination of research through education and publications.  
 
The conflict between a number of FAO’s powerful member states and the 
epistemic community was clearly evident as the Commission struggled to 
combine the different objectives of each set of actors, of nutrition versus trade, 
demonstrating the fault lines between state sovereignty, institution autonomy 
and interdependence within the international system, even at this early stage of 
its creation. By relegating freedom from hunger to the periphery and placing the 
emphasis on states’ responsibilities to their own populations the Commission 
had in a single stroke undermined the authority of the epistemic community, and 
the nutritional standard they advocated; enshrined the autonomy of states as 
main actors, with ultimate authority over the nascent FAO; and limited the scope 
of a truly interdependent post-war world, as envisaged by those at Hot Springs. 
 
Although the remit of FAO was more limited than some would have hoped it still 
had a daunting task ahead, one in which it had to steer a course between taking 
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“vigorous action in the critical period just after the war when conditions [were] 
fluid and before vested interests [had] become established,” following “a policy 
of careful development, involving the painstaking study of its complicated 
problems.” (Interim Commission, 1944, p.31) Notwithstanding the initial hope for 
FAO to carve out its own niche this would prove challenging as the powerful 
member states had already staked out their own interests. 
 
Although cognitivists place significant emphasis on the role of the epistemic 
community and its role in the provision of information, this role is arguably only 
one element that is required. Even if the epistemic community is in agreement, 
as was demonstrated by the champions of nutrition, its ability to persuade states 
to create an authoritative organisation was limited as states sought to protect 
their own national interests.  
 
Traditional realist theorist Kindleberger ([1973], 1986) argues that there is no 
substitute for a strong hegemon within the system. In the post-war world the 
hegemon was clearly the US. However, Krasner’s (1993) interpretation of the 
role played by regimes may be more appropriate as he argues that regimes are 
distributors of power and interests, through which the players and game rules 
are decided by those in power. Powerful states, most notably the US and to a 
lesser extent Britain, ensured FAO did not possess too much authority by 
limiting its remit at its moment of creation. 
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Organisational Structure   
All those countries represented at the Hot Springs Conference were entitled to 
join the new permanent organisation. Countries not represented at the 
Conference, including former enemies, were also invited to join. All potential 
new members needed a two-thirds majority for acceptance. The organisation 
was, and remains, designed to be inclusive and egalitarian with each member 
state permitted one representative and one vote at FAO’s Conference, which 
meets at least once a year and is the policy-making body. The Interim 
Commission also proposed the establishment of an Executive Committee, of 
nine to fifteen members, ideally experts with a variety of experience in relation to 
food and agriculture, designed to act for the conference between sessions. This 
was established but later disbanded, as detailed below. 
 
FAO head, the director-general, has full power and authority to direct the work 
of the organisation but needs the support of the conference and, until 
disbanded, the executive committee. He, and so far there have only been male 
director-generals, does not have the right to vote.  
 
Although FAO operates in a state-centric anarchic system the organisation itself 
is international with staff recruited on their ability, rather than nationality, and 
their allegiance exclusively reserved for FAO. No members of staff are allowed 
to receive instructions from any authority external to FAO. Member states are 
reminded to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the staff 
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and not to attempt to influence them in any way. The director-general, with the 
approval of the conference, can establish regional and liaison offices. And FAO 
is tasked with cooperating with other organisations. 
Financial Control 
There were two groups at Hot Springs22, one which favoured a strong 
organisation with the authority to promote increased world food production with 
stabilised prices and a budget of US $10 million, a modest budget, argued Boyd 
Orr (1966), in relation to that of the Agricultural Department of the United States, 
with a budget of US $1,000 million, and the opposing group that wanted to curb 
the authority of the new organisation and limit its budget to US $1.5 million.  In 
the end it was agreed that FAO would have an operating budget of US $5 
million a year. 
 
Member states’ contributions, which were determined on an assessed rather 
than a voluntary basis, were calculated on a sliding scale but no one country 
was expected to contribute more than 25 percent of the organisation’s total 
expenses (Mayne, 1947). Yet according to FAO archives, in its first year the US 
contributed 8.3 million dollars and by 1955 it provided 30 percent of the 
organisation’s costs (O’Brien, 2000). It has to be recognised that the relationship 
between the US and FAO, and the UN itself, has always been complex as each 
                                            
22
 Boyd Orr, MacDougall, members of the US delegation from the Department of Agriculture, 
Latin American delegates and several members of the British Food Mission in Washington 
supported the idea of an activist organisation but arguing against the idea were the British 
delegation, fearful of a rise in food prices, and US delegates from the State and Commerce 
Departments, aiming instead for an internationally managed system of free trade (Staples, 2006) 
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actor has endeavoured to exert control over policy-formation and finances. In 
this battle for control the US can clearly be seen as the hegemon within the 
international system, especially considering the position of the USSR, as even 
though present at the Hot Springs Conference in 1943, and therefore eligible for 
original membership, the USSR did not take up this opportunity. It was not until 
2006 that the USSR’s successor, the Russian Federation, accepted FAO 
constitution and joined as a full member, from its position as an observer (FAO, 
2006). And so it can be argued that whatever criticisms are levelled at the US 
regarding its relationship with FAO, its willingness to enter the game, however it 
chose to play it, has to be taken into account.  
 
Despite the support given to the young organisation FAO faced daunting 
problems in the post-war world in which half the global population was 
estimated to be malnourished, worldwide agricultural production was down 10% 
and the global population was increasing by 22 million a year (Boyd Orr, 1966). 
And this was in addition to the three decades of falling agricultural prices, 
general economic slump and large-scale unemployment (Shaw, 2007). 
Nevertheless, members of the international staff at FAO were convinced that if 
the world’s people could be adequately fed, the increased demand for 
agricultural products would stimulate growth in the agricultural sectors and 
beyond, creating a healthy economy and a healthy global population. They were 
convinced that by taking nutrition as a starting point that the wider situation 
would improve. However, as ultimate financial control remained external to 
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FAO, and many of the issues that needed to be addressed impinged on the 
economic policies of sovereign states, the conflict between the actors was ever 
present.  
 
On October 16, 1945, the first conference of FAO was held at Chateau 
Frontenac, in Quebec. After years of campaigning by the champions of nutrition 
and months of vigorous debate between politicians, economists and nutritional 
experts across the world as to the best way to achieve freedom from want, the 
constitution was accepted, the Interim Commission dissolved and the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation was established with John Boyd Orr at the helm. 
John Boyd Orr and the nascent FAO 
John Boyd Orr, who was only invited to the Quebec conference by the British 
government as an observer, was, against his own country’s wishes, appointed 
FAO’s first Director General in October 1945. Despite accepting the office Boyd 
Orr was gravely disappointed with the limited powers of the new body, which he 
had fought so hard to create but now, in his view, only offered empty promises. 
He stated that FAO was contrary to all his hopes and voiced his frustrations 
when he argued: “The hungry people of the world wanted bread, and they were 
to be given statistics” (Boyd Orr, 1966, p.162).  
 
Despite his pessimism Boyd Orr was determined to fulfil his remit. In the post-
war era the Anglo-American world-view predominated, in “national security 
policies were based on alliances, atomic weapons, unilateral international 
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action, large peacetime militaries, and a system of managed free trade” 
(Staples, 2006, p.85). And yet under Boyd Orr FAO offered a counter-
hegemonic view since “as an international organisation that included most of the 
world’s countries, its suggestions and criticisms could not be ignored entirely, 
and it was therefore able to focus global attention on some of the shortcomings 
of the emerging world system.” (ibid) The conflicts seen in the establishment of 
the organisation and the appointment of Boyd Orr, as he was only permitted to 
remain as its director general for two years, clearly demonstrated the conviction 
held by a number of its powerful member states that, although not entirely 
autonomous, FAO was seen as a potentially powerful organisation. Care, 
therefore, had to be taken to ensure there were safeguards that did not allow it 
to impinge on these member states’ sovereignty, while at the same time the 
appearance of compliance was maintained.        
John Boyd Orr’s World Food Board Proposal 
In the post-war situation food production was one of the main issues of concern. 
The world had to produce enough food to feed the expanding population. In 
1950 the world population was estimated to be just over 2.5 billion and 
throughout the 1950s the annual growth rate was between 1.4 percent and 1.9 
percent. However, in the ten years from 1962 the world population annual 
growth rate remained above 2 percent, creating additional pressure on food 
systems (United States Census Bureau, 2012). Despite this upward trend, 
many, including Boyd Orr and McDougall, believed that with the advancements 
in science an expansion in production was achievable. And yet by utilising 
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scientific methods to boost production fewer people would be needed to work 
the land and so increased industrialisation would be required to provide 
employment for former farmers. Different parts of the world faced different 
challenges. In the developing countries, according to the prevailing scientific 
theories of the time, there needed to be a shift from smallholder farms to larger 
entities and the introduction of modern agricultural methods. Since then, doubt 
has been cast on the wisdom of the drive to modernise agriculture in such a 
way, through the increased use of fertilizers and insecticides, and the move to 
create large monoculture-based farms or plantations (Tansey and Rajotte, 2008; 
Weis, 2007; Mulvany, 2010). In the developed countries it was the fluctuations 
in price that were described as the bane of agricultural producers, which needed 
to be addressed. Prices for wheat fluctuated dramatically during the years of the 
Great Depression as Shaw (2007, p.18) explained: “in nine out of the ten years 
in the decade between 1928 and 1938 the price of wheat on the world market 
fluctuated by 70 percent.”  
 
And it was not just a case of producing more food. Having surpluses in certain 
agricultural products, such as grain, did not equate to everyone having a well-
balanced, nutritious diet. Similar to the situation in developing countries, what 
was frequently at issue was not necessarily the amount of food but the quality of 
food being consumed and the ability of people to purchase it. Boyd Orr believed 
poverty was the reason for many people having insufficient nutritious food. He 
recognised the interdependency of nutrition and volume of trade but instead of 
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treating food as just another commodity he viewed it as an essential of life; thus 
his recommended route to prosperity started from the objective of improving 
people’s welfare, rather than increasing trade. This stance, based on human 
needs, placed Boyd Orr in conflict with the prevailing capitalist states, which 
were driving forward their market-based model; itself implemented with 
pragmatic adjustments because of the use of protectionist practices by key 
agricultural producers, including the US, that led to surpluses in key crops 
(Sumner, 2008).  
 
With clear objectives, and not wanting to lose the impetus generated through 
the creation of FAO, Boyd Orr established a Special Meeting on Urgent Food 
Matters to consider options to deal with the problems of food production and 
distribution; and surpluses and shortages. Prior to the second FAO conference 
in Copenhagen in September 1946, Boyd Orr produced the report, Proposals for 
a World Food Board, which outlined his grand plan. It called for the creation of a 
World Food Board that would “stabilise the prices of agricultural commodities on 
world markets, establish a world food reserve sufficient for any emergency, 
provide funds for financing the disposal of surplus agricultural products, and co-
operate with organisations concerned with international credits” (Mayne, 1947, 
p.422).  
 
Boyd Orr’s grand and visionary plan went beyond providing a nutritious diet for 
all; he believed that these measures would be the catalyst for global post-war 
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economic prosperity; agricultural prosperity would be followed by industrial 
prosperity, and people would be brought together, increasing understanding and 
the opportunities for world peace. To implement this grand plan Boyd Orr 
envisaged the creation of three new international organisations as part of the 
Board: a credit facility; a buffer-stock regulatory agency; and a distribution 
agency for concessionary food and famine relief (Staples, 2006). With an 
emphasis on improving the health of everyone, the Board would be able to hold 
stocks of each important commodity and determine a maximum and minimum 
world price for these commodities, which it would buy if the world price fell and 
sell when the price exceeded the maximum, thus achieving agricultural price 
stabilization, (Shaw, 2007). As an additional safeguard, if people were unable to 
afford sufficient food the Board would be able to divert unmarketable surpluses 
and sell them at a concessionary price. Despite Boyd Orr’s reasoned arguments 
FAO lacked two key prerequisites to create such a body: power and finance, 
and therefore needed the full support of member states.  
 
At the Copenhagen Conference the World Food Board Preparatory Commission 
was created to develop a plan of action based on these proposals. Despite this 
seemingly positive move the proposals were opposed by the US, keen to 
promote the International Trade Organisation23 as a way to manage the system 
of free trade; and by Britain, which was a big food importer struggling with its 
                                            
23 The forerunner to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and ultimately the World 
Trade Organisation 
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war deficit. The USSR had considered supporting the creation of a World Food 
Board if the US and Britain had also given the proposal their support; however 
this was not forthcoming (Boyd Orr, 1966). Staples (2006, pp.88-89) argues that 
adherence to an external body’s authority, such as the World Food Board, 
would “limit the US government’s control over the country’s agricultural 
production, its ability to use food aid to bring third world nationalists into the US 
fold and its leverage in garnering international goodwill through food aid 
initiatives.” Unlike Boyd Orr, who viewed food as a basic human need, food was 
viewed by the US as a commodity and tool of political leverage in the fight for 
hearts and minds in the Cold War (Ruttan, 1990; Staples, 2006)24. 
 
Much to the bitter disappointment of Boyd Orr, the Commission did not favour 
the creation of a World Food Board; instead, it undertook an exhaustive 
examination of the basic economic and technical issues related to the 
production and distribution of agricultural products and then put forward its own 
recommendations. It did recommend the establishment of working stocks, 
famine reserves and price stabilization reserves but proposed that all these 
should be managed by each country, rather than through an international body. 
Instead of the creation of a World Food Board it recommended the replacement 
                                            
24
 For example in 1964 legislation was passed by the US Congress as an extension of the PL-
480, Food for Peace Programme (first established in 1954), that required PL-480 expenditures 
to be classified under international affairs and finance rather than agriculture; placed restrictions 
on sales to communist countries; and gave authorisation for the use of soft currencies, gained 
through agricultural sales, in support of counter-insurgency programmes (Ruttan, 1990). The 
Kennedy administration also attempted to use food aid as a tool to further its national interests 
when it tried to influence Algerian and Egyptian foreign policy as well as in South Vietnam 
(Staples, 2006)  
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of FAO Executive Committee, which comprised experts within the field of 
agriculture, with a World Food Council, consisting of 18 national 
representatives; and instead of an independent agricultural credit facility FAO 
would offer advice to member countries applying to the World Bank and other 
development lending bodies. (Staples, 2006) The World Food Council 
emphasised industrial development, full employment and self-help, rather than 
regulating supply and increasing demand. At the same time, it removed some 
authority of the director general and his secretariat by placing further controls on 
budgets and reviews on programme progress.  
 
By taking nutrition as his main aim Boyd Orr argued that a centrally organised 
system to stabilise prices, establish a reserve and provide financial support for 
agricultural development would prove beneficial in the fight against hunger. 
These actions would have impacted on the sovereignty of member states, 
increased the autonomy of FAO and acted as a stimulus for greater 
interdependency within the international system. Arguably none of which the 
powerful member states, most notably the US and Britain, wished to encourage 
(Boyd Orr, 1966; Staples, 2006). And so, by maintaining national control of 
working stocks, famine reserves and price stabilisation reserves the powerful 
member states remained in control of the food production and distribution and 
protected their own autonomy, while at the same time limiting that of FAO.   
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The replacement of FAO Executive Committee with the World Food Council was 
yet another blow to Boyd Orr as national interests took precedence. The final 
demonstration of the powerful states’ refusal to grant real power and autonomy 
to FAO can be seen in the decision to grant it an advisory role to the World 
Bank instead of entrusting it with independent financial control. Had Boyd Orr’s 
World Food Board plans been accepted FAO would have become an 
authoritative organisation able to stimulate agricultural production and 
distribution, with economic tools at its disposal. However Boyd Orr’s hopes were 
defeated. 
 
Boyd Orr was bitterly disappointed with the outcome and resigned as Director 
General (Boyd Orr, 1966). He stayed in office until a replacement was found 
and in that time dedicated his energies to technical missions, agricultural 
development in the Middle East and Africa and the establishment of several 
regional offices. He left FAO in April, 1948. 
Norris E. Dodd’s International Commodity 
Clearing House vision 
Norris E. Dodd was appointed as the next Director General of FAO, and was in 
the role from April 1948 to December 1953, during which time he oversaw the 
move of FAO’s headquarters from Washington to Rome. Having successfully 
run a number of agricultural businesses, as well as a department within the US 
Department of Agriculture, Dodd was well qualified for the role (Abbott, 1992).  
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Although he had seen the reluctance of member countries to support a larger 
FAO or the establishment of formal global regulation, he himself had supported 
Boyd Orr’s proposals for a World Food Board (Shaw, 2007). He therefore 
attempted to salvage what he could from the situation when asked for a report 
on the underlying causes of emerging commodity trade problems. In the report 
he highlighted issues surrounding food and equipment distribution in countries 
outside the dollar area and food surpluses within the dollar area; arguably the 
same problems that had existed for some time. Working with his assistant 
director general, Sir Herbert Broadley, and Professor John Condliffe, of the 
University of California, Dodd drew up proposals for an International Commodity 
Clearing House (ICCH), with an operating budget of US $5 million (Staples, 
2006). It was proposed that this organisation would purchase surpluses within 
the dollar area, sell them for soft currencies outside the area or trade for raw 
materials, and in order to feed the hungry, sell at a concessionary rate any 
remaining foodstuffs. In this way Dodd and his colleagues hoped to distribute 
food surpluses without disrupting regular commercial markets and then using 
the profits generated to create buffer stocks, which would help stabilise key 
commodity prices.  
 
Similar to the fate of Boyd Orr’s logically argued proposals, Dodd’s plan was 
rejected outright by member countries, led by the US, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and France. Again, instead of accepting proposals put forward by FAO 
director general, the member states created a different type of body with limited 
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authority, in this case the Committee on Commodity Problems (CCP). Although 
surpluses were discussed by the CCP, action was tentative and limited. 
 
The US went a step further in addressing the issue of surpluses by passing their 
own Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 1954, known as PL 
480. The Act led to a number of problems: the cost of storing the surplus 
produce (an estimated US $1 million a day) threatened to undermine prices; the 
accumulation of non-convertible currencies in US coffers; strained relations with 
other exporters; and the dependency of deficit countries on American produce 
(Beringer, 1963; Ruttan, 1990; Staples, 2006). The Act demonstrated that: “the 
US was not so much opposed to the theory and operations behind the 
proposals for the World Food Board or the ICCH as it was to moving the locus 
of decision-making out of Washington” (Staples, 2006, pp.98-99). Although a 
costly operation, the Act dealt with US surpluses, at the discretion of the US, 
and was domestically popular and so received significant financial support from 
Congress.  
 
Denied an opportunity to implement a grand scheme to improve the global 
governance of food and agriculture, and following in the footsteps of his 
predecessor, Dodd tried to make the best of the situation by concentrating his 
energies on technical assistance, often with the funds and support of partner 
organisations, such as the UN’s Expanded Programme for Technical 
Assistance, UNICEF and the International Labour Organisation (FAO, 2011c). 
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He helped create the International Rice Commission in 1949, co-ordinated an 
attack on a plague of desert locusts in the Arabian Peninsula in 1952 and 
organised a mass vaccination against rinderpest in the Middle East, Africa and 
Asia (Diouf, 1995). The information-gathering role of FAO also expanded at this 
time with the World Census of Agriculture in 1950, as well as the introduction of 
the annual crop outlook reports.  
 
All these activities were seen as acceptable by the member states that had 
worked for an advisory body. As the first leaders of FAO fought to create a 
global organisation capable of managing the world’s resources for the benefit of 
the world’s people, and in so doing change global governance structures, its 
member states, most notably the large agricultural producers such as the US, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and France, successfully thwarted each new 
threat to their autonomy, while at the same time recognising the problems facing 
the poor and lamenting their plight. By establishing the Committee on 
Commodity Problems instead of the International Commodity Clearing House 
the powerful states had again strengthened their position as the autonomous 
actors. Interdependence was further limited by the unilateral actions of the US 
through its Agricultural Aid and Assistance Act and the use of surplus 
distribution as an aid to obtain its foreign policy objectives.  
 
The next director general, Philip Cardon, proved to be too sensitive to withstand 
the pressures of managing a large public organisation and resigned in 1956 
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after two years in the role (Abbott, 1992). Following a brief period under the 
stewardship of Herbert Broadley, the helm of FAO was taken in November 1956 
by a man many regard as its finest director general, Binay Ranjan Sen, of India.  
B. R. Sen’s ambitious Freedom from Hunger 
Campaign  
Educated in India and Britain B. R. Sen had risen through the ranks of the 
Indian civil service and had been ambassador to a number of countries, before 
taking on the role of director general. But it was his credentials as a citizen of 
one of the largest developing countries and his first-hand experience of the 
Bengal famine that ensured he made the role his own. He presided over FAO 
during its most successful period in which its budget increased and its position 
within the global governance of food and agriculture was relatively 
unchallenged. During his time in office FAO’s annual budget increased from US 
$7 million in 1958 to US $83.5 million in 1967 (Staples, 2006); he witnessed the 
independence of many former colonies, which then required technical 
assistance; he brought in many new voices into the debate through the 
Freedom from Hunger Campaign (FFHC); led the first World Food Congress in 
1963; and oversaw the creation of the World Food Programme (Abbott, 1992).  
 
Despite opposition from key agricultural producers, the FFHC, launched in 
1959, was instrumental in bringing new voices into the global debate on 
combating hunger, such as NGOs, churches and their leaders, including Pope 
John XXIII, the Islamic Congress, philanthropists, governments and individual 
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citizens, as a way of side-stepping member countries not interested in FAO 
involvement. (FAO, 2011c; Catholic Herald, 1963) By utilising a bottom-up 
approach many FAO projects encouraged local populations to grow their own 
food, with the broader aims of enabling countries to conserve their foreign 
exchange resources and to insulate themselves from the volatility of the 
commodity markets. The cultivation of indigenous seeds to help improve the 
quality of crops and decrease the reliance on imported seeds was also 
promoted. Unfortunately these aims were not ultimately successful as problems 
surrounding seed ownership and market volatility are dispiritingly familiar in the 
twenty-first century. 
 
The Eisenhower administration did not support the aims of the FFHC and in 
April 1959 the US representative to FAO Council emphasised the importance of 
the development of trade, disposal of surpluses, focus on scientific research 
efforts and the global division of labour in regards to agriculture, thus 
contradicting the aims of the FFHC to combat hunger and malnutrition and 
promote indigenous food production. However, at the same time, there was a 
shift in Eisenhower’s policies from “trade and aid” to “food for peace”, which was 
then adopted and expanded by President Kennedy, who emphasised the 
importance of development over surplus disposal and small projects to feed 
children and educate farmers (Staples, 2006). Even so, the Food for Peace 
programme was still used as an instrument of US foreign policy. 
 
198 
 
By the early 1960s the US had shown interest in establishing a multilateral aid 
agency for the dispersal of famine and disaster aid; an idea supported by other 
developed countries that also had surpluses to move, and were therefore keen 
to bring the US into a joint decision-making mechanism. To fulfil this need in 
1963 the World Food Programme (WFP) was created, and in the process, 
argued Abbott (1992), met two of Boyd Orr’s World Food Board objectives: to 
establish world food reserves against periodic crop failures; and to finance 
agricultural surplus disposal. FAO played an important role in the establishment 
of the WFP by providing administrative services and being jointly responsible for 
the appointment of its head. In addition, 20 percent of the food stocks were 
available to FAO’s director general to be allocated at short notice for emergency 
relief.  
 
Nevertheless, the WFP was, and still is, an organisation independent of FAO 
and, despite its humanitarian remit, had been engineered to serve developed 
countries’ interests. Abbott (1992) argued that the WFP helped countries 
dispose of their burdensome surpluses and benefit from shipping contracts and 
in return the developing countries faced depressed prices for their own 
producers as food aid flooded their markets, which in turn removed the urgent 
need for recipient governments to promote local agriculture and instead 
introduced local people to new consumer tastes, and thus drove the demand for 
imports.  
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Although there were a number of nationally-based bodies competing within the 
field already, such as the US Food for Peace programme, the WFP was the first 
global organisation to be created within the global governance system since the 
establishment of FAO. Even so, during this period FAO was virtually the only 
source of expertise in the governance of food and agriculture (Independent 
External Evaluation, 2007). The WFP, even in its first years, channelled 
significant amounts of aid. By 1970 there had been 550 economic development 
projects in 88 countries funded through the WFP, demonstrating that the 
financing of global agricultural aid and development projects was an 
increasingly high priority at this time. By the early 1980s the resources pledged 
to the WFP annually had reached US $1,000 million (Abbott, 1992; Staples, 
2006).  
 
Alongside the creation of the WFP Sen’s energies, despite opposition from the 
US, were channelled into the FFHC, which reached its zenith at the World Food 
Congress in 1963 - a showcase for FAO’s new approach to agricultural 
development. As part of this drive Sen convened a Special Assembly on Man’s 
Right to Freedom from Hunger, reconnecting with the founding principles of the 
organisation (FAO, 1963). In June 1,300 private citizens, academics, 
representatives from NGOs and governments from over 100 countries attended 
the Congress. 
 
200 
 
US President Kennedy summarised the understanding of the issues within the 
international community and yet the ultimate dilemma when he spoke at the 
World Food Congress:  
For the first time in the history of the world we do know how to 
produce enough food now to feed every man, woman and child 
in the world, enough to eliminate all hunger completely...We 
have the ability, as members of the human race. We have the 
means; we have the capacity to eliminate hunger from the face 
of the earth in our lifetime. We only need the will (Kennedy, 
1963 p.2-3). 
The new president of the World Bank, George Woods, responded to the call to 
action and established a joint funding arrangement with FAO in 1964 to create 
the Cooperative Programme; an arrangement that fulfilled Boyd Orr’s fourth aim 
in his grand plan, to cooperate with organisations concerned with international 
credits. The Independent External Evaluation report (2007, p.55) described this 
arrangement as “an effective and complementary use of the international 
agricultural capacity existing in each agency.” This programme enabled FAO to 
expand its technical capabilities, a worthy endeavour, but one which again was 
clearly sanctioned by the developed countries, instead of the more radical role 
of managing the world’s resources and playing an active role within a 
reconfigured global governance architecture.  
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Sen stepped down from the helm of FAO in 1967, constitutionally unable to 
stand for election again. His FFHC had led to greater public realisation of the 
extent of world hunger as he promoted the involvement of a number of non-
state actors. However, despite his drive and ambition for FAO, Sen was unable 
to bridge the gap between the national interests and those for the greater good 
of humanity, thus highlighting the source of real power within the international 
system. 
 
Although FAO saw a substantial increase in its budget under Sen’s directorship 
and still enjoyed a position of authority as a global actor within the global 
governance of food and agriculture its successes were limited by the action of 
its member states and the creation of the WFP. Although the WFP may have 
met two of Boyd Orr’s objectives: establishing world food reserves and the 
financing of agricultural surplus disposal the WFP itself was not controlled by 
FAO. Instead it diluted FAO’s authority. Powerful members states were able to 
dispose of their surpluses under their own terms and the international structure, 
which had been responsible for creating the surpluses and shortages, remained 
unchallenged. Again the member states had maintained their control and at the 
same time undermined FAO.  
 
Sen endeavoured to break the stranglehold of the states as the main actors 
within the system by including a diverse range of organisations and individuals 
in the debate on hunger and malnutrition as a moral issue. In his way he created 
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a global community of keen advocates for his policies but ultimately the most 
powerful member states maintained their authority through the disposal of 
surpluses and control of finance. FAO may have excelled as an advisory body in 
its partnership with the World Bank through technical programmes but it lacked 
the authority and autonomy to demand real change within the international 
system.  
 
His successor, Addeke Henrik Boerma, oversaw the dismantling of much of 
Sen’s progress as the emphasis shifted from the ideals of the FFHC, placing 
human needs foremost, to those expounded by the Green Revolution, which 
placed more emphasis on the technical advancements in agriculture. Staples 
(2006) argued that under Boerma FAO lost its leadership, its mandate became 
fractured into several different organisations on food and agriculture and the 
organisation itself became increasingly politicised.  
Conclusion 
The champions of nutrition had envisaged a different and better post-war world 
as they fought for the creation of an international organisation, with the authority 
and finances to change the ailing food production and distribution systems, to 
enable all peoples of all nations to access a nutritious diet. Knowledge and the 
epistemic communities that provide it are important, according to cognitivists, 
such as Haas (1993), and yet even a unified epistemic community, such as the 
champions of nutrition, was not able to persuade the powerful states to cede 
any national sovereignty to FAO, even in a time of crisis. These idealistic 
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individuals had hoped that a well-fed world population and an optimally 
functioning food system would have the power to lift the world economy and 
drive development for the benefit of everyone. But even before its birth FAO had 
failed to live up to their expectations, a disappointment so profound that its first 
director general, Boyd Orr, had called for it to be abandoned in its proposed 
form and created again (Boyd Orr, 1966). Despite this damning criticism he 
launched himself into the task of extending its remit and regaining some of the 
impetus that had inspired its founders at Hot Springs. And yet his efforts came 
to nought, as did many of those of his successors; great men like B. R. Sen 
driven to fight the scourge of hunger but eventually defeated by nationalistic 
interests and the compelling force of the status quo. 
 
As the world entered the 1970s FAO faced mounting criticism for not tackling 
global hunger. (Society for International Development, 1978; WDM, 1974; 
Shaw, 2007) However many of the contributing factors to the food crisis of the 
early 1970s were beyond the control of the organisation. World grain production 
declined for the first time in 20 years because the monsoons had failed two 
years in a row and the yields of the green revolution had started to plateau. This 
situation was compounded by the actions of the US and Canada, which had set 
aside agricultural land to avoid surpluses and the USSR’s discrete importation 
of vast quantities of subsidised grain after a disastrous harvest. In addition the 
oil producing countries had sharply increased the price of oil, which had a direct 
impact on the cost of fertilizer (Shaw, 2007). And these problems were taking 
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place in a world in which many countries were experiencing population growth 
rates of three percent or more (Rogers, 2008a) and concerns had been raised 
over the earth’s carrying capacity (UNEP, 1972). Against this backdrop the 
world faced its worst food crisis since the end of World War Two, with a 
predicted 40 million people in 30 countries at risk of starvation (Rogers, 2008b), 
and FAO had to answer to its critics at the World Food Conference in 1974. The 
next chapter will chart FAO’s response to the global food crisis of the 1970s and 
its development through to 2007 when it faced the most extensive evaluation in 
its history and a call for complete reform. 
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Chapter Five: 
FAO in a Globalised and Fragmented 
World (1974-2007) 
Introduction 
The champions of nutrition had envisaged a different and better post-war world 
as they fought for the creation of an international organisation, with the authority 
and finances to change the ailing food production and distribution systems, to 
enable all peoples of all nations to access a nutritious diet. These idealistic 
individuals had hoped that a well-fed world population and an optimally 
functioning food system would have the power to lift the world economy and 
drive development for the benefit of everyone. However despite Boyd Orr’s best 
efforts, as FAO’s first director general, he struggled to create an organisation 
with convincing authority, as did many of his successors. (Boyd Orr, 1966) 
 
This chapter will examine the history of FAO from the World Food Conference in 
1974 until 2007, when the reform of the organisation began. Initially there will be 
an examination of the outcomes and criticisms of the World Food Conference, 
which will be followed by a brief assessment of the impact of the structural 
adjustment programmes of the 1980s and then FAO’s response to increasing 
food insecurity from the 1990s onwards, This chapter will also consider the roles 
of the different actors, including states, international organisations, NGOs and 
foundations, multinational corporations and farmers, which all operate within the 
same globalised and fragmented system. 
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FAO’s role questioned as world food crisis 
loomed 
As the world entered the 1970s FAO faced mounting criticism for not tackling 
global hunger. (Society for International Development, 1978; WDM, 1974; 
Shaw, 2007) However many of the contributing factors to the food crisis of the 
early 1970s were beyond the control of the organisation. World grain production 
declined for the first time in 20 years because the monsoons had failed two 
years in a row and the yields of the green revolution had started to plateau. This 
situation was compounded by the actions of the US and Canada, which had set 
aside agricultural land to avoid surpluses and the USSR’s discrete importation 
of vast quantities of subsidised grain after a disastrous harvest. In addition the 
oil producing countries of OPEC had sharply increased the price of oil, which 
had a direct impact on the cost of fertilizer (Shaw, 2007), as well as the cost of 
transportation and running agricultural equipment.  
 
For generations there had been a lack of development in rural areas in 
developing countries, with less than four percent of World Bank funds directed 
to increasing the productivity of subsistence agriculture and development 
programmes managed by urban elites with little concern for rural areas (WDM, 
1974). In developed countries there had been an increase in demand for meat, 
most notably beef, which drove the consumption by animals of precious grain 
stocks and forced the need for imports in countries such as Britain.  
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These problems were taking place in a world in which many countries were 
experiencing population growth rates of three percent or more; in global terms 
this meant an additional 25 million tonnes of grain, as well as other food, would 
be required annually to feed everyone (WDM, 1974; Rogers, 2008a). Alongside 
these problems concerns had also been raised over the earth’s carrying 
capacity (UNEP, 1972). 
 
All these factors placed the agricultural system under increasing strain and 
meant that by 1973 the world faced its worst food crisis since the end of World 
War Two, with a predicted 40 million people in 30 countries at risk of starvation 
(Rogers, 2008b).  
World Food Conference, 1974 
By the late 1960s food security was rising up the international agenda again but 
despite the fact that freedom from hunger had been recognised as a 
fundamental right by the UN in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights in 1966, (UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A, 1966); UNCTAD had 
examined the world food problem in 1968 and FAO had held a Second World 
Food Congress at the Hague in 1970, the world was not prepared for the world 
food crisis of the 1970s. The culmination of the varying factors, most beyond the 
control of any one organisation, was not envisaged until it was too late and the 
world was already facing a potential catastrophe. The international community 
was judged on its actions. 
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The Society for International Development (1978, p53) argued that FAO was 
particularly underwhelming in its response.  
The results of the Hague Congress were disappointing if 
one compares them with the magnitude of the problems 
the world was facing and those which would emerge later. 
In contrast to what happened at the First World Food 
Congress [1963] the Final Declaration neither analysed the 
world food situation in depth nor formulated any precise 
directives. Indeed it limited itself to generalities, not to say 
platitudes. 
FAO’s The State of Food and Agriculture (1973) report raised the flag on the 
impending crisis, which it described as the most difficult since the years 
immediately after the war and yet there were few recommendations on how to 
tackle the problem.  
 
Discussions of the food crisis took place in September 1973 at the Summit 
Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries, which called for an emergency joint 
conference of FAO and UNCTAD to formulate a programme of international 
cooperation (Society for International Development, 1978). Henry Kissinger, US 
Secretary of State, also called for a World Food Conference to be held under 
the auspices of the UN to discuss ways to tackle the increasingly urgent 
problem, which he admitted was beyond the ability of any one country to 
resolve. 
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The conference was established by the UN General Assembly with a small 
secretariat under the UN Economic and Social Council. Preparatory meetings 
were held in New York, Geneva and Rome. The preliminary work was divided 
into three main areas: investment in agriculture, which it was estimated needed 
to be increased from US$ 1.5 billion to around US$ 5 billion; the need to rebuild 
and then maintain adequate food reserves preferably under international control 
or at least international co-ordination; and following strong pressure from the 
developing countries, the issues surrounding trade reforms (WDM, 1974). 
 
Following their deliberations, Sartaj Aziz, director of FAO’s Commodities and 
Trade division, was charged with the production of the conference 
documentation; a role in which he had to balance the expectations of the 
developing countries, the questionable political will of the developed countries 
as well as the ‘constant tug of war’ he noted between the FAO and the US team 
led by John Hannah, financed by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, which 
attempted to take over the production of the conference documentation arguing 
that FAO could not be trusted to give objective advice (Shaw, 2007). 
 
Finally the conference was held in Rome, although not at FAO headquarters, 
between November 5 and 16, 1974 with the participation of 135 state 
representatives, five UN bodies, seven UN specialized agencies, including FAO, 
which had successfully provided reports for the conference, 26 observers from 
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intergovernmental organisations and representatives of 161 international and 
national NGOs were also invited to participate. (UN, 1975) 
 
With news of the continuing ‘grain gap’ and ‘fertilizer gap’ pledges by developed 
countries should have been forthcoming to render swift assistance, however 
only Canada responded positively. Instead a situation emerged that resulted in 
a distinct lack of progress: the developed countries, led by the US, blamed the 
recently formed OPEC coalition for the food crisis due to the sharp increase in 
oil prices, and the oil producing countries refused to accept ultimate 
responsibility for the situation and instead blamed the West for its continued 
inaction. In his opening statement the Iranian Minister of the Interior, Jamshid 
Amouzegar, argued: “Years of neglect, inaction and unfair policies by the West 
are the root cause of the present food crisis.” (Amouzegar quoted in WMD, 
1974, p10) Each group refused to increase their contributions before their 
opponents had done so first.   
 
Alongside the continued ideological wrangling the rhetoric aimed high with calls 
for the complete eradication of hunger. Henry Kissinger called for all 
governments to accept the premise: “that within a decade no child will go to bed 
hungry, that no family will fear for its next day’s bread, and that no human 
being’s future and capacities will be stunted by malnutrition.” (Kissinger quoted 
in Shaw, 2007, p113). This goal formed the basis of the first laudable resolution 
agreed by the conference (UN, 1975, p1):  
211 
 
Every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to 
be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop 
fully and maintain their physical and mental faculties. 
Society today already possesses sufficient resources, 
organisational ability and technology and hence the 
competence to achieve this objective. 
However despite the high aims the lack of progress was frustrating, especially 
as the grain gap and fertilizer gap were relatively small in global terms. The 
grain gap, estimated to be about ten million tons, was less than one percent of 
the annual grain consumption and less than two percent of the grain fed to 
cattle. And the fertilizer gap was also small as Rogers argued: “The fertilizer gap 
amounts to one percent of world fertilizer usage ... and considerably less than 
the amount of fertilizers used annually in the United States for non-agricultural 
purposes like golf courses, lawns and public parks.” (WDM, 1974, p6) He 
concluded that the achievements of the first World Food Conference were 
negligible in terms of real progress to tackle hunger. 
World Food Conference: Outcomes 
Delegates at the conference agreed to establish the World Food Council, 
through the UN General Assembly, which would report to the UN through the 
Economic and Social Council. It was to be a ministerial body based in Rome 
with the remit of programming policy on emergency food aid and investments for 
agriculture in developing countries.  
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The conference also proposed the creation of an Agricultural Development 
Fund. The arguments against such a fund were numerous from the developed 
countries, with Germany publicly declaring that she would not contribute. The 
US was also against such a proposal and argued it was not needed as the 
World Bank was the best place through which to direct any contributions. 
Rogers in his report for WDM (1974) argued that the US was concerned about 
the potential loss of influence, both politically and commercially, if financial 
contributions by OPEC resulted in a shift in voting rights.  
 
Despite the arguments it was agreed to establish an international financial 
institution as a specialised agency of the UN to finance agricultural development 
projects primarily for food production in developing countries. The International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), one of the major outcomes of the 
World Food Conference, was established in 1977. It recognised that one of the 
most important insights of the conference was that “the causes of food 
insecurity and famine were not so much failures in food production but structural 
problems relating to poverty, and to the fact that the majority of the developing 
world’s poor population are concentrated in rural areas.” (IFAD, 2015) 
 
World food security was the most important question at the conference and in 
order to tackle the issue three areas were discussed; the creation of a global 
information and early warning system on food and agriculture, reserve stocks 
and food aid. The first concept was accepted by all countries except the USSR 
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and China, which expressed their reservations. They argued that such an 
information-gathering system, could jeopardise state sovereignty, contain 
information of a strategic nature and contribute to the speculative operations of 
multinational companies (Commission of the European Communities, 1974).  
 
The differences of opinion between the developing countries, which had called 
for a system of emergency reserve stocks of 500,000 tonnes of cereals, and the 
developed countries that rejected the call were partially addressed in the 
International Undertaking for World Food Security project, known as the Boerma 
Plan. However as the issue had not been resolved to any side’s satisfaction the 
Commission of the European Communities (1974) foresaw difficulties in the 
future. The conference also accepted a recommendation that food aid, from 
1975, should be increased to a minimum of 100 million tonnes per year.  
Australia and Canada both stated their willingness to increase their food aid 
contributions but the US and the EEC confined themselves to accepting the 
overall objective of 10 million tonnes.  
 
Soon after the conference the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) was 
established as an intergovernmental body within the UN system to oversee the 
implementation of policies to eradicate hunger and malnutrition within ten years; 
the aim set down by the conference. The CFS will be discussed in chapter eight. 
The Society for International Development (1978) admitted that the final 
declaration of the World Food Conference contained interesting conceptual 
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innovations and guidelines that may have improved the world food situation. 
However the society concluded (1978, p63) that “once the immediate crisis has 
passed, the declaration and its proposals were quickly forgotten and this 
problem, unparalleled in gravity and explosive potential, has been allowed to 
drift once more into the background.”  
 
Despite all the rhetoric of the conference, which had called on all peoples to 
“work together to bring about the end of the age-old scourge of hunger” (UN, 
1975, p7) the food crisis of the early 1970s was not effectively tackled by the 
collective action of the international community, as states or international 
organisations. The unresolved issues, such as the disagreements over reserve 
stocks, problems of trade and the balance of payments all continued into the 
‘lost development decade’ of the 1980s. 
 
Again the actors involved in the World Food Conference had agreed that there 
was an urgent challenge facing the world, with millions facing starvation. 
However, even with the US acting as hegemon and leading the way, there was 
little consensus on the best way in which to tackle the multi-faceted problems. 
With this level of complexity and uncertainty, the epistemic community should 
have been in a stronger position to offer advice to decision makers, according to 
Haas (1992). This was not the case: national interests, especially focused on 
Cold War dynamics, took precedence, as demonstrated through the US’ support 
for the World Bank as a channel for funds rather than the creation of a new 
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fund, and opposition to global data gathering on food and agriculture by the 
USSR and China. 
Structural Adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s 
Following their disastrous economic performance in the 1970s and the shock of 
the Third World debt crisis of 1982 many developing countries were left 
struggling to survive in a world hit by recession and rising interest rates in the 
early 1980s (Svendsen, 1996). In this financial climate many countries agreed to 
participate in the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in 
return for loans. For example; “By 1989 37 African nations had signed up for 
over $25 billion in Western donor support.” (Ayittey, 2005, p.154) In fact, aid 
from multilateral sources increased from only 13 percent of the total in 1970 to 
34 percent in 1987 (Ayittey, 2005).  
 
The controversial SAPs, which introduced far-reaching ‘conditionalities’, were 
designed to achieve macroeconomic stability, increase economic efficiency and 
enhance economic growth (Demery, 1994) by implementing a package of 
reforms drawn up by the IFIs.  Hoogvelt (2001, p.181) argues that “the aim of 
adjustment was to shatter the dominant post-war, state-led development 
paradigm and overcome problems of development stagnation by promoting 
open and free competitive market economies, supervised by minimal states.”  
 
The SAPs were part of the emerging market-based neoliberal agenda. Gaining 
dominance in national and international politics neoliberalism was promoted in 
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the US through the dramatically changed monetary policies of Paul Volker, who 
became the head of the US Federal Reserve in 1979, Ronald Reagan, who was 
voted in as US president in 1980 and in the UK by Margaret Thatcher, who 
became prime minister in 1979. (Harvey, 2005) 
 
The measures implemented through the SAPs were wide ranging and included 
currency devaluation, deregulation of prices and wages, reduction of public 
spending on social programmes and state bureaucracies, removal of food 
subsidies and other supports on basic necessities, trade liberalisation, 
privatisation of parastatal enterprises and expansion of the export sector, often 
at the expense of food production for local populations. (Hoogvelt, 2001) 
 
SAPs had a dramatic and detrimental impact on developing countries and their 
people: unemployment increased and wages decreased as governments 
suddenly reduced their state apparatus; sharp declines in real incomes followed 
devaluation, which, combined with interest rate liberalisation, forced 
governments to borrow more (Hoogvelt, 2001). This had serious consequences 
as Berry (1995, p.367) noted: “In Tanzania, for example, the purchasing power 
of urban workers’ wages fell 50 percent between 1980-1984; in Ghana, urban 
incomes fell by 40 percent in the same period.” Producers proved ill-equipped to 
deal with increased competition from cheap foreign goods when trade was 
liberalised and under a system of privatisation assets and enterprises were 
bought by either the governing elites or foreign investors.  
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Agriculture was hit hard by SAPs as food security was sacrificed for the 
production of cash crops for export. Instead of playing a central role in 
development by raising the nutritional standards and feeding the expanding 
population farmers and plantation owners focused their efforts on growing luxury 
crops, such as coffee, cocoa, cotton and groundnuts (Stryker and Ndegwa, 
1995) for the world market as part of the drive towards globalisation. This led to 
poor agricultural performance, rural poverty, child malnutrition and a lack of 
food. Stewart (1994, p.102) argues that the neglect of agriculture affected the 
balance of payments and “for countries with chronic foreign-exchange 
shortages, any substantial dependence on food imports creates vulnerability.” 
As countries concentrated on primary cash crops they became increasingly 
vulnerable in the ‘free market’ leading to their marginalisation in the world 
economy, which had a devastating impact on their terms of trade. “About 25 
percent of the purchasing power of the exports of sub-Saharan Africa as a 
whole was lost over the 1980s.” (Stryker and Ndegwa, 1995, p.381) 
 
The neoliberal policies advanced as conditionalities by the IFIs have been 
instrumental in the drive towards globalisation, which Kenichi Ohmae claimed 
would lead to a “borderless world” and an “interlinked economy of one billion 
people, in which transnational companies are bringing the promise of a better 
life with increased security and prosperity” (Ohmae quoted in Tickner, 1999, 
p.43). However, Wilkin (1999) argued the implementation of the neoliberal 
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economic policies of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation have 
disempowered large sections of the world’s poor, moved resources and wealth 
from the developing South to the developed North and undermined democracy 
as wealth and power are secured by the dominant social forces, which act in 
their own best interests. Hoogvelt (2001, p.180) also argued that globalisation 
benefits the developed countries at the expense of the developing world as the 
IMF and World Bank exert their considerable influence “to affect profoundly the 
organisation of production and trade in the periphery to the benefit of the core of 
the world capitalist system.” 
 
In the 1990s IFIs changed their approach to structural adjustment by introducing 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), designed to encourage broader 
participation and greater ownership of economic programmes. This change in 
policy followed criticisms of the first phase of adjustment as acknowledged by 
the World Bank. In a retrospective  report on structural lending it states (2001a, 
p.xi) “The first decade of adjustment lending raised concerns that the emphasis 
on getting relative prices right paid too little attention to the social impact of 
countries’ economic adjustment and to institutional constraints in adjusting 
countries.”  The report highlights (2001a, p.ix) the “episodes of disappointing 
country economic performance and uneven progress in policy formation” in the 
1980s but states that “the overall quality of Bank adjustment lending improved 
markedly during the 1990s.” Poverty-focused adjustment operations in the 
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1990s included measures to protect the poor through social expenditures and 
safety nets. 
 
Despite the criticisms of structural adjustment the problems facing agriculture, 
especially in Africa, go back further than the early 1980s. Mkandawire (1999) 
acknowledges that in the decades that followed the post-colonial era Africa was 
the only major developing region that suffered a decline in per capita levels of 
food production, mainly as a result of policies that favoured industry or urban 
development. According to the World Bank (1997, p.48) these anti-agricultural 
policies, which included implicit and explicit taxes, “contributed to alarming 
declines in sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural growth rates: from an annual 
average of 2.2 percent in 1965-73 to one percent in 1974-80 and 0.6 percent in 
1981-85.” Despite structural adjustment, which was supposed to reverse the 
decline, African agriculture in the late 1990s still lagged behind on irrigation, 
having only four percent of land irrigated, compared with 26 percent in India and 
44 percent in China. Mkandawire (1999) argues that this makes African 
agriculture very weather dependent.  
 
Although the introduction of PRSPs may be seen as an attempt to address the 
lack of ownership and participation, they still promote the neoliberal agenda. 
The Jubilee South Pan-African Declaration (quoted in Bond, 2006, p.42) stated: 
“The poverty programmes are expected to be consistent with the neoliberal 
paradigm including privatisation, deregulation, budgetary constraints and trade 
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and financial liberalisation. Yet these have exacerbated economic and social 
crises in our countries.” 
 
SAPs and their successors, PRSPs, were seen as having a negative impact on 
the poor and food insecure. In the wider sphere market globalisation and 
liberalisation were seen by developed countries, mainly major food exporters, as 
having a largely positive effect. Trade was viewed as helping to reduce 
fluctuations in food consumption, relieving part of the burden of stockholding 
and promoting economic growth. Developing countries and NGOs operating in 
the field of food security were largely critical of trade liberalisation and the SAPs, 
arguing that there was a lack of accountability in relation to the transnational 
corporations operating in the global economy (Shaw, 2007). 
 
Growing Food Insecurity: FAO response 
 
International Conference on Nutrition, 1992 
At the beginning of the 1990s it was widely accepted that the number of people 
without access to enough food to meet their daily needs was approximately 800 
million people (US Dept. of Agriculture, 1995). In addition, there was an 
estimated 40 percent of the world’s population, two billion people, with 
deficiencies in one or more micronutrients (FAO, 1995). However, according to 
FAO’s own Hunger Portal (FAO, 2014e) the number of people who were 
undernourished could have been as high as 1,015 million. In an effort to 
address these pressing issues FAO and the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
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combined forces and convened the first global conference devoted to nutrition. 
The International Conference on Nutrition 1992 was held in Rome at FAO 
headquarters and was attended by representatives from 159 countries and the 
European Community, 15 UN organisations and 144 NGOs.  
 
During the three years prior to the conference governments prepared papers on 
the nutritional situation in their own countries, paying particular attention to the 
factors influencing the nutritional status of their people and identifying the most 
vulnerable groups. The conference agreed the World Declaration on Nutrition 
and Plan of Action for Nutrition, with nine priority areas highlighted. Over 73 
countries created National Plans of Action for Nutrition (NPLANS), with FAO 
playing a fundamental technical assistance role. In addition, many governments, 
NGOs and international agencies continued with the work started in preparation 
for the conference (FAO, 1995). 
World Food Summit, 1996 
In the first half of the 1990s there had been at least ten international 
conferences covering a wide range of issues from the environment and 
development to women. These also included the World Conference on 
Overcoming Global Hunger 1993 and A 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture and 
the Environment 1995 (Shaw, 2007) Despite this plethora of international 
conferences, leading to possible conference fatigue, FAO, following the election 
of Jacque Diouf, started to put the case forward for a world summit to discuss 
food.  
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It was acknowledged (US Dept. of Agriculture, 1995) that action needed to be 
taken to address the dual problems of continued chronic malnutrition faced 
across the developing world, with 88 countries categorised as low-income food-
deficit countries (LIFDCs), and the falling aid budgets for developing country 
agriculture, which had declined from US$ 10 billion in 1982 to US$ 7.2 billion in 
199225.  
 
In addition, it was argued that since the World Food Conference in 1974 there 
had not been a high-level meeting, with heads of state present, to assess the 
state of global food security. The multifaceted nature of food security 
necessitated a response from many different government departments, from the 
ministries of agriculture to the ministries of foreign affairs, trade and economy; a 
situation only possible with the personal participation of the heads of state and 
government. However, despite this desire to engage the heads of state and 
government it was also argued that this was not a pledging conference, nor 
would it create new financial mechanisms, institutions or bureaucracy (US Dept. 
of Agriculture, 1995).  
 
At the World Food Summit, which was held in the FAO headquarters in 
November 1996, there were 186 participating countries, of which 41 were 
represented at the level of head of state, 15 at the level of deputy head of state, 
                                            
25
 This figure is calculated in constant 1985 US dollars (US Dept. of Agriculture, 1995) 
223 
 
41 at the level of head of government and 15 at the level of deputy head of 
government (FAO, 1995).  
 
The summit agreed the Rome Declaration and the Plan of Action, which 
contained seven commitment areas with a total of 27 objectives and targets. 
The declaration stated: “Everyone should have access to adequate and safe 
food and be free from hunger.” This may have been couched in the same terms 
as the Four Freedoms championed by Roosevelt (Roosevelt, 1941) five 
decades earlier but it did not move the debate forward.  
 
According to Shaw (2007, p353) “critics argued that what the summit achieved 
was only a restatement of commitments acceptable to every government 
rephrased in the sustainable, participatory gender-sensitive, anti-poverty, 
environmentally-friendly terms of the moment.” The summit did not deliver any 
legally binding agreements, any new aid commitments nor were there any new 
institutional arrangements proposed. However, as FAO was attempting to 
reclaim its role as the central body to deal with global food issues any proposals 
for new institutional arrangements would have been unwelcome as they would 
have diluted its position further. 
 
Nonetheless, the summit did help to create more coherence between 
governments and food agencies in discussions on issues of food security. It also 
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promoted the monitoring of progress made towards reducing chronic hunger, 
with the use of vulnerability and risk mapping.  
 
FAO in its attempt to regain its position as the central organisation within the 
sphere of food and agriculture had convened the World Food Summit. States 
resisted pressure to make any significant changes to the status quo by deciding 
this was not a pledging conference, nor one to establish any new infrastructure, 
and thus limiting the progress possible even before the conference had started. 
However, despite this lack of commitment, FAO was still able to bring together a 
large number of state and non-state actors creating stronger networks focused 
on food security. These connections have helped to build the knowledge base 
and establish shared understandings for an expanding epistemic community.  
Millennium Development Goals 
The World Food Summit also put food security back at the top of the 
international agenda going forward into the twenty-first century, ensuring it 
would be seen as a priority for the Millennium Development Goals. In the 
opening lines of the Rome Declaration on World Food Security the delegates at 
the summit (FAO, 1996, p1) declared:  
 
We pledge our political will and our common and national 
commitment to achieving food security for all and to an on-
going effort to eradicate hunger in all countries with an 
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immediate view to reducing the number of undernourished 
people to half their present level no later than 2015.  
The vision for how this ambitious target was to be achieved was then set out in 
FAO’s The Strategic Framework for FAO: 2000-2015 which stated that the 
organisation’s mission was “to help build a food-secure world for present and 
future generations” (FAO, 1999) through leadership and partnership. FAO 
acknowledged that it could only work within its own mandate and sphere of 
competence in a supporting role to states, recognised as the only entities with 
the capacity to achieve the goal, in what was termed “national responsibility and 
international solidarity” (FAO, 1999). 
 
Following the Millennium Summit in 2000 189 member states and more than 23 
international organisations signed the United Nations Millennium Declaration 
(UN, 2000a), which then led to the adoption of the eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (UN, 2000b). The aim of eradicating extreme 
poverty and hunger was set out in the first MDG. Hunger was addressed in 
target 1c, the aim of which was to “halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people who suffer from hunger” (UN, 2015c). 
 
Success in achieving the MDGs has been variable, across the different goals 
and across geographical areas. For example, global progress on MDG 4, 
reducing child mortality by two-thirds in the under-fives, has been substantial but 
insufficient. Overall figures show a global reduction of 49 percent between 1990 
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and 2013, a decline from 12.7 million to 6.3 million annually. (Gaffey et al, 2015) 
Additionally, the maternal mortality rate (MMR) has fallen from approximately 
523,000 to 289,000 annually, a reduction of 45 percent since 1990. Gaffey et al, 
(2015, p.287) argue that: “Although not insignificant, this decline clearly falls far 
short of the MDG-targeted 75 percent reduction in MMR by 2015.” The success 
in tackling malnutrition has also been varied, from country to country and within 
countries. In Tanzania, for example, stunting has remained prevalent in the 
Kongwa district despite general improvements in child nutritional status at the 
national level. (Semali et al, 2015) 
 
Jayati Ghosh (2015, p.320) argues that the challenges that continue to be faced 
require changing “economic strategies rather than tinkering with minor 
outcomes.” In the post-2015 SDGs Ghosh argues that the issues that need to 
be addressed, including persistence of extreme poverty, growing inequality, 
environmental degradation and climate change, will require a major change in 
approach but are still being met by relatively small answers. He argues (2015, 
p.321) “It is no longer credible to think that deregulated markets in a context of 
unfettered capital flows driven mostly by the pursuit of short-term profits or 
capital gains will deliver inclusive economic growth.” 
   
There have been a number of criticisms levelled at the manner in which the 
MDGs were established. They were seen as created by only a few stakeholders 
with inadequate involvement of developing countries, they overlooked many 
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development objectives previously agreed and they were not adapted to 
national requirements (Fehling et al., 2013). Issues seen to play a key role in 
development were not included, such as sustainable development and peace 
and security, and some developing countries have lacked the capacity to collect 
the data required to track performance (Harris and Provost, 2013). 
 
Ashwani Saith (2006) is very critical of the MDGs, from the manner in which 
they were created to their implementation, their omissions, as well as their 
continuance of neoliberalism. He traces the development of the MDGs from the 
International Development Goals (IDGs) as proposed by the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the late 1990s. Saith argues that 
a joint report on the progress of the IDGs by the UN, OECD, World Bank and 
IMF (UN, 2000c) drew strong criticism from NGOs, CSOs and even church 
bodies for its narrowing of the development agenda. Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, 
(2011, p.25) highlight the uproar the report created in the NGO networks that 
“were shocked that the UN Secretary-General would sign a document with the 
heads of the World Bank, IMF and OECD. This was seen as a betrayal. The 
anti-globalisation debates behind much NGO thinking were often framed in anti-
market ideology and portrayed the World Bank and the IMF as the enemy.” 
Clive Gabay (2011, p.491) argues that the connection with the donor-driven 
IDGs immediately “problematizes the idea of the MDGs as an automatically 
benign and apolitical set of goals and targets.” He challenges the vision of 
development, which he argues is “inherently contradictory, dependent on 
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processes such as privatisation and subsidy reduction which, when 
implemented, have proven high social costs seemingly opposed to the 
sentiments embodied in the MDGs.” (Gabay, 2011, p.492) 
 
However, to create a development framework acceptable to the widest possible 
audience, and therefore, one that would offer the best possible chance of 
success, the ‘message entrepreneurs’ who helped to create the MDGs from the 
long development ‘wish list’ that had been growing throughout the 1990s had 
combined principles with pragmatism to achieve a deal. However, this had 
created a situation in which the MDGs, from a neoliberal growth perspective 
were seen as a threat to economic growth, and from an anti-neoliberal 
perspective, were seen as not being progressive enough. (Fukuda-Parr and 
Hulme, 2011)  
 
Saith (2006, p.1170-1171) argues that despite its initial opposition to the MDGs 
the US unveiled the “so-called Monterrey Consensus, which effectively and 
firmly embedded the MDG implementation process within the mainstream 
neoliberal strategic and policy framework.” In so doing the US was able to pay 
“lip service to the MDGs” whilst using the device to “further push the UN 
development agenda and policy instruments into close convergence with the 
neoliberal prescriptions.” This top-down approach “leaves little space for 
substantive input from domestic populations” argues Liam Clegg, (2015, p.951) 
With a focus on benchmarking, Clegg highlights the criticisms levelled at the 
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MDGs as exclusive instruments and argues that “there is a tendency for 
benchmarking initiatives to crowd out the perspectives and interests of more 
marginalised agents.” (Clegg, 2011, p.951) 
 
Critics also highlight the many omissions from the framework, which include 
reproductive health services for all; governance, human rights and democracy; 
gender empowerment; and decent work targets. These had been omitted for 
various reasons, argue Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2011) as ‘message 
entrepreneurs’ attempted to create a list of goals that would gain near-universal 
acceptance. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the criticisms, by setting the MDGs the international 
community has been able to focus its attention on certain, if limited, issues. 
These have included food security. This international attention enabled the FAO 
to set its sights on becoming the centre of excellence and an authoritative 
purveyor of knowledge and advice on food security (FAO, 1999). It is debatable 
whether this was achieved.  
 
The MDGs and their successors, the SDGs, will be discussed in relation to 
FAO’s ability to provide GPGs through norms and standards setting in chapter 
nine. 
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Fragmentation in the food and agriculture arena 
FAO is only one organisation operating within the diverse and wide-ranging 
arena of food and agriculture. States and different departments within states, 
groups of states, as well as a wide range of non-state actors, from NGOs and 
CSOs to foundations and multinational corporations, are operating at many 
different levels within this very complex and interconnected area. These actors 
all have different priorities and objectives, which shape the field within which 
FAO and the other international organisations related to food and agriculture, 
operate. Of course, in the midst of all these different actors, farmers have to 
produce the food. A full investigation of this complex situation is beyond the 
remit of this thesis; however a brief overview would be beneficial to aid 
understanding of FAO’s role and position within this globalised and fragmented 
system. 
States 
At the national level many different government departments are involved, from 
agriculture to trade, from rural development to environment. All these different 
departments need to communicate within their own government and with 
respective departments in other governments. Departments within one state will 
have different approaches to any one issue as they strive to fulfil their remit and 
position themselves centrally within the state apparatus; essential to ensure 
budget allocations from central government, which are determined by the state’s 
overall priorities. Traditionally agriculture has been given low priority, especially 
in states where farmers are seen as marginal groups.  
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There are also different groups of states, such as the G7/G8, G20, the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the G77 that all have their 
own agendas relating to agriculture; politics, economics and ideology all play a 
role. This is clearly seen with the promotion of the neoliberal agenda by the US 
and UK from the 1980s onwards. However, as the economies of states, such as 
China, Brazil and India have grown the balance of power has shifted. Murphy et 
al (2012, p.5) argue that this has made the likelihood of a meaningful outcome 
of the latest round of WTO negotiations improbable. This they argue is because 
“the new emerging powers are not as wedded to open trade, deregulated 
markets and deregulated capital flows as are the governments they now 
challenge (the United States and the European Union in particular).” 
 
Within this continuously evolving political and economic situation FAO has to 
operate through co-operation and partnership building. States, especially those 
from different groups, do not form a homogenous group, which makes 
consensus building on any issue challenging. The role that states play in FAO in 
relation to the organisation’s reform and its provision of GPGs will be discussed 
in greater detail in the following chapters. 
International Organisations 
At the international level FAO is only one international organisation, among 
many, that deals with food and agriculture. There are over 20 IOs and special 
advisors that operate in this area, from the Office of the High Commissioner for 
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Human Rights to the UN Environment Programme. Alongside these IOs are the 
IFIs, the World Bank and IMF, and the WTO, which as previously discussed, 
play a significant role in policy implementation that directly affects agriculture. 
However, FAO is the only IO as a specialised UN agency that has a mandate in 
all areas connected to all aspects of food and agriculture. 
 
The WFP and IFAD, as the other Rome-based agencies, are FAO’s traditional 
partners; there is close co-operation between the three agencies. The WFP was 
established in 1961 and is the largest humanitarian agency fighting hunger. It 
delivers food at times of emergency and when the emergency has passed to 
help people rebuild their lives. Every year it gives assistance to millions. For 
example, in 2013 it reached 80 million people with food assistance in 75 
countries; delivered 3.1 million metric tonnes of food, 86 percent of which was 
purchased in developing countries (WFP, 2015c). The organisation’s focus is on 
emergency relief and assisting people through specific feeding programmes, 
such as schools meals projects, which reached 18.6 million children in 2013. Its 
work does not significantly impact on that of FAO but is instead complementary 
to it. 
 
IFAD was established in 1977 as one of the outcomes of the World Food 
Conference in 1974. Its aim is to finance agricultural development projects 
primarily for food production in developing countries. By February 2015 it had 
mobilised approximately US$ 23.4 billion in co-financing and funding from 
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domestic sources for rural development in addition to its own contribution of 
US$ 16.3 billion in loans and grants; it had supported 974 programmes and 
projects in partnership with 122 recipient governments and empowered 438 
million people to grow more food, better manage their land and gain new skills. 
IFAD aims to transform agriculture and rural communities through practical 
projects with much of its work focussed on smallholder farmers. (IFAD, 2015) 
 
FAO is operating in a crowded arena with many different IOs concerned with 
some aspect of food and agriculture. WFP and IFAD are the principle agencies 
working alongside FAO but with these as well as the other organisations FAO 
aims to form partnerships. This will prove more difficult with some than others 
depending on the other organisations’ remit membership and political aims. 
Nevertheless FAO is still the only specialised agency in food and agriculture 
with a mandate to operate in all areas. 
NGOs and Foundations 
There are a range of non-state actors operating in food and agriculture, from 
development NGOs such as Oxfam and Save the Children, to philanthropic 
foundations, including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Many of these organisations have greater financial 
resources and more staff than FAO but do not have the global mandate.  
 
Foundations have been operating in the realm of food and agriculture for 
decades. Some have been involved in international development for many years 
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and others have only recently been established. Many of their aims and 
objectives are very similar, based on improving lives, ending hunger and helping 
people adapt to climate change, however some have additional economic, 
social or political objectives too. For example the Rockefeller Foundation (2015) 
launched its Mexican Agriculture Programme (MAP) in 1943, through which it 
helped develop hybrid crops that were the founding crops in the ‘green 
revolution’ of the late 1960s.  
 
This drive to create high-yielding crops was not only based on the foundation’s 
desire to “guarantee humane benefits” but also instrumental in the fight against 
communism. Warren Weaver, the foundation’s Natural Sciences Director in 
1951, saw the work in Mexico as “the world’s principal refuge from Communism” 
and argued that “in this struggle for the minds of men, the side that best helps 
satisfy man’s primary needs for food, clothing and shelter is likely to win.” 
(Weaver quoted in Rockefeller, 2015). In 1984 the Rockefeller Foundation 
launched its International Programme in Rice Biotechnology, which 
reinvigorated the foundation’s support of biological research. The foundation 
has funded research into the mapping of the rice genome, which has led to the 
engineering of ‘golden rice’ a genetically modified hybrid that contains beta-
carotene, which the body coverts to vitamin A (Rockefeller, 2015). 
 
The promotion of ‘green revolution’ technology is seen in the work of a number 
of foundations, including the world’s largest, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
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Foundation (2015a), which is also supporting the development of ‘golden rice’ 
as it aims to help farmers increase their productivity with the use of ‘heartier 
seeds’. With a foundation trust endowment of US$ 41.3 billion and total grant 
payments of US$ 34.5 billion since its creation in 2000 the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation (2015b) is a significant force within international 
development. It has taken the ethos of the ‘green revolution’ of the 1960s to 
1980s and is now promoting its expansion to Africa through the Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) to which it has so far given funding totalling 
US$ 264.5 million. 
 
This level of funding is significant and in many cases overshadows official 
development aid and the total resource base of international organisations such 
as FAO, which has an annual budget of US$ 2.4 billion for 2014-2015. (FAO, 
2015) These foundations aim to improve the lives of small-scale farmers; 
however the benefits of these types of genetically modified seeds have yet to be 
ascertained; their predecessors used in the first ‘green revolution’ were not a 
success. As discussed in chapter one these technological fixes were highly 
reliant on industrialised methods, requiring more fertilizers, pesticides and 
water, which made them expensive and environmentally unsustainable.  
 
Research has shown that the technological solutions employed in the ‘green 
revolution’ in India from the 1960s onwards had serious negative 
consequences. Although yields improved in the first few years of production by 
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the 1980s the soils were exhausted and infertile from the overuse of chemical 
fertilizers. Farmers trying to compete with highly subsidised US wheat made 
available through liberalised markets were forced into debt as crops failed, the 
price for wheat fell and the price of inputs, such as modified seeds, fertilizers 
and pesticides rose. This situation became intolerable for many farmers. In India 
over 100,000 farmers have taken their own lives since 1997; on average 
between 1997 and 2005 one farmer committed suicide every 32 minutes. 
(UNDESA, 2008) 
 
Agricultural areas throughout India were affected, including Punjab. Vandana 
Shiva (1991, p.18) argues that “instead of abundance, Punjab has been left with 
diseased soils, pest-infested crops, waterlogged deserts and indebted and 
discontented farmers.” Despite the problems associated with the ‘green 
revolution’ solutions and the failure of the experiment Shiva (1991, p.12) states 
“the green revolution miracle continues to be advertised on every platform of 
every agency that stood to gain from it, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, 
the World Bank, the seed and chemical multinationals, the Government of India 
and the various agencies it controls.” Since Shiva’s initial research into the 
consequences of the ‘green revolution’ the Gates Foundation has been created 
and is now also promoting the same types of technological solutions for Africa. 
 
Michael Edwards (2008) has also questioned approach of foundations to solving 
social problems with market-based solutions. He argues (2008, p.2) that with 
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their significant resources they are able to extend access to useful goods and 
services but these are “insufficient to lever deeper changes in the distribution of 
power and resources across the world” as this type of “systemic change 
involves social movement, politics and the state, which these experiments 
generally ignore.” The reluctance of these foundations to promote systemic 
change is unsurprising as their wealth is derived from and dependent upon the 
maintenance of the status quo and the market-based economy. 
 
Foundations have significant resources at their disposal and they do work to 
improve the lives of millions of people. However, by taking a market-led 
approach to research and development and by promoting industrial agricultural 
methods, such as genetically modified seeds, they are operating within the 
neoliberal model.  
 
In addition to the many large and well-financed foundations there are also 
thousands of NGOs operating in the food and agriculture arena. Many are small 
and work at the local level, directly with small-scale farmers to help improve 
food security for families and communities. Others are global entities that not 
only work at the local level but also operate globally to secure funds, 
commission independent research, campaign on issues and lobby governments 
for policy change. For example, Oxfam International has commissioned many 
reports (Murphy et al, 2012; Sahan and Mikhail, 2012) on issues relating to food 
security and development as well as initiating its Grow Campaign.  
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NGOs may be seen as offering a third route to development, an alternative to 
the state-led and market-led approaches. Wagona Makoba (2002,) argues “The 
prevalence of weak states and declining markets in the Third World inevitably 
leave development-oriented NGOs as the only alternative to promote grassroots 
development.”  
 
There are so many different types and sizes of NGOs in the food and 
agricultural sector making this group of organisations incredibly diverse and 
complex. The ability of FAO to work in partnership with foundations and NGOs 
will depend on the willingness and capacity of each different organisation to do 
so. This is a complicated area which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Multinational Corporations 
Multinational corporations that sell seed, fertilizers, pesticides, as well as 
foodstuffs have significant resources and power within the marketplace. 
Industrialised agriculture has helped create vast wealth for these companies, 
often at the expense of small-scale farmers, but there is little known about their 
operations. Some of the largest companies are completely or partially privately 
owned, such as French company Louis Dreyfus, and Cargill, which has been 
controlled by the same two families for over 150 years. (Murphy et al, 2012)  
 
There are four big commodity traders operating in the agricultural sector, Archer 
Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus. These are known as 
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the ABCDs. They dominate the market and are central to the modern food and 
agriculture system. All four were founded more than a century ago; the youngest 
of this group, ADM was established in 1902 and the oldest, Bunge, dates back 
to 1818. All are global operators with two (Cargill and ADM) US companies; 
Louis Dreyfus is a primarily family-owned French conglomerate with 20 percent 
of its shares held by employees; and Bunge, founded in Amsterdam has 
recently moved its headquarters to the US. (ADM, 2015; Bunge, 2015; Louis 
Dreyfus, 2015; Murphy et al, 2012) 
 
ADM has 33,000 employees and serves 140 countries. It is the third largest 
processor of oil seed, corn, wheat and cocoa. In 2011 it had net sales of US$ 
80.7 billion and it’s been listed on the New York Stock Exchange since 1925. 
Bunge is the largest grain trader in South America. It had net sales of US$ 58.7 
billion in 2011, employs 35,000 worldwide, operates in 40 countries and has 
approximately 400 facilities. Louis Dreyfus is active in more than 100 countries, 
its net sales in 2009 were US$ 34 billion and it is the world’s leading 
manufacturer in cotton and rice and one of the largest producers of orange 
juice, producing 15 percent of the world’s total. (ADM, 2015; Bunge, 2015; Louis 
Dreyfus, 2015; Murphy et al, 2012) Cargill is the largest ABCD and also the 
largest privately owned company in the US; owned by the same two families 
since it was founded in 1865. It has 153,000 employees worldwide and operates 
in 67 countries. It had sales and revenues of US$119.5 billion in 2011. (Cargill, 
2015; Murphy et all, 2012).  
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Combined these four companies control a significant proportion of a range of 
basic commodities. For example they control 90 percent of the global grain 
trade. These companies do not just trade in physical commodities; they operate 
at every level from the farm to processing, acting as landowners, providers of 
seed, fertilizers and agrochemicals, as well as buyers of the end products, 
which they transport on their own fleets of ships. They have also expanded their 
operations into biofuel production and as well as providing financial services in 
commodity markets; two global developments that had a direct impact on the 
global food price crises in 2007-2008 and 2010-2011, as previously discussed. 
Jeremy Hobbs, Executive Director of Oxfam, (quoted in Murphy et al, 2012, p.3) 
argues that “Traders have been integral to the transformation of food production 
into a complex, globalised and financialised business. Food prices, access to 
scarce resources like land and water, climate change and food security are all 
affected by the activities of traders.” 
 
This control is exerted in many different ways. With their dominance in the 
market they influence what is grown, how, in what quantities and for which 
markets. With links to agro-chemical companies, for example Cargill with 
Monsanto and ADM with Syngenta, they promote particular technology 
packages and they also set the purchase price for commodities. However, 
although they are influential they do not operate in a vacuum and they are not 
the only large companies now operating in the global market. Japanese trading 
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firms Mitsubishi and Marubeni, new comer to the agri-business scene Glencore, 
Singapore-based Olam, and Bangkok-based Charoen Pokphand Group, are all 
making their presence felt.   
 
These commodity traders are not the only multinational corporations operating 
in the food and agricultural sectors using their size and market penetration to 
exert influence. Chemicals companies such as Monsanto and Ciba-Geigy have 
moved their operations into agricultural biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. 
There are six major seed and agrochemical companies, Syngenta, Bayer, 
BASF, Dow, Monsanto and DuPont, which control 59.8 percent of seeds and 
76.1 percent of agrochemicals. The share of the global proprietary seed market 
for the top three largest firms (Monsanto, DuPont and Syngenta) has increased 
from 22 percent in 1996 to 53.4 percent in 2011. The three largest agrochemical 
companies (Syngenta, Bayer and BASF) gained control of 52.5 percent of the 
market up from 33 percent in 1996. Between them these six companies 
accounted for 98 percent of all biotech acres. (ETC Group, 213)  
 
These companies have a comprehensive hold of the inputs for industrial and 
genetically engineered agriculture and the farmers employing these methods, as 
promoted through industrial agriculture. However, there are millions of small-
scale farmers in developing countries that are not tied into the corporate seed 
chain; instead they obtain their seeds from the informal sector, through saving 
their own seeds and exchanging seeds with their neighbours. It is through these 
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informal exchanges that many of the problems associated with genetically 
engineered seed, such as the growth of glyphosate-resistant weeds and the 
yield-reducing tendencies exhibited by transgenic hybrids, can be avoided 
(ETC, 2013). Issues surrounding genetically engineered seeds are complex and 
contentious. (Guardian, 2015) However, this discussion is also beyond the remit 
of this thesis. 
 
In addition to the ABCDs and the large seed and agrochemical companies there 
are a number of food processors, such as Nestle and Unilever, as well as the 
final distributors, the supermarkets, including Tesco, Carrefour and Wal-Mart, 
which now exert influence in every continent and use their superior purchasing 
power to write their own terms. According to Fortune 500 (2015) Wal-Mart is the 
largest company in the world with a market value of over US$ 265 billion and 
profits of US$ 16 billion. 
 
At every stage these large multinational corporations control the market, 
especially food produced through industrial agriculture. Although the private 
sector is invited to participate in negotiations taking place in fora including the 
CFS of FAO these companies all too often operate outside these arenas. They 
do not enter into debates on issues that may be affected by their actions and 
products, such as food security, price volatility, climate change, land use or 
water pollution. Instead they operate a business as usual approach and fight 
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any attempt to curb their control (Organic Consumers Association, 2015; 
Guardian, 2015). 
Farmers 
In addition to all these large organisations are the farmers themselves. As 
discussed in chapter one, farmers operate at many different levels from the 
small-scale farmer in a developing country to a producer on a very large scale 
using mechanised and industrial methods.  
 
Farming differs from state to state and within states. According to Lowder et al 
(2014) there are at least 570 million farms worldwide, of which more than 500 
million can be considered family farms. Most of the world’s farms are very small 
with more than 475 million farms less than two hectares. However, a large in 
number these small farms only operate small share of the world’s farmland. This 
farmland is not evenly distributed. Lowder et al (2014, p.ii) argue that “Farmland 
distribution would seem quite unequal at the global level, but it is less so in low- 
and lower-middle-income countries as well as in some regional groups.” Of the 
570 million farms 74 percent are located in East Asia, and the Pacific and South 
Asia, with China alone accounting for 35 percent and India 24 percent of the 
world’s total. The remaining regions have considerably fewer farms for example 
of the total 570 million farms nine percent are in sub-Saharan Africa, seven 
percent in Europe and Central Asia, three percent in the Middle East and North 
Africa and four percent in Latin America. There are four percent of all farms in 
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high income countries, which include those in the EU, United States, Canada 
and Australia. (Lowder et al, 2014) 
 
According to the US Department of Agriculture (2014) the number of farms has 
decreased from 2,204,792 farms in 2007 to 2,109,363 in 2012 but the average 
size of the farms has increased from 418 acres to 435 acres in the same period. 
From 2007 to 2012 the market value of all agricultural products has increased 
by 33 percent to US$ 395; this includes crop sales, which have increased 48 
percent and livestock sales up 19 percent. However, it has to be noted that 
these increases in market value have taken place over the food price crises of 
2007-2008 and 2010-2011. 
 
In the EU over 47 percent of the land is farm land with 12 million full-time 
farmers working in the sector, on farms that average 15 hectares. There is 
range of farming methods used, including intensive, conventional and organic 
farming, especially with the inclusion of new member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe. (Europa, 2015a) 
 
Farmers are the essential component in any food production process and as 
such they must have a voice at the global level. To better protect their interests 
in a system designed and operated by those who promote industrial agriculture 
small-scale farmers have joined forces; the largest of these farmers’ 
organisations is La Via Campesina, which represents 200 million small and 
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medium scale farmers. (WDM, 2012) FAO is in a position to allow these voices 
to be heard, along with those of member states and the other organisations 
involved in food and agriculture. With the creation of La Via Campesina the 
voices of the small-scale farmers, who feed the majority of the world’s 
population, can also now be heard. This recent development will be examined in 
more detail in chapter eight.  
Loss of faith in FAO  
The FAO may have had laudable intentions but during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century it drew criticism from many quarters. In 2002 it held the 
World Food Summit; Five Years Later to assess the progress on the MDG to 
address hunger. Progress had been slow with only a three percent decrease in 
the number of hungry people to approximately 815 million. Coupled with this the 
failure to propose any new legally-binding measures meant the summit was 
seen by many as a waste of time (Pearce, 2002; Mulvany, 2002).  
 
Its official declaration, The International Alliance Against Hunger, (FAO, 2002a) 
was rejected by many NGOs and social movements. In fact, Patrick Mulvany 
(2002, p2) argued it “restates the same old recipe now spiked with 
biotechnology and with pious words about how governments must deal with the 
‘lack of political will’ to solve hunger.”  
 
Civil society and farmers’ organisations were particularly angered by the political 
direction and tone of the summit, especially when the meeting had come only 
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five weeks after a NATO-Russia meeting, also in Rome, which had agreed to 
sustain the US$ 800 billion a year global armaments industry. The dominant 
US-led ideology was seen as having a negative impact on FAO and its agenda, 
with the inclusion of biotechnology in the final declaration. The NGOs rejected 
the declaration and said it was “not ‘lack of political will’ but ‘too much political 
will’ to establish a global hegemony for trade liberation, industrial agriculture, 
genetic engineering and military dominance that are the main causes of 
hunger.” (Mulvany, 2002, p.2) 
 
FAO continued to garner criticism (Blaustein, 2005) as it explored the potential 
of biotechnology to combat hunger in its 2004 State of Food and Agriculture: 
2003-2004 Agricultural Biotechnology: meeting the needs of the poor? (FAO, 
2004b) In response to this controversial report 650 organisations sent an open 
letter to FAO accusing it of breaking it commitment to civil society and peasants’ 
organisations and calling into question FAO’s independence and its intellectual 
integrity (La Via Campesina, 2004).  
 
This was followed by widespread criticisms of FAO at the 32
nd
 session of the 
Committee on World Food Security (CFS) in October 2006. The global 
organisation representing peasant and small-scale famers, La Via Campesina, 
called for an end to the neoliberal agenda in the FAO and a move towards Food 
Sovereignty (Saragih, 2006). 
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To address the widespread criticisms the first-ever Independent External 
Evaluation (IEE) of FAO was undertaken. This evaluation and the extensive 
reform that followed will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Conclusion 
Since the World Food Conference in 1974 the world has become more 
globalised and the food and agriculture arena more fragmented, with many 
more actors operating within it. Neoliberalism and industrial agriculture have 
been promoted, creating new challenges for the food system and exacerbating 
those already present. (Weis, 2007; Murphy, 2013; De Schutter, 2014) Different 
groups want FAO to play different roles, for example the small-scale farmers 
represented by La Via Campesina would like FAO to offer an alternative to the 
neoliberal agenda promoted by developed countries, especially the US and EU 
through the WTO, the foundations and multinational corporations. (Mulvany, 
2002; La Via Campesina, 2004; Saragih, 2006) 
 
As a result of these competing pressures and the difficulties of operating in an 
increasingly complex global system attempting to tackle some the world’s most 
challenging and contentious issues, with decreasing levels of support from its 
member states, FAO has struggled to meet anyone’s expectations. (La Via 
Campesina, 2004; Blaustein, 2005) Facing criticisms for its lack of direction 
FAO instigated the most comprehensive reform in its history to enable it to face 
the challenges of the twenty-first century with renewed confidence. This will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Six: 
Reform of FAO 
Introduction 
The research for this thesis was conducted during a transitional period in FAO’s 
history. The need for reform had become urgent as the organisation struggled to 
fulfil its mandate with its budget and staff levels in decline, the enormity and 
complexity of the challenges to food security increasing and member states 
failing to reach consensus in their decision-making because of high levels of 
distrust. In 2004 the FAO Council agreed to launch an Independent External 
Evaluation (IEE) to strengthen and improve the organisation (FAO, 2004a). The 
FAO Conference in November 2005 agreed to initiate the evaluation and 
established the Council Committee for the Independent External Evaluation of 
FAO (CC-IEE) (FAO, 2005a). 
 
At the FAO Conference in November 2005 the director general, Jacques Diouf, 
also put forward proposals for reform. Member states noted that the director 
general had “emphasised that reforms were necessary and urgent and should 
be implemented regardless of the budget level” and they agreed with his 
“assessment of the need to enhance the organisation’s ability to fulfil its 
mandate through its normative and operational activities.” (FAO, 2005a, p.17) 
These reform proposals were in addition to the IEE and members reiterated 
their expectation that both reform processes should be mutually supportive.  
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The IEE was the first ever independent external evaluation of the FAO. During 
its investigation the IEE team (2007, p.181) found that there were many inter-
related reasons for the organisation’s inability to fulfil its role, including mistrust 
between different groups of member states and also between member states 
and FAO’s governing bodies, which led to reductions in resources, especially 
from the larger donors of the OECD states, which in turn affected the 
organisation’s ability to fulfil its role thus fuelling more mistrust.   
The split between the OECD and G77 members on 
substantive and political (ideological) grounds and the 
distrust between some of the membership and 
management are major factors rendering governing bodies 
ineffective, limiting their capacity for substantive 
discussion, constraining their ability to decide on major 
issues and programmes and preventing them from taking 
consensual decisions on priorities. 
With so many complex challenges facing the organisation, many of which were 
rooted in so many different ideological perspectives, the evaluation had to be 
thorough and fair to ensure all stakeholders accepted its findings and engaged 
with its recommendations. Fortunately the IEE process and final report were 
accepted across the board as it delivered an honest appraisal: its investigation 
was extensive, its findings challenging and its recommendations far-reaching. 
FAO fully engaged with the reform process, implementing profound changes, 
which are still on-going. At the time that the interviews were conducted in June 
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2013 at FAO headquarters in Rome the new director general, Jose Graziano da 
Silva, was just about to present his programme for change to the FAO 
Conference. The interviews reflect a sense of uncertainty, of change but overall 
a sense of optimism.  
 
This chapter will examine the role of the IEE, its findings and recommendations, 
and then how these were implemented through the reform process, through the 
implementation of the renewed global goals and the new strategic objectives. 
The reform process has not been straightforward with concerns expressed in 
the UK Government’s multilateral aid review, and strain placed on budgets and 
human resources, however there has been some progress in breaking down the 
silos within FAO’s organisational structure. These issues will also be discussed. 
Independent External Evaluation 
Findings 
The IEE, a fully independent team of six, led by Leif E. Christoffersen, delivered 
its report after 18 months of detailed investigation at FAO’s Rome headquarters 
and its field operations across the world. The IEE team assessed FAO’s overall 
performance but also had a mandate to help shape the organisation of the 
future so it would be in a strong position to “cost-effectively support humanity in 
facing the challenges of this 21st century, in particular the continuing scourges of 
hunger and poverty and the growing challenges to our fragile environment.” 
(IEE, 2007, p.2) To allow it to do this the team’s report covered four key areas: 
FAO’s role in the multilateral system, which it acknowledged as very different to 
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that in which it was created; its technical work and the relevance and 
effectiveness of its normative and co-operative programmes; FAO’s 
management, administration and organisation in all areas; and the global 
governance of food and agriculture and governance of the work of the FAO 
Secretariat. 
 
The IEE report found that there was much that FAO did well but the organisation 
was in a state of decline, which would continue if renewal and reform was not 
undertaken as a matter of urgency. To do this FAO needed additional resources 
for a process the report described as Reform with Growth. It described FAO as 
“in financial and programme crisis that imperils the organisation’s future in 
delivering essential services to the world.” (IEE, 2007, p.3) This was not 
surprising as the IEE team found that between 1994 and 2005 FAO’s total 
financial resources had declined in real terms by 31% and its total staff 
complement fell by 25%. However, the team argued (IEE, 2007, p.3) that: 
If FAO were to disappear tomorrow, much of it would need to be 
re-invented but with much more precise priorities and a 
concentration of its efforts in areas of demonstrable need which 
correspond to its comparative advantage. The challenge is to 
move forward on reform with growth before further decline 
inflicts irreversible damage on the organisation.  
The IEE report outlined the essential goods, some of which are GPGs, and 
services, which it argued no other organisation was able to provide, but which it 
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also argued were at serious risk if FAO was not reformed and given adequate 
finances to complete the reform process. The report found that the 
organisation’s efforts were fragmented and, rather than taking a broader view of 
the whole, it concentrated on small components of its vast challenge. This had 
undermined confidence in its abilities, which had then contributed to a 
continuing reduction in its financial resources, resulting in further declining 
capacity which had placed many of its core competencies in peril. It was in a 
spiral of decline, which if not addressed the IEE believed would place the 
organisation itself in danger.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, it is clear that the global food situation has 
shifted dramatically since the organisation was created. The world’s population 
has increased from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 7 billion today with an estimated 2 
billion more to be added by 2050 (United States Census Bureau, 2012; United 
Nations, 2014). In an attempt to address the food shortages of World War Two 
FAO’s main focus was the increase in food production; this has been 
successful: since 1945 food production has tripled and the average food 
availability per person has risen by 40 percent (Da Silva, 2015). At the 
aggregate level this means that there is enough food for everyone in the world 
today; however this supply side success has not been transferred to those who 
need it the most. In addition to this distribution problem, production is also now 
growing more slowly and will be inadequate to meet the demands of a growing 
population, as well as changed consumer patterns that will inevitably follow from 
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income growth, such as higher demand for livestock products and higher value 
crops. These challenges are in addition to the strain placed on the world’s 
resources through an increased need for energy and water, and problems 
associated with climate change and increased urbanisation.  
 
The IEE argued that FAO needs to address simultaneously the issues of food 
production, livelihoods, income and food access. It called for the organisation to 
be more flexible and overcome its aversion to risk-taking, as well as change the 
way in which it is organised and the way it works. The IEE highlighted problems 
with the FAO’s “heavy and costly bureaucracy”, which “creates and reinforces a 
rigid, risk-averse and centralised organisational culture, with weak horizontal 
communication and linkages.” (IEE, 2007, p.3) This was particularly relevant to 
the relationships between the organisation’s headquarters in Rome and its field 
operations, which were described as “fragmented”. It argued that the overall 
governance by its member states was failing the FAO. 
Recommendations 
The IEE made over 100 recommendations to enable reform with growth. It 
called for the organisation to form, adopt and implement a three to four year 
plan and suggested that this Immediate Action Plan should be “aimed at 
securing the future of FAO as the dynamic, credible and effective global 
organisation that its original architects intended.” It saw FAO as in a strong 
position to tackle the “continuously emerging challenges that only a global 
organisation with the mandate and experience of FAO can address with 
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legitimacy and authority. (IEE, 2007, p.4-5) However it warned that “without 
transformational reforms, FAO’s current trajectory will prove unsustainable 
financially, strategically and programmatically.” (IEE, 2007, p.5)  
 
Four main areas were addressed in the IEE’s recommendations: establishing a 
new strategic framework, investing in governance, enabling institutional cultural 
change with reform of the administrative and management systems, and 
restructuring for effectiveness and efficiency in both the headquarters and the 
field operations. The IEE argued that if these changes were successfully 
implemented “FAO would have set the new standard of excellence in 
multilateral organisations.” (IEE, 2007, p.5) FAO has an opportunity to move 
from a position of near irrelevancy through reduced capabilities to that of a 
trailblazer in reform. 
Process of Reform 
Taking the recommendations of the IEE as a point of reference FAO entered a 
period of reassessment and reform. Initially FAO established the Conference 
Committee on Follow-up to the Independent External Evaluation (CoC-IEE, 
2008a) chaired by Mohammad Saeid Noori-Naeini. The committee reiterated 
the three global goals of FAO, to be discussed below, and outlined eleven 
strategic goals and eight core functions. These would be streamlined as part of 
the reform process. A root and branch review of the management of the 
organisation was also undertaken to help inform the process. (Ernst and Young, 
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2009) Although this was a start it was perceived by some26 to be lacking the 
commitment to the fundamental reform recommended by the IEE and required 
to ensure FAO would be fit for purpose. 
 
The appointment of the new director general Jose Graziano da Silva in January 
2012 was a significant step in driving the reform process forward. Following an 
in-depth analysis of the management, administration and organisation of FAO 
the new director general went before the 38th session of the FAO Conference in 
June 2013 with his Reviewed Strategic Framework (FAO, 2013d) and Medium 
Term Plan 2014-17 and Programme of Work and Budget 2014-15 (FAO, 2013a) 
for consideration.  
Global Goals 
The Reviewed Strategic Framework outlined an amendment to the FAO’s 
Global Goals, which had been agreed by Conference in 2009. Instead of merely 
attempting to ‘reduce’ hunger FAO would now strive to ‘eliminate’ it. This aim 
was synonymous with those of the champions of nutrition, who established FAO 
seven decades earlier and which now set the tone for the whole reform process.  
 
The change was endorsed by the FAO Conference. FAO’s three Global Goals 
are now the:  
                                            
26
 Some interviewees expressed their support for the streamlined Strategic Objectives and the 
new drive for reform instigated by the arrival of the new director general Jose Graziano da Silva, 
Rome, 2013 
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 Eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition, progressively 
ensuring a world in which people at all times have sufficient and nutritious 
food that meets all their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life; 
 Elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social 
progress for all, with increased food production, enhanced rural 
development and sustainable livelihoods; 
 Sustainable management and utilization of natural resource, including 
land, water, air, climate and genetic resources for the benefit of present 
and future generations. (FAO, 2013d, p.6) 
 
The three Global Goals are extensive and ambitious; they also include a 
number of GPGs in their trans-boundary and trans-generational reach, including 
the sustainable management of natural resources for this and future 
generations. These goals cannot be achieved by FAO alone, as the director 
general argued in a statement to Wageningen University (2013, p.1): “In the 
fight against hunger and malnutrition, partnerships are absolutely essential. No 
single government, international agency or university can do it alone. Each one 
of us has a different contribution to give.” Partnerships have always played an 
important role in FAO’s work but will be even more important in the future. 
Strategic Objectives 
As a result of the Strategic Thinking Process instigated by the new director 
general five cross-cutting Strategic Objectives were established following 
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several rounds of negotiation. These have been created to assist FAO, with its 
partners, in striving to achieve its ambitious global goals. The five Strategic 
Objectives are to: 
 Contribute to the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition  
 Increase and improve provision of goods and services from agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries in a sustainable manner  
 Reduce rural poverty 
 Enable more inclusive and efficient agriculture and food systems at local, 
national and international levels 
 Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises. (FAO, 2013d) 
 
The proposals set out in the strategic framework were put before the 38th 
Session of the FAO Conference, which welcomed the cross-cutting nature of the 
five Strategic Objectives, which members argued would “enable the 
organisation to better work in a multidisciplinary and integrated manner.” (FAO, 
2013b)  
The Sixth Objective 
A sixth objective, focused on technical knowledge, quality and service, was also 
welcomed by FAO’s member states, which they argued was important for the 
organisation’s ability to provide GPGs. (FAO, 2013b) The Reviewed Strategic 
Framework argues that the sixth objective is of paramount importance “in an 
increasingly decentralised context” and should be seen as an instrument to build 
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up the capacity of FAO’s mainstream key technical functions and to protect the 
quality and integrity of its technical and normative work, the data it produces and 
analyses and the quality of its services. It argues this is essential “to ensure a 
robust and practical results-based approach to all of the work of the 
organisation.” (FAO, 2013d, p25) 
 
Through the sixth objective there will be renewed focus on the provision of 
GPGs, which are recognised by the director general, staff and member states 
as integral to the organisation. By protecting the quality and integrity of its 
normative work and the data it produces and analyses FAO will be ensuring the 
continuing provision of GPGs and its own reputation as a valued international 
organisation and trusted partner. 
 
In addition to the ‘five plus one’ strategic objectives, two cross-cutting themes of 
gender and governance were also identified to operate across all objectives. As 
means of action for the organisation seven core functions have also been 
highlighted, through: 
 Normative work and standard setting instruments 
 Data and information 
 Policy dialogue 
 Capacity development 
 Uptake of knowledge and technologies 
 Facilitating partnerships 
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 Advocacy and communications. 
 
The six strategic objectives as well as the seven core functions are all very 
closely related to the provision of GPGs, many of which are pure GPGs, and 
which also come under the three main roles of the organisation. Establishing 
this strategic framework has been central to the reform of FAO. The director 
general stated that since his appointment he had been involved in “a wide and 
inclusive initiative to modernise and transform the organisation” with the ultimate 
aim “to improve the delivery and impact of FAO’s programmes by effective 
translation of our normative work into country-level impact and of our global 
knowledge products into tangible change in policy and practice.” (FAO, 2013d, 
p.2) 
UK Government’s Multilateral Aid Review 
The IEE had not been the only critic of FAO’s performance. In 2011 the UK 
government conducted a Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) of FAO as part of a 
larger review to assess the value for money for UK taxpayers delivered by 
multilateral organisations. This review was conducted under the UK’s Coalition 
Government as part of its austerity drive.  
 
The UK Government, through the Department for International Development 
provided £87 million to FAO in 2013-14, 44 percent of which was assessed core 
funding. (DFID, 2014) The UK government’s contributions to FAO are not high, 
especially when compared to the UK’s defence budget, which despite an eight 
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percent cut in real terms introduced as part of the 2010 Spending Review was 
still in excess of £33 billion each year from 2011 to 201527  (UK Government, 
2010).  
 
The MAR (UK Government, 2011, p.1) recognised the value that FAO brought 
to the sphere of food and agriculture as “a unique source of knowledge and 
information, gathering, analysing and disseminating data that aid development” 
and through its normative and standard setting work, its ability to provide a 
neutral forum for member states to negotiate international treaties, agreements 
and guidelines and then its assistance to member states for implementation. It 
also acknowledged its work in the area of food safety, quality and facilitation of 
trade, and in dealing with cross border issues such as avian influenza and the 
implementation of a successful decades’ long global campaign for the 
eradication of rinderpest (UK Government, 2011; FAO, 2011a).28  
 
Despite the provision of these many GPGs the MAR also found that FAO 
offered poor value for money for UK aid. The UK government’s assessment 
highlighted a number of weaknesses in FAO’s organisation and operations 
especially its lack of focus on results, particularly at a country level; 
                                            
27
 The Spending Review 2010 (UK Government, 2010) outlined proposals for defence spending 
to be £33.8 billion in the financial year 2011-12; £34.4 billion in 2012-13; £34.1 billion in 2013-14 
and £3.5 billion in 2014-15.  
28
 In 2011 rinderpest, a deadly cattle virus that has killed millions of cows, buffalo and other 
animals causing hunger and economic hardship in Africa, Asia and Europe, became one of only 
a few diseases to be officially eradicated. This success has been the result of the hard work of 
FAO and its partners across the world. (FAO, 2011a) 
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organisational strengths; financial resources management; core and value 
consciousness; and transparency and accountability.  
 
With the scale of reform required the UK government was uncertain as to the 
likelihood of FAO’s ability to enact positive change. The MAR argued that strong 
leadership would be required to oversee the full implementation of the existing 
reform package; if successfully completed it would turn FAO into a much more 
efficient and effective organisation. However, its prognosis was not optimistic: 
“The current likelihood of full, successful implementation with the necessary 
urgency is low.” (UK Government, 2011, p.6) It should be noted that this 
assessment was made in March 2011, before the appointment of the new 
director general, who started in his role at the head of the organisation the 
following January.  
 
In an update of the MAR in 2013 the UK government recognised that there had 
been overall progress on a number of issues as FAO had “introduced greater 
prioritisation and more focus on results through streamlined strategic objectives 
and new frameworks at country and corporate levels.” (UK Government, 2013, 
p.1) It also recognised improvements in the recruitment processes and 
performance management but highlighted the fact that human resource reform 
remained a priority. It found a similar improved situation in the organisation’s 
transparency and accountability, which had been deemed ‘unsatisfactory’ in the 
original MAR in 2011.  
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Budgets under Pressure 
As part of its reform with growth FAO has been expected to implement 
fundamental and transformational change at the same time as responding to its 
member states’ concerns not only in relation to FAO’s perceived lack of ‘value 
for money’ but also the volatile global financial situation. In addition to these 
concerns it also has to contend with cash flow challenges due to delayed 
payments of assessed contributions, which account for approximately 41 
percent of its overall budget; unplanned expenditures; and the uncertainty over 
the amount and timing of voluntary contributions, which account for the 
remaining 59 percent of its budget. (Pasquini, 2013c; IEE, 2007) 
 
One of FAO’s largest donors is the EU, which contributes significant amounts to 
the organisation. EU funding includes investment in specific projects, including 
€3.5 billion over the next seven years on agriculture-related programmes, €400 
million of which will be spent on nutrition-specific projects (Pasquini, 2013d). 
The EU has high expectations of FAO wanting it to be a champion on nutrition 
and resilience, an important regulatory and policy agency, as well as having 
expertise on epidemics, efficient agriculture, development of new technologies 
and all in a sustainable manner. 
 
Laurence Argimon-Pistre, head of the EU delegation to Rome, was critical of 
FAO’s budget and argued that the EU wanted all UN agencies to have zero 
nominal growth. However, she also voiced support for the director general in a 
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press interview given in July 2013 following the 38th FAO Conference. “Our 
countries are going through crisis and very difficult times in terms of budget. We 
may be rigorous and strict in the definition of budgetary constraints, [but] we feel 
that the [FAO] director general is a doing a great job.” (Argimon-Pistre quoted in 
an interview, Pasquini, 2013d).  
 
FAO member states may have recognised the important role played by the 
organisation, the progress made in the reform process and their support for the 
work already done by the new director general but they did not fully support his 
budget. At the 38th FAO Conference in June 2013 member states found 
consensus on a 2.2 percent budget increase, but this was conditional on 
increased efficiency gains and savings. This set the organisation’s 2014-15 
budget to just over US$1.028 billion; a figure approximately US$22.6 million 
lower than that which the director general had proposed in his budget.  This was 
in addition to the US$14 million of efficiency gains and savings already outlined 
in his original budget, which meant FAO had to find a total US$36.6 million in 
savings (Pasquini, 2013a). 
Human Resources under Pressure 
Efficiencies have been a driving force for member states, which may have 
expressed their support for the director general’s vision for FAO but reiterated 
their own position and “in the prevailing global economic and financial climate, 
stressed the need to fully implement the proposed Programme of Work in the 
most cost effective manner possible” (FAO, 2013b, p17, emphasis in the 
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original). Member states also, whilst recognising the level of efficiency gains and 
savings already achieved during 2012-13 nevertheless wanted further efficiency 
gains to be made, particularly in relation to staffing related costs. Members 
agreed to FAO conducting a strategic workforce planning exercise and job audit, 
with reports delivered to the organisation’s Finance Committee.  
 
The IEE (2007, p.3) had highlighted the significant issues arising from the 
“heavy and costly bureaucracy” but also acknowledged the problems that had 
resulted from the substantial reductions in staff numbers, which it argued had 
imperilled the organisation’s ability to fulfil its primary functions. A different 
approach to the organisation’s human resources management was required 
rather than widespread staff reductions. 
 
Despite the EU’s calls for budget restraint Argimon-Pistre recognised the need 
for adequate staffing in FAO, a human resources organisation that is dependent 
on the expertise of its people. She argued: “You have to keep strong expertise 
also at the headquarters. It is very difficult to balance...because the resources 
here at the headquarters are limited. If you put too many people on the ground 
you may actually lose the basis here in terms of expertise.” (Quoted in Pasquini, 
2013 c, p.3)  Creating a strategy that addresses the concerns of member states 
whilst enabling the organisation to move forward is a challenge and the process 
has not been without its critics. 
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The overall review and reform of human resources management started with the 
creation of the Human Resources Strategic Framework and Action Plan (FAO, 
2012a) in response to the recommendations of the IEE and accelerated with the 
appointment of the new director general. These reforms are the first of their kind 
in the organisation’s history. The Finance Committee receives progress reports 
on the implementation of the strategic framework and action plan every six 
months.  
 
The aim of the strategic framework and action plan is to govern “the 
organisation’s human resources management programme in a coherent and 
integrated manner as well as align its workforce capabilities to support 
effectively the delivery of corporate strategic objectives.” (FAO, 2012a, p.2) 
These have included the introduction of an overall human resources strategy, 
organisational design, performance management and staff and career 
development.  
 
One of the main aims of the reform process was to decentralise the organisation 
and to help create a more flexible and versatile workforce with a greater 
understanding of FAO’s different areas of work. To this end the strategic 
framework (FAO, 2012a, p.9) set out initiatives to “develop a managed mobility 
programme which would comprise both functional and geographical rotation of 
staff.”  
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By November 2014 a Performance Evaluation and Management System 
(PEMS) review had been conducted and recommendations had been fed into a 
revised performance management policy framework, a Competency Framework 
had been introduced at the start of 2014, a revised recruitment process had 
been put in place, and generic job profiles were being introduced to increase 
efficiency of human resources management (FAO, 2014a). FAO has also 
agreed a framework with its sister organisations, IFAD and WFP, for 
collaboration on recruitment, selection and appointment of general service staff 
for the headquarters for the Rome-based agencies.  
 
However the way in which changes are being made has aggrieved staff and 
caused increasing tensions between FAO management and staff. It was 
estimated that 75 percent of the efficiency gains would have to be made through 
the rationalisation of FAO’s staff. Unions balloted members on support for strike 
action in October 2013 in response to the news that a possible 56 full-time 
positions would have to go, in addition to the loss of the IT department. 
(Pasquini, 2013a) Members of staff were also concerned about the lack of 
information, consultation and transparency and the move towards having fewer 
permanent staff and more consultants (Pasquini, 2013b).  
 
Tensions have continued and following a breakdown in relations between 
management and staff strike action was taken in March 2015 (The Italian 
Insider, 2015; AP in FAO, 2015; CCISUA, 2015). It had been scheduled to last 
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three days but extended to a fourth day. The professional workers’ staff 
association the AP in FAO (Association of Professionals in FAO) held an 
Extraordinary Assembly to discuss the situation. It noted with “deep concern: 
The lack of willingness of Senior Management of FAO to conduct consultation in 
good faith”; “The repeated unilateral introduction of piecemeal measures and 
changes to policies affecting the conditions of employment and work”; “The 
absence of any coherent human resources policy aimed at encouraging, 
acknowledging and rewarding good performance of staff” (AP in FAO, 2015) as 
well as concerns over the treatment of elected officers of the union.  
 
Denis Aitken, assistant director general for corporate services, human resources 
and finance and architect of the human resources reform process, defended the 
changes in an interview with Devex in March 2015. He defended the 55-month 
cap on short-term contract renewability as an effort to reduce “the number of 
staff that are working in the organisation who have not gone through a full 
competition process for the position” (Pasquini, 2015). He argued that having 
temporary staff for eight or ten years “is not good management practice.” In 
addition, he argued that the opening up of general service vacancies to external 
candidates would increase the organisation’s credibility among donors and 
contributors. He also highlighted the achievements in the acceleration of the 
recruitment process from an average of between nine and ten months to fill a 
position to just five months. 
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Another area of disagreement between staff and senior management has been 
the introduction of staff performance evaluation. The AP in FAO called for the 
postponement of “the introduction of the proposed new Performance Evaluation 
and Management System until further meaningful consultations are held with 
the Staff Representative Bodies” (AP in FAO, 2015). Notwithstanding the 
differences of opinion on when and how changes are implemented an overhaul 
of the evaluation process is required. The IEE (2007, p.327) had found that 24% 
of FAO staff had had no appraisal at all and when implemented “the use is 
erratic, it is not enforced systematically and division directors and above have 
generally been exempt from any form of performance appraisal.” Devex (2015) 
found that evaluations had previously not been critical with 95 percent of staff 
members receiving ‘high marks’ in their assessments because managers were 
reluctant to criticise. 
 
The way forward on all these issues needs to be found to enable the 
organisation to proceed with its reforms. FAO needs to have the right members 
of staff in the right places to be able to achieve its objectives, both in the field 
delivering technical projects and in headquarters supporting field operations, as 
well as in the provision of GPGs. Staff and the senior managers need to build a 
relationship based on mutual respect and confidence, through open 
communication and a shared vision for the organisation.  
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Breaking down the Silos 
The way in which the reforms are being implemented may have been criticised, 
especially their impact on human resources management, as discussed 
previously, however positive changes have also been recognised.  
As part of the restructuring we are now talking to each 
other; breaking down the silos. For example, sustainable 
agriculture is an issue across the board, and there needs 
to be discussion between divisions and departments. 
That’s what the new objectives are all about. There is 
complexity in both the problems and the solutions. There 
are the country responses to problems but there also 
needs to be an international response.29  
The removal of ‘the silos’ has been seen by many30 as one of the main 
advantages of the reform process, especially considering the breadth of the 
issues tackled by FAO. The IEE (2007) had highlighted the problems faced by 
the organisation, which had become fragmented in its approach to the many 
challenges it faced rather than taking a broader view of the whole. Before the 
reform each division concentrated on one specific area of work and did not 
interact with other divisions in a cohesive way; overall FAO had lost sight of its 
main global objectives.  
 
                                            
29
 Personal interview with Erwin Northoff, FAO news coordinator, June 2013, Rome 
30
 As highlighted in personal interviews conducted at FAO, Rome, June 2013 
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However, the breadth of the work undertaken by FAO and the expertise it has 
gained through continued work in many different areas for decades is not a 
weakness but one of its main strengths. It is hoped that the introduction of the 
Strategic Objectives, as cross-cutting governance tools, will allow FAO to draw 
on this knowledge base and deliver a service not available through any other 
organisation operating in this arena. 
The complexity of the issues in our domain, such as 
biofuels, gender and price volatility, means that FAO is the 
place to come to address all of these issues. We are 
knocking down the walls, doing a lot more multi-
disciplinary work. We have to provide integrated solutions. 
We can do that and no-one else can.31 
Re-engagement with its global goals and establishing refined strategic 
objectives with cross cutting themes allows for discussions to take place across 
the organisation to address challenges that require co-ordinated action from a 
number of divisions. Budgets will now reflect this change in emphasis with funds 
allocated according to the objectives, linked to outputs, and managed by 
objective co-ordinators, rather than through departments and divisions.
32
 
 
Through this root and branch reform process and with the introduction of the 
Strategic Objectives, there is a hope and expectation that the silos will be 
                                            
31
 Personal interview with Michael Clark, FAO Special Advisor on International Governance, 
June 2013, Rome 
32
 Personal interview with Olaf Thieme, Livestock Development Officer FAO, June 2013, Rome 
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transformed and the governance structure of FAO strengthened.33 If successful 
these new governance systems will add value to FAO and assist it in the 
provision of GPGs. However, it may take years to see the true impact of the 
changes being implemented. 
Conclusion 
At the turn of the century FAO was finding it increasingly difficult to fulfil its 
mandate as its budgets and staffing levels were systematically reduced through 
budgets cuts and restricted cash flow. Added to these practical problems the 
organisation also faced more complex global challenges to food security making 
the work of the organisation more critical but also more difficult. FAO was 
expected to respond to these challenges whilst combating mistrust between 
different groups of its member states and its own governing bodies, which in 
turn had resulted in reduced financial support.  
 
The IEE had the task of investigating this complicated situation, which it did in 
its extensive review. Finding FAO in a state of decline, from which it may have 
suffered irreversible damage if left unchecked, the IEE has hopefully been able 
to steer the organisation in the direction of renew through its recommendations 
for reform with growth. By addressing the heavy and costly bureaucracy, 
concentrating its efforts on the areas in which it has comparative advantage and 
                                            
33
 Personal interview with Richard Trenchard, Senior Advisor, Office of the Deputy Director-
General (Operations) FAO, June 2013, Rome 
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breaking down the silos the organisation will be in a better position to meet the 
challenges of the twenty-first century. 
 
The IEE acknowledged the important role that FAO plays in the arena of food 
and agriculture and its provision of GPGs. It noted that the organisation would 
have to be created if it did not already exist as there is a requirement for a 
global organisation with the mandate and experience of FAO to tackle the 
present and emerging challenges. However the organisation is not without its 
faults and it cannot fulfil its mandate without transformational change. If 
successful, FAO could move from a position of near irrelevancy to one of 
trailblazer, leading the way in organisational reform.    
 
Through the appointment of Jose Graziano da Silva as director general and the 
implementation of the strategic plan, with its five plus one strategic objectives, 
two cross-cutting themes and seven core functions, as well as its reformed 
human resources, FAO should be able to overcome many of its bureaucratic 
issues and respond to its many critics, including the UK government. However, 
if many of the developed countries, such as the UK and others within the OECD 
were hoping for an organisation that would unquestioningly support their 
neoliberal market driven agenda they may well be disappointed. FAO may be 
seeking to work with all partners, all its member states as well as non-state 
entities including the private sector, but its strengthened global goals are 
ideologically opposed to the neoliberal agenda and instead deeply rooted in the 
274 
 
common cause of humanity through the provision of GPGs, such as the 
sustainable management of natural resources for this and future generations; 
far from the market approach to development. Its role in the provision of GPGs 
will be addressed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Seven: 
FAO and the Provision of GPGs: 
The Power of Measurement 
 
Introduction 
Many of the different organisations in the UN produce a range of pure GPGs, 
such as statistics and publications, and FAO is no exception. FAO is ideally 
placed as a specialised agency of the UN with a mandate and global reach. For 
example it is able to produce statistics that are relevant to its areas of mandate, 
including but not confined to, food security, natural resources and food 
production. There are no other organisations able to produce this information on 
this scale and so FAO, even in just this one area, is fulfilling an important 
function.  
 
In the next three chapters there will be an examination of the main areas in 
which FAO provides GPGs and an assessment of its ability to do so in the 
future. This is particularly relevant now as the organisation undergoes its most 
rigorous and radical reform in its 70 year history in an attempt to recreate itself 
for the challenges of the 21st century. 
 
As FAO works in so many different ways it is not possible to give a detailed 
account of each area of its work in this thesis. In addition to this limitation some 
of its operations, such as technical assistance to member countries, do not 
qualify as GPGs as they are not global or trans-boundary in their scope. 
276 
 
However, even the GPGs it does provide are too numerous to review here and 
so a selection of GPGs will be examined in relation to the three main roles of 
FAO: measurement, through data collection, analysis and dissemination; 
convening, bringing together its member states and a wide range of actors to 
debate issues and form agreements; and its normative function in setting norms 
and standards. This chapter will discuss the role that FAO plays in the provision 
of statistics and publications, chapter eight will discuss the organisation’s role as 
a convener, and chapter nine will address norms and standards settings. 
 
These three main roles have been chosen as they exemplify the GPG work of 
the organisation; they have been at the core of FAO’s work since it was 
established in 1945 and will always form part of its remit. FAO’s technical work, 
although important, does not qualify as a GPG, whereas measurement, 
convening and its norm setting are not only vital to the work of the organisation 
but are also GPGs. These three main roles also allow for analysis using the four 
interlinked themes of regime theory highlighted in chapter three. 
 
Examples of the range of GPGs provided by FAO through its three main roles 
will be examined taking into consideration the different dimensions of GPG 
provision, their non-rivalrous, non-excludable, trans-boundary or global nature 
as well as acting across generations, as discussed in chapter two. In addition, 
the four interlinked themes of regimes and international organisations 
highlighted in chapter three, namely the identity of the main actors, level of 
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autonomy enjoyed by regimes and international organisations, the 
interdependence of states and other actors and the level of importance granted 
to information and the communities that provide it will inform the analysis of the 
GPGs provided by FAO.  
Three roles of FAO in the provision of Global 
Public Goods 
In its provision of GPGs FAO operates through its three main roles; by 
measurement with the creation and then analysis of statistics, by bringing 
together a range of actors as part of its convening role, and norm and standard 
setting; all three operate across the divisions. The complexity and integrated 
nature of the issues addressed means that the organisation’s responses have to 
be multifaceted and multi-disciplinary.  
 
Not only does there have to be communication, co-ordination and co-operation 
between the different divisions and departments but this also has to take place 
between FAO’s three main roles. The statistics produced are used by individual 
member states as they implement programmes to tackle all aspects of food 
insecurity. These statistics, in the form of reports, also play a vital role in 
informing the discussions during international conferences and in the creation of 
treaties, guidelines and international standards. Without reliable, objective data 
informed decisions cannot be made. In addition, through its ability to bring a 
range of actors into negotiations and using its expertise in the areas under its 
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remit it is able to act as an informed facilitator. It is in this nexus that there is a 
dynamic relationship between the three main roles of the organisation. 
The Power of Measurement 
Through measurement it is possible to gauge the extent of a problem, whether 
that is the number of hungry people of the extent of environment damage in a 
particular region or associated with a type of agriculture. This greater 
understanding is the first step to finding a solution to any problem. However, 
with so many different actors, all with different agendas, using these 
measurements, their reliability and trustworthiness is vital.  
Statistics  
FAO measures the many different aspects of food security, food production and 
the many cross cutting themes, such as poverty, gender, climate change and 
land tenure, as discussed in chapter one. In so doing it produces the statistics 
that enable informed policy decision-making both at the national and 
international levels.  
 
Annual reports, such as the State of Food Insecurity (SOFI), play an important 
part in the regular output of FAO, as do issue-specific reports that highlight an 
area that needs in-depth analysis. The gathering and then analysis of data is 
one of the purest forms of GPG that any UN specialised agency provides.  
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It has been one of the primary functions of FAO since its creation in 1945. At the 
very first FAO Conference in Quebec the importance of statistics was 
highlighted. The Report of the Conference (FAO, 1945) stated:  
If FAO is to carry out its work successfully it will need to 
know where and why hunger and malnutrition exist, what 
forms they take, and how widespread they are. Such data 
will serve as a basis for making plans, determining the 
efficacy of measures used, and measuring progress from 
time to time.  
The provision of statistics was seen as part of its advisory role. Its founders, in 
particular Boyd Orr, although recognising the urgent need for good statistical 
data also wanted FAO to be a regulatory organisation as discussed in chapter 
four. Its remit to provide information has never been questioned; however, its 
ability to continue to do so has.  
Reform of Statistics at FAO 
The IEE (2007, p.152) also recognised its importance. “This is a pure public 
goods function in the strict sense of the term and there are not significant 
alternative sources of supply… For the least developed countries (LDCs), such 
data underpins fundamental analysis of policy options for use in policy support.” 
The IEE argued that this data was vital, as “Information on food supply, food 
insecurity and vulnerability is fundamental to LDCs in ensuring adequate food to 
their populations.” 
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The IEE highlighted the role played by the organisation’s information systems 
and publications, which enable FAO to aggregate, analyse and disseminate 
knowledge and which underpin FAO’s technical co-operation, work on treaties 
and agreements as well as policy and technical meetings.  
 
Despite its relevance as a core function, its value to LDCs in particular and its 
role as a pure public good, basic statistical work has received steadily less 
emphasis in FAO’s regular budget, with land resources and land use found to 
be a particularly neglected area. The IEE recommended a total re-examination 
of the provision of statistics, with an emphasis on the needs of the users.  
 
Acting upon the IEE’s recommendation the FAO Programme Committee 
mandated the establishment of the Independent Evaluation of FAO’s Role and 
Work in Statistics, which delivered its report to the committee in 2008. The 
Evaluation Team (2008) found that FAO’s mandate to provide agricultural 
statistics was as valid as ever, although the working environment had changed 
considerably. Provision within FAO and at a country level had deteriorated as a 
result of lack of donor interest in agricultural statistics. Interviewees also cited 
this lack of political will to tackle food insecurity as a significant challenge for 
FAO in general.34 
 
                                            
34
 As highlighted in personal interviews conducted at FAO, June 2013, Rome 
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The team (2008, p.13) also found that despite the provision of data in these 
areas by different organisations, such as universities, industry, private entities 
and national governments “[N]one, however, provide global statistics in such a 
wide range of areas as FAO.” In addition to the heavy use of the organisation’s 
databases by FAO itself to produce analysis, publications and projections 
“FAO’s global statistics are quoted continuously and used externally in global 
analysis by academics, research institutions and governments. They are also 
used extensively by the private sector.” (Evaluation Team, 2008, p.13) This use 
by such a wide range of actors demonstrates the level of trust placed in them. 
Even in the UK Government’s MAR (2011, p.1) FAO was recognised as “a 
unique source of knowledge and information, gathering, analysing and 
disseminating data to aid development.” However the quality of the statistics 
received from member states was more problematic. 
 
During the 1990s there had been a dramatic reduction in ODA (Official 
Development Assistance) and FAO funding, most notably on maintaining 
national capabilities. In fact, the Evaluation Team found that this decline, 
especially in Africa, had resulted in a situation in which the “official data 
submissions from countries in Africa are at their lowest level since before 1961, 
with only one in four African countries reporting basic crop production data.” 
(Evaluation Team, 2008, p.7) Without this data member states are not equipped 
to make informed policy decisions nationally or as a member of the international 
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community. It also has consequences for the quality of data found in FAO’s 
global statistical system. 
 
Within FAO itself, against a backdrop of declining resources and technical 
capabilities, the units providing agriculture, forestry and fisheries statistics had 
to deal with emerging demands for quality data and additional analyses. Despite 
this increase in demand the system was being deprived of sufficient funds. 
Between the funding periods of 1994-95 and 2006-07 statistics’ percentage of 
FAO’s net appropriations had gone from 6.7 percent to 4.5 percent. (Evaluation 
Team, 2008)  
 
The high expectations placed upon FAO by a wide range of users, declining 
funds to provide reliable data, through limited national capabilities and reduced 
budgets within FAO itself, as well as the ever increasing data requirements in 
the expanding and inter-connected food and agriculture areas have placed 
significant strain on the organisation’s ability to provide reliable and timely 
statistics. The team’s overall conclusion was that “FAO’s basic statistics 
programme is crumbling.” (Evaluation Team, 2008, p.8) 
 
To remedy this situation the Evaluation Team made several recommendations. 
It suggested: improving national statistical capacity, the creation of synergy and 
balance between FAO and its member states to help improve the quality of 
country submissions, the creation and implementation of a corporate quality 
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framework to put in place principles of good practice, ensuring a user-orientated 
approach to integration of the statistical system, as well as elevating the visibility 
of FAO statistics in the international arena. Strong leadership of the programme 
would be required and so the team (2008, p.10) also recommended the 
organisation “establish the position of Chief Statistician for FAO with a mandate 
to lead all of the FAO Statistical System into the 21st Century.”  
New Purpose and Vision: Statistics Reformed 
Taking the report of the Evaluation Team FAO has implemented a number of its 
recommendations, including the creation of the position of Chief Statistician and 
the establishment of an Inter-Departmental Working Group on Statistics. FAO’s 
Chief Statistician is Pietro Gennari and his role is to manage the overall 
governance and coordination of the FAO statistical system. He is also 
responsible for the quality and integrity of the technical and normative work of 
the organisation, which is closely related to the sixth objective. Acting upon the 
recommendations of the Evaluation Team FAO has now established a 
decentralised statistical system involving 17 divisions in eight departments, and 
with five regional statisticians who provide dedicated support to member 
countries. Output covers all sectors related to food and agriculture: crops, 
livestock, forestry, fisheries, natural resources (land and water), agri-business, 
food security and nutrition. These activities cover five key functions: data 
collection, processing and dissemination; monitoring and analysis; norms and 
standards; capacity development and statistics coordination (FAO, 2014c). 
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The first step in finding a solution for a problem is to understand the problem. 
The recently reformed Statistics Division of FAO “serves as the foremost 
authoritative source of standards and methods as well as timely and reliable 
data on hunger, food and agriculture” (FAO Statistics Division, 2015b).  To allow 
it to fulfil this vision and its mission to “advance statistics on food and nutrition 
security, sustainable agriculture and rural development at national and 
international levels” the division works to “develop, implement and promote 
international statistical standards, methods and tools in collecting, analysing and 
disseminating data.”  
 
Partnerships are essential to the division. It works directly with member states to 
help them develop their own national statistical strategies and strengthen their 
institutional and technical capabilities. This helps to improve statistical systems 
to allow for better design and monitoring of policies and programmes. With 
stronger capabilities on the ground this will also improve the quality of data 
available for global analyses, for FAO programmes and those delivered through 
partnerships with other organisations, at the national, regional and international 
level. 
 
The division’s budget has been increased from appropriations of US$ 
11,507,000 in the Programme of Work and Budget 2008-09 (FAO, 2007) to a 
projected total of US$ 23,881,000 in the Programme of Work and Budget for 
2014-15 (FAO, 2013a). Although this is a significant increase in the division’s 
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budget it did start from a low base. It also has to fund, not only the basic core 
functions of the division but also its reform, member states’ capacity building 
and an increasing demand for statistics over a wide series of indicators, as 
argued by Josef Schmidhuber, Deputy Director of the Statistics Division. 
The growing need to cover an ever increasing set of data 
with a rather stagnant amount of resources is posing a 
major challenge to the division. There’s a wider range of 
domains, across economics, climate change, global and 
regional, as well as agri-environmental indicators, such as 
land, water, fertilizer and pesticide use and a lot more 
datasets and indicators in the pipeline. In parallel, we try to 
strengthen the capacity of developing countries to produce 
more accurate agricultural statistics and do so more timely 
and more frequently.35 
Provision of Statistics 
The Statistics Division produces publications, working papers and statistical 
yearbooks that cover food security, prices, production and trade as well as agri-
environmental statistics. One of its main activities is maintaining the corporate 
statistical database, FAOSTAT. This is time series statistical information 
compiled, processed and stored by country from 1961, which includes data from 
245 countries and territories covering information on agriculture (production, 
                                            
35
 Personal interview with Josef Schmidhuber, Deputy Director, Statistics Division, Economic 
and Social Development Department, FAO, June 2013, Rome. 
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consumption, trade, prices and resources), as well as nutrition, fisheries, 
forestry, food aid, land use and population. It is currently the largest and most 
comprehensive statistical database on food and agriculture in the world. (FAO 
Statistics Division, 2015a) 
 
As part of its commitment to improve the provision of statistics and to assist its 
member states develop their capacity the division has initiated the Global 
Strategy to improve agricultural and rural statistics. This enhanced capacity will 
enable member states to produce basic data and information that can then help 
guide the decision-making process, both at the national level, as well as then 
also being available at the international level.  
 
In addition to these areas of work the division is working in partnership with 
other organisations and member states in providing the Agricultural Market 
Information System (AMIS), which was established at the request of Agricultural 
Ministers of the G20 in 2011. This is an inter-agency platform created to 
enhance food market transparency to help co-ordinate policy action in response 
to market uncertainty. (AMIS, 2015a) AMIS is at the pilot stage.  
Alongside the usual reports we are also working on AMIS. 
FAO is playing a big role and hosts it here. There’s a small 
budget available to the division for capacity development 
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in AMIS. We are rolling this out in AMIS countries with a 
pilot scheme in Kenya and some provinces of India.36 
AMIS, when completely operational, may prove to be a revolutionary tool for 
farmers around the world. By using a smart phone, connected to GPS and using 
a free app farmers will be able to access market price data. 
The idea simply is to create a real-time, geo-referenced 
price monitoring system for agricultural prices, ideally with 
global coverage. All you’ll need is a smart phone and the 
app will be free. If people can key in the price, of wheat for 
example, and where the market is, then we can visualise it 
on a map and it will go live globally. Everyone will be able 
to access the information. It will all go on a price 
monitoring database. With food security monitoring we’ll 
be able to see how quickly prices are transmitted, such as 
a shock at the international level to local levels.37  
Although Josef Schmidhuber has high expectations of AMIS and its potentially 
revolutionary role in alleviating food insecurity by connecting individual farmers 
through more co-ordinated market information the initiative has not made the 
progress its instigators, the Agricultural Ministers of the G20, had hoped. In its 
most recent progress report (2015b, p.2) it was found that “data transfers from 
participating countries remained insufficient. Only five countries honoured their 
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 Personal interview with Josef Schmidhuber 
37
 Personal interview with Josef Schmidhuber 
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commitment to send monthly forecasts for all the elements of their crop 
balances.” AMIS continues to rely on existing information sources, including that 
of FAO.  
 
This lack of participation may be the result of a lack of capacity at the national 
level, which would be unsurprising given the findings of the IEE (2007) and the 
Evaluation Team (2008) as previously discussed. Capacity building at all levels 
is vital for the production of reliable and timely data. At FAO the importance of 
this data provision needs to be emphasised.  
Everyone wants better data but how much will people 
invest in obtaining better data? We need to increase the 
value of our data to our users. We have a clearly defined 
role in this process as a knowledge organisation that can 
provide widely accepted and recognised standards and 
methodologies.38 
Ensuring people recognise of the value of FAO’s statistical work is essential to 
making sure it receives adequate funding.  
Publications 
FAO produces a wide range of publications that cover every aspect of food and 
agriculture within its remit, with either a global reach or regional focus. Its 
publications, many of which have been published regularly for decades giving 
an objective view of emerging issues and challenges, provide an unrivalled 
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 Personal interview with Josef Schmidhuber 
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overview of many aspects of the food system. Designed to promote 
understanding, inform debate and form the starting point for decision-making 
processes FAO’s publications play a key role in the organisation’s provision of 
GPGs. 
 
Using the data supplied FAO produces a range of publications, including its 
flagship State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA) reports, which have been 
produced annually since 1947, and its State of Food Insecurity (SOFI) reports, 
which were instigated by the World Food Summit in 1996. The IEE (2007) 
concluded such publications offer value-for-money with costs for SOFA reports 
varying from US$ 900,000 to US$ 1,400,000 to produce. The SOFI cost 
approximately US$ 300,000. This compares favourably with similar publications 
produced at the same time, such as the World Bank Development Report 
(2006), at US$ 3.6 million, and the Global Economic Prospects (2005) at US$ 
931,000.  
 
The IEE (2007, p.82) found that these flagship reports and the “numerous 
specialised publications contribute to FAO’s image as a ‘serious and credible 
organisation’. In addition, their range and depth meant they were important 
reference and policy documents used to place critical issues on the international 
agenda and to help facilitate debate, as advocacy tools for governments, 
opinion-makers and the general public.  
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It is this gravitas, due in part to the rigorous analysis and scientific scrutiny to 
which the reports have been subjected, which allows the reports to “present 
overall argumentation for conclusions which may be controversial.” (IEE, 2007, 
p.81) This has been demonstrated by FAO’s role in examining the implications 
of trade policy; a politically sensitive area. The IEE (2007, p.81) argued that the 
organisation needs to continue to take these types of risks “on behalf of its 
poorest members, even when this impinges on the interests of some of its 
largest contributors, but it must always be grounded in intellectual rigour and in-
depth analysis of implications.”  
 
The production of publications, using the data gathered by the Statistics 
Division, is a crucial role for FAO and although Boyd Orr wanted the 
organisation to have additional regulatory capabilities, the ability to put difficult 
issues on the agenda is the essential starting point for any political discussion. It 
also aids FAO in its normative role. 
Changing Formats Add Reach for Publications 
With the advent of the internet the format in which FAO disseminates its 
information has been forced to change. In 1997 FAO’s technical department 
produced 5,516 publications including translations and reprints; by 2004-5 this 
had fallen to just 3,228; a 41 percent reduction. (IEE, 2007) During this time the 
organisation’s website had expanded dramatically to become the largest 
website in the UN system, and one of the most visited. However, this large 
website was difficult to navigate. Taking the comments of the IEE and as part of 
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the reform process work is being undertaken to address these issues, including 
the launch of a new website, using a more user-friendly format and refreshed 
content. Across all media branding plays a particularly important role, as 
highlighted by Nick Rubery of the Information Division. 
Across all content we have to manage the branding of 
FAO. If there’s any digression from the official logo, for 
example, that can have a negative impact; its position can 
be undermined and its authority eroded. FAO is operating 
in a crowded arena but we have lots of expertise so it’s 
essential for us to defend our standing.39  
Protecting FAO’s reputation is one issue to be addressed in this new digital era; 
the ways in which the information is accessed also brings challenges. There are 
an ever-expanding number of devices able to connect to the internet, from 
smartphones and tablets to laptops and desktops, all have different capabilities. 
The challenge is to make sure FAO’s publications are accessible to all, 
whatever device is being used and in whichever part of the world.  
Digital has changed the nature of my work, the packaging 
of it, the design and the delivery. It’s a multi-media product 
now with the shift from analogue to digital. The book as a 
comprehensive format is still paramount but it’s not 
necessarily printed now. There’s an incredible growth in 
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 Personal interview with Nick Rubery, Design and Information, Information Division, FAO, June 
2013, Rome 
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the number of mobile devices being used, especially in 
Africa. It’s a different world of consumption and we have to 
make sure we can publish across the different media. This 
makes delivery a complex challenge.40 
The interests of the end-user, as well as the manner in which the information is 
accessed, also have to be taken into consideration. FAO publishes for a wide 
range of audiences, from global decision-makers and technical users, to 
members of the general public and farmers in the fields. Information on its 
website and through its many publications has to be readily available to all. 
Each different audience has particular requirements and should have their 
needs met. In its role as a GPG provider FAO needs to ensure the data it has 
gathered and analysed is disseminated effectively.  
Statistics and Publications as Global Public 
Goods 
There is no doubt that the provision of statistics is a GPG. It is also a pure GPG 
as a non-rivalrous resource, which does not diminish with use. As FAO’s 
purpose is it disseminate this information as widely as possible, through its 
recently re-launched website, various publications and datasets, as well as at 
workshops, meetings and conferences, this provision is also non-excludable.  
 
Although some of the data gathered is at a country level, it is used not only in 
the country of origin but also to inform decision-making at the regional and 
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international level and is made available to a wider audience via FAO’s website 
and publications. It informs the larger body of knowledge, which has been 
gathered and analysed since the establishment of FAO in 1945, and prior to that 
by those involved in the International Food Movement, as discussed in chapter 
four. It is undoubtedly trans-boundary and global. In addition, as this information 
is used to predict future trends and inform policy formation to address issues 
that will affect future generations, such as climate change and potential patterns 
of food insecurity, it also acts across the generations.  
 
The GPG value of the data provided is recognised by the division, which states 
it provides “free and easy to access harmonised, reliable, timely and policy-
relevant data and advocate for their use for evidence-based decision making.” 
(FAO Statistics Division, 2015b) The provision of data is, and always has been, 
a core function of FAO. As a GPG it is one of the most important functions of the 
organisation, and one that should be recognised as such. 
The Role of Statistics and Publications in FAO as 
an International Organisation 
 
As GPGs FAO’s provision of statistics and publications plays a vital role in 
extending the knowledge base in the area of food and agriculture. The way in 
which this provision is integrated into the international system through FAO as 
an international organisation will now be examined in relation to the four areas 
of regime theory discussed in chapter three. These are the identity of the main 
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actors, the level of autonomy of the international organisation, the 
interdependence of the actors and the level of importance granted to information 
and the epistemic communities that provide it.  
 
Realists, neo-realists, liberals and neoliberals all perceive the state to be the 
main actor within the anarchic international system. State sovereignty is 
paramount but the ways in which states relate to and work with other entities 
within this system, including international organisations, is an area in which 
there is disagreement between these four main theories. Liberals and 
neoliberals believe that international organisations play a much greater role and 
that there is a significant level of interdependence. The constructivists and 
cognitivists concentrate their attention on the construction of norms and are 
therefore more concerned with the role of knowledge, the importance of 
intersubjectively shared meanings and the authority given to knowledge and the 
epistemic communities that provide it. 
 
Although technical assistance to member states and the communities within 
states has not been addressed in this thesis, as it is not a GPG and therefore 
beyond the scope of this thesis, the role that statistics plays as the basis for 
project formation has to be acknowledged. This work transforms the lives of 
millions of people, creating more food secure communities and lifting people out 
of poverty through agricultural programmes and is a vital function of FAO. (FAO, 
2015j) 
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FAO’s member states play a number of roles in determining FAO’s mandate 
and providing the funds to allow it to achieve its objectives. In the case of 
statistics and publications the member states are both the consumers of these 
goods, to inform their own national policies and their debates on international 
issues, and they are often the information providers. Member states that have 
limited capacity have found this aspect of their commitment problematic, an 
issue highlighted by both the IEE (2007) and the Evaluation Team (2008). 
  
In order for FAO to accomplish anything it has to have the support of its member 
states; not all of them, all of the time, but the member states have to reach an 
agreement on the best way forward for the organisation and its budget. This is 
relevant for the whole organisation and each division and department within it.  
 
The importance of the provision of statistics has been recognised by the IEE, 
the Evaluation Team, by FAO and its member states. This has ensured it plays 
a central role in the strategic objectives and has led to an increase in the 
division’s budget. This increase may not have been as substantial as some 
believed was necessary
41
 however it is an increase designed to fund the reform 
of the Statistics Division and the increased work load associated with capacity 
building. As discussed previously the overall increase in the budget has been 
modest as member states demanded more efficiency savings to be made 
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(Pasquini, 2013d) in addition to those already written into the director general’s 
budget proposal (FAO, 2013a) for the reform of FAO. 
 
Both evaluations recognised the need for capacity building for member states 
unable to produce statistics of sufficient quality. This is an on-going process 
which will take time to complete. As the AMIS progress report (2015) highlighted 
member states are still not yet providing statistics on a regular monthly basis, 
which may indicate that capacity is still inadequate. 
 
The statistics and publications that are provided are used in a number of ways, 
within FAO, within member states, to inform international debate and to highlight 
the many issues of concern in the food and agriculture arena to the general 
public. As such these statistics and publications are used and cited by many 
different actors, from policy-makers at the national and international level, 
NGOs, CSOs, academic institutions, the private sector, farmers and concerned 
members of the public. This information also feeds into the UN system as a 
whole and adds to the broader knowledge base of the epistemic community. As 
such these groups can also be identified as main actors, as consumers of the 
information. Without an audience and purpose there would be no need for their 
provision. 
 
FAO receives its mandate from its member states. The way in which it fulfils this 
mandate also has to be approved. This has been particularly important during 
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the organisation’s reform process. The statistics division has received scrutiny 
through both evaluations and has reformed in accordance with their 
recommendations. It is now in a position to move forward.  
 
It will continue to work with the main actors, the member states, and assist their 
participation in the gathering of statistical data and their consumption of it. In this 
way the division, as seen in the overall organisation, is always dependent on the 
member states and as the larger donors provide additional funds they will 
continue to monitor the value for money that they receive, as evidenced by the 
UK Government’s MAR (2011). 
 
Partnerships are essential to FAO. The challenges faced by the world in relation 
to food and agriculture are so far-reaching, interconnected and immense that 
only by working together can the international community achieve the 
eradication of hunger. As previously outlined the collection of data is a very 
interactive process and FAO relies on its member states for their cooperation.  
 
However, FAO also has the expertise to allow it to establish the best 
methodologies for data gathering and analysis. Through seven decades of 
working in the arena of food and agriculture, working on the issues that have 
always been relevant, such as food production, and also charting emerging 
challenges, including the impact of climate change, FAO is in a better position 
than any other organisation to provide and analyse the relevant statistics. 
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Therefore, although there is a need for strong partnerships it has to be 
acknowledged FAO has unrivalled expertise in this area that should not be 
overlooked or diminished. It has a well earned reputation for objectivity, which it 
needs to protect and preserve. Despite its relatively small size and budget it is 
the main actor in the international system in the provision of statistics and 
publications on issues related to its mandate.  
 
In relation to statistics and publications the level of importance granted to 
information and the communities that provide it is the most crucial of the four 
interlinked key themes of regime theory. FAO is the information generator and 
holds a central position within the epistemic community working within food and 
agriculture. It needs to defend its position as it is the only international 
organisation with an overall mandate to do so.  
 
The provision of statistics and publications is important in putting issues on the 
agenda, informing policy and steering decision-makers. To enable FAO’s 
statistics and publications to play this vital role they have to be trusted and 
accepted by the majority of the main actors, in particular the member states. 
Transparency, sound methodology, well defined objectives, which are linked to 
FAO’s overall strategic objectives, and a thorough and scientific approach to the 
gathering and analysis of data, are all essential. In addition, FAO also has to 
have a clear idea of its position and role within the international system. 
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We have to position ourselves as trusted advisors to our 
member states; we have to help them steer; we have to be 
present and have gravitas. We cannot play the role of 
policy vending machines.42 
Through the gathering and dissemination process FAO is not only interacting 
with its member states and their agriculture ministers but also the wider 
epistemic community. It is engaging with research institutes, NGOs and CSOs, 
the private sector, as well as other international organisations with overlapping 
areas of interest. These connections are vital in achieving the overall aims of 
FAO, including the eradication of hunger.  
Conclusion 
The provision of statistics and publications is a pure GPG. It has always played 
a crucial role within FAO and placed the organisation at the forefront of the 
epistemic community. It has increased the level of understanding of issues 
related to food and agriculture, informed policy and driven technical assistance, 
which has improved the lives of millions. Through the reform of their provision, 
as with the wider reform of FAO, it is hoped that well-defined objectives, 
capacity development and an increased budget will enable the organisation and 
the division to continue to provide this GPG. FAO and its member states have to 
recognise the important role played by its statistics and publications as the 
organisation strives to achieve its global goals and the eradication of hunger. 
FAO’s role in their provision and its well-earned reputation should be protected, 
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enhanced and celebrated. The following chapter will address the role of FAO as 
a convener. 
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Chapter Eight: 
FAO and the Provision of GPGs: 
The Role of Convener 
Introduction 
FAO has the mandate and authority to bring together, not only its member 
states to discuss issues under its remit, but also a wide range of non-state 
actors, which is expanding in the dynamic arena of food and agriculture, as 
discussed in chapter six. And by bringing together these different actors 
informed and advised by FAO’s own knowledgeable experts within their own 
fields, as part of a wider epistemic community, agreement can be reached 
through negotiation and partnership building for international treaties, standard 
setting, the establishment of codes of conduct, voluntary guidelines and 
agreement on norms. FAO is then ideally placed to assist member states to 
implement these treaties, standards, codes and guidelines once agreed. 
 
The work of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) will be analysed 
closely, through observations that took place during the CFS meetings in 2011 
and 2012, and an examination of voluntary guidelines produced. The CFS 
demonstrates many of the different ways in which FAO operates, as a facilitator, 
partner and provider of relevant information. The inclusion of non-state actors, 
most notably the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the formally recognised 
Civil Society Mechanism (CSM), as well as NGOs, foundations and private 
sector organisations, is a key feature of the CFS. If these non-state actors are 
302 
 
formerly and genuinely accepted as valued partners by the member states the 
changes taking place in the CFS could pave the way for their inclusion in many 
other international fora, in FAO and beyond. 
 
FAO has always acted as a convenor. From the first international meeting at Hot 
Springs at which the international community agreed to establish the 
organisation, FAO has always been able to bring together member states and 
other actors to discuss issues relating to food and agriculture. In the post-war 
world there was an urgency to their discussions, as many countries struggled to 
feed their populations. However, despite the continuing problems, with almost 
800 million people still suffering from chronic hunger today (FAO, 2015a), the 
political will to tackle the issues in the twenty-first century is inadequate.  
There is a lack of political will to reduce hunger. The 
hungry have no voice. International organisations need to 
work with countries to make sure there’s enough food and 
people have access to it. Access is connected to poverty 
but although there have been achievements on poverty 
reduction the number of hungry people is still stubbornly 
high.43 
This lack of political will is not new, as discussed in previous chapters. There 
are many vested interests in maintaining the present system. As the 
international trade system has become more globalised and the planet’s 
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ecosystem more fragile through overuse and the burden of an increasing 
population greater strain has been placed on food production. However, as 
discussed in chapter one, food production is only one small part of the problem, 
as access to adequate food is also vital to ensure food security. There are many 
reasons for the persistence of hunger. 
There have been huge achievements, especially in India 
and China, but hunger is still there. There are many 
reasons for this; there are more disasters and civil wars, 
climate change is having an impact and natural resources 
are being degraded, as well as the spread of diseases 
such as Avian Influenza. With the expansion of 
international trade there are additional food security 
issues, as well as those linked to the inputs associated 
with more complex food chains.44 
Taking into consideration the complexity of the challenges faced and the array 
of different actors involved at every level of food production, supply and 
consumption, it should be obvious that states should not be the only actors 
involved in addressing these issues. Although FAO’s mandate and funding 
come directly from its member states, and as such they are the main actors 
within the organisation, it is important that given the complexity of the 
challenges faced that FAO brings together all relevant parties. Working in 
partnership with different organisations has been recognised as the only way in 
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which progress will be made on these complex global issues, which is why the 
development of partnerships also plays an important role in FAO’s new 
Strategic Objectives. 
 
This serves a number of purposes; it ensures there is a breadth of perspectives 
represented, different sources of information accessible, and it acts as a 
motivator for member states, which may otherwise wish to sideline the 
organisation or ignore the issues. With different organisations, such as NGOs 
and CSOs, observing and in some cases participating in negotiations, it is more 
difficult for member states to act with impunity.  
 
FAO hosts numerous international conferences on many different aspects of the 
work under its remit however this thesis will concentrate its attention on the 
Committee on World Food Security (CFS). The CFS has been selected because 
it has been in the vanguard of FAO’s reform process and has allowed for an 
unprecedented level of participation. Following the publication of the IEE report 
this committee has been reformed and has led the way in creating an inclusive 
space for many different actors, most notably through the Civil Society 
Mechanism (CSM). This has broadened the committee’s reach, its importance 
within FAO and established its role as a provider of GPGs. Its performance is 
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being closely monitored45 as this model may be used elsewhere in FAO and by 
other organisations if successful.46  
The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) 
The food price crisis in 2008 placed food security firmly at the top of the 
international political agenda for the first time in decades. Unfortunately this 
attention arrived at a time when FAO had just received the IEE report and was 
beginning the process of self-examination in an attempt to reform. This 
introspection placed the organisation in a disadvantageous position, especially 
when faced with the possibility of increased competition from other 
organisations on matters within its remit.  
 
As a response to the food price crisis the United Nations Secretary General, 
Ban Ki Moon, created the High Level Task Force on Global Food and Nutrition 
Security (HLTF) to promote a comprehensive and unified response to the crisis. 
This included the heads of the UN specialised agencies, FAO among them, the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), OECD and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). David Nabarro, Assistant Secretary General of the UN, 
was appointed the co-ordinator of the HLTF, which was supported by a small 
co-ordination secretariat hosted by IFAD in Rome. (HLTF, 2015) Its first role 
was to produce the Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), which was 
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presented at the High Level Meeting on Food Security for All in Madrid in 
January 2009.  
 
The High Level Meeting in Madrid (IISD, 2009) was attended by 62 ministers 
from more than 126 countries, as well as members of civil society, trade unions, 
the private sector, academia, donor agencies and international organisations, 
including FAO Director General Jacques Diouf. Progress since the High Level 
Conference on World Food Security in June 2008 (FAO, 2008b) was discussed, 
as was the need for a coordinated response to the crisis. The idea of creating a 
Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition was also put 
forward by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy.   
 
Although a co-ordinated response to the crisis was needed the Madrid meeting, 
promoting the HLTF and the Global Partnership proposal, highlighted the 
difference between two competing groups, each wanting overall control of the 
governance of food and agriculture (Duncan, 2015). The G8, G20 and the UN in 
New York were championing the HLTF to become the primary body to address 
the crisis and the Rome-based agencies were pushing for participatory 
processes and reform of the existing bodies, which would guarantee their 
relevance and long-term survival.  
 
In response to the perceived threat of the proposed Global Partnership, which 
lacked substance, and the prospect of the creation of new financial 
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mechanisms, which would have taken control of this arena away from the 
Rome-based agencies, FAO’s director general suggested an alternative. He 
argued that the CFS, a multi-agency organisation hosted at FAO, would be a 
suitable vehicle for a co-ordinated response to tackle the short-term food price 
crisis and through which to address the longer-term issues of food insecurity.  
To accomplish this, the committee would need to be reformed. Participants at 
the Madrid meeting agreed to give the CFS an opportunity to reform into a 
stronger inter-agency instrument. 
 
The ETC Group (2009, p.1) argued that it was not so much the future of the 
CFS that was at stake but rather:  
whether or not leadership on food and agriculture issues 
would remain within the UN system and among the Rome-
based agencies – or, whether some undefined new 
partnership of public and private interests would take over 
and possibly move the focus from Rome to New York or 
Washington. 
The CFS had a limited opportunity to reform into an organisation that could 
deliver on these complex and emotive issues. Non-state actors, such as 
peasant farmers, would also have a chance to participate in a more profound 
way in a reformed CFS. 
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Reform of the CFS 
The CFS had been established at the 18th Session of FAO Conference in 1975 
(Res 21/75) acting upon recommendations from the World Food Conference in 
1974. The actions of member states were to be monitored by the CFS to ensure 
adequate food was available for and accessible to everyone. By monitoring 
actions at the country level the committee would then be able to achieve a 
global perspective to be used to inform its recommendations for policy action to 
alleviate short-term problems and plan ahead to avoid their reoccurrence. As 
such it was created to offer global oversight. The CFS is an intergovernmental 
body, hosted by FAO and which includes WFP and IFAD. The committee 
reports annually to the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC). 
 
In recent years it had been tasked with producing guidelines on the Right to 
Food, as set out by the 1996 World Food Summit, which it did with CSO 
participation47, and monitoring the progress being made towards the first MDG 
target on reducing hunger. However, its future usefulness had recently been 
questioned. The IEE (2007) found that the CFS had been dynamic in its 
monitoring role and was the committee which best involved civil society. Despite 
this praise the IEE concluded: “With the completion of discussions on the Right 
to Food it is now losing some of its momentum and questions have arisen as to 
whether it meets for too long and too frequently.” (IEE, 2007, p.178) 
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This weak performance had also been noted within FAO but instead of 
suggesting it meet less frequently member states agreed to embark on its 
reform, as championed by FAO’s director general at the Madrid meeting. Eight 
months of deliberations between the CFS Bureau and an open Contact Group 
resulted in energetic negotiations, which included CSOs and other non-state 
actors, but no document to debate at the 35th session of CFS in October 2009.  
 
In addition to this obstacle there was also disagreement between the member 
states as to the preferred format of the reformed CFS. OECD countries wanted 
to limit the level at which the CSOs could participate. They did not want CSOs 
able to enter negotiations on global issues. “Far from being an influential 
coordination body, most OECD states saw a reformed CFS as a ‘forum’ or, as 
one CSO suggested in the light of the OECD’s reluctance to give the CFS a 
global overview, a ‘small talk’ forum.” (ETC, 2009, p.2) This was not the stance 
taken by the G77 and China which wanted to “both think and act locally and 
globally.”  
 
Although the CFS is an intergovernmental body and not a committee of FAO the 
reactions of member states to the CFS were based on their perceptions of FAO, 
which had just started its own reform process, the outcome of which was not 
certain. The ETC Group’s assessment of the situation was that opinions were 
divided. The group (2009, p.3) argued that the OECD countries distrusted FAO 
and “the last thing many countries want to do is give more power to FAO as it 
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struggles through its own reform process.” However the G77 and China 
preferred FAO to IFAD and WFP as it operated a one-country one-vote system 
rather than a weighted voting system. 
 
Despite these underlying tensions and different motivations there was also 
much co-operation between member states and non-state actors during this 
CFS meeting, which proved to be a landmark event. By its conclusion 
agreement had been reached on the future direction of the committee. It was 
agreed (CFS, 2009, p.2) that the CFS would remain an intergovernmental 
committee in FAO with the vision that: 
as a central component of the evolving Global Partnership 
for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition will constitute 
the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental 
platform for a broad range of committed stakeholders to 
work together in a coordinated manner and in support of 
country-led processes towards the elimination of hunger 
and ensuring food security and nutrition for all human 
beings. 
This vision statement placed it centrally in any future Global Partnership, a 
move designed not only to ensure the committee’s central position but also to 
prevent any attempts to resurrect the Global Partnership in another guise 
outside the sphere of FAO and the other Rome-based organisations. It 
reiterated its global remit and also the importance of the broad participation of 
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different stakeholders that the CFS had developed through the Right to Food 
negotiations. The Right to Food concept was also embedded in the vision 
statement (CFS, 2009, p.2) which concluded: “The CFS will strive for a world 
free from hunger where countries implement the voluntary guidelines for the 
progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national 
food security.” Although other stakeholders were to be included in the 
negotiations the responsibility for a state’s population’s food security remained 
solely with the state. 
 
Initially the roles of the CFS would be to coordinate at the global level, by 
providing a platform for discussion; policy convergence, through the 
development of international strategies and voluntary guidelines; and offer 
support and advice to countries and regions, in the development, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of their own plans to eliminate 
hunger. In the second phase of reform the committee would then take on 
additional roles, such as coordination at national and regional levels, promote 
accountability and share best practice at all levels and develop a Global 
Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition. The first version of this 
living document was completed in 2012 (CFS, 2012a) and presented to the 39th 
session of CFS in October 2012. It was received warmly48, due to its 
significance as the result of collaborative process and as a living and flexible 
document designed “to provide an overarching framework and a single 
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reference document with practical guidance on core recommendations for food 
security and nutrition strategies.” (CFS, 2012a, p5-6) This living document is 
now on its third version (CFS, 2014) with updates incorporated to include 
changing priorities.  
 
The reformed CFS has a new structure designed to allow for input from all 
stakeholders at the global, regional and national levels. This comprises of the 
CFS Bureau and Advisory Group, Plenary, the High Level Panel of Experts 
(HLPE) and the Secretariat (CFS, 2015a).  
 
The Bureau is the executive arm of the committee and consists of a chairperson 
and twelve member countries. The Advisory Group is made up of 
representatives from five different categories of CFS Participants: UN agencies 
and other UN bodies; civil society and NGOs particularly organisations 
representing small-scale food producers and disadvantaged groups49; 
international agricultural research institutions; international and regional financial 
institutes, such as the World Bank and the IMF; and private sector associations 
and philanthropic foundations. The Advisory Group is tasked with advancing the 
committee’s objectives, ensuring continued linkages and two-way 
communication between the different stakeholders. 
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The Plenary is held annually over several days that incorporate World Food Day 
on 16 October. It is the “central body for decision-taking, debate, coordination, 
lesson-learning and convergence by all stakeholders at a global level on food 
security issues” (CFS, 2015a, p2). The CFS has a permanent Secretariat 
located at FAO, which includes members from WFP and IFAD. Its role is to 
support all sections of CFS.  
 
A High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) has also been introduced as part of the 
reform process. It has a Steering Committee that has internationally recognised 
experts in a variety of food security and nutrition-related fields. It also has a 
roster of experts that can be used to build specialised teams to work on specific 
areas. The HLPE has clear objectives to assess and analyse the current state of 
food security and nutrition and to provide scientific and knowledge-based 
analysis and advice on policy-relevant issues and identify emerging trends. 
(CFS, 2015b)  
 
Since 2010 the CFS has made requests for 11 reports from the HLPE relating to 
issues surrounding food security and nutrition. These have been presented to 
the CFS meetings to inform debate and policy recommendations.  
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HLPE Report Date Published CFS Session 
Price Volatility and Food Security 2011 CFS 37 
Land Tenure and International Investments in 
Agriculture 
2011 CFS 37 
Climate Change and Food Security 2012 CFS 39 
Social Protection and Food Security 2012 CFS 39 
Biofuels and Food Security 2013 CFS 40 
Investing in Smallholder Agriculture for Food 
Security 
2013 CFS 40 
The Role of Sustainable Fisheries and 
Aquaculture for Food Security and Nutrition 
2014 CFS 41 
Food Losses and Waste in the context of 
Sustainable Food Systems 
2014 CFS 41 
Water and Food Security 2015 CFS 42 
Sustainable Agricultural Development for Food 
Security and Nutrition, including the Role of 
Livestock 
Expected 2016 CFS 43 
Sustainable Forestry for Food Security and 
Nutrition 
Expected 2017 CFS 44 
Table 1: Information sourced from (CFS, 2015b) 
 
 
The reports produced by the HLPE are used to inform CFS debates and ensure 
the guidelines produced by the committee are based on scientific evidence and 
knowledge. Since its reformation the CFS has established a number of 
guidelines through inclusive negotiations, which will be examined in the next 
section on the role of norm and standard setting. 
 
The CFS is no longer limited to an annual meeting. The reformed CFS has an 
on-going work programme implemented by the Bureau with inputs from the 
Advisory Group and the HLPE (CFS, 2010). The 39th session the CFS adopted 
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a multi-year programme of work (CFS, 2012c), which set out the committee’s 
priorities for the forthcoming years. 
Civil Society Mechanism 
Prior to the reform of the CFS civil society organisations had started to 
participate in a small number of global negotiations on a few issues, such as the 
guidelines on the Right to Food as previously discussed, and at the climate 
change conferences in Rio in 1992 and 2012, and Johannesburg in 2002. 
However, despite the promising start to civil society inclusion in Rio member 
states have since become more sensitive to their presence and the process has 
become more closed.50  
 
Despite the reluctance demonstrated in other global fora, and by some states in 
the CFS as discussed previously, during the CFS reform negotiations there 
emerged a growing consensus on the need to allow an unprecedented level of 
participation for CSOs, especially social movements and those representing 
people most affected by food security issues. A group of approximately twenty 
CSOs attended this important CFS meeting in 2009. According to the ETC 
Group they worked well together, participated actively in the plenary debate, 
had three representatives inside the open Contact Group and observers in the 
drafting committee. The ETC Group (2009, p.4) observed that: “Government 
delegations from all perspectives were impressed by CSO participation which 
was reserved and balanced.” 
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This inclusion was formalised in the reform document, which stated: “Civil 
society organisations/NGOs and their networks will be invited to autonomously 
establish a global mechanism for food security and nutrition which will function 
as a facilitating body for CSO/NGOs consultation and participation in the CFS.” 
(CFS, 2009, p.5) The CFS intended this mechanism to “serve inter-sessional 
global, regional and national actions” with activities to include the “exchange of 
information, analysis and experience”, to develop “common positions as 
appropriate”, to communicate with CFS and to convene “a civil society forum as 
a preparatory event before CFS sessions if so decided by the civil society 
mechanism”. (CFS, 2009, p.5) The CFS invited the CSOs to submit a proposal 
on how these aims would be achieved and how the civil society mechanism 
(CSM) would be organised and function. 
 
In response the newly formed CSM submitted its proposal to the next session of 
the CFS in October 2010. In the proposal the Declaration of the People’s Food 
Sovereignty Forum was reiterated, which stated civil society’s support of the 
CFS reform and emphasised the important role of civil society’s involvement in 
the process, which had been instrumental in “opening up a critical space which 
we intend to fully occupy...In so doing we will ensure that the voices of the 
excluded continue to be heard at the heart of food and agricultural policy-
making and governance, at all levels.” (CFS, 2010, p.1) The proposals for CSM 
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participation in the CFS process outlined its role and functions, year-round 
activities and role in the plenary sessions, among other procedural items.  
 
The CSM in now the largest international mechanism of CSOs working to 
influence policies and actions related to agriculture, food security and nutrition, 
on the national, regional and global level. The CSM reaches out to hundreds of 
CSOs on all continents, sharing information on global policy debates and 
processes and promoting consultations and dialogue. It is founded on the belief 
that the people most affected by food insecurity “are best placed to represent 
their own interests and views and are not only victims but also bearers of 
solutions.” (CSM, 2015) 
 
The relationship between the CSM and member states has not always been 
straightforward but the complexity of the issues debated and the range of 
perspectives brought to the negotiating table from all stakeholders has to be 
recognised. This is not surprising considering the fact that the CSM is an 
inclusive and open space through which 900 NGOs and CSOs share 
information and participate in policy debates. (CSM, 2015b) However 
consensus is reached by the CSM on many issues. It also has to be recognised 
that member states themselves do not form a homogenous group and approach 
negotiations from a range of different perspectives.  
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The CSM has a number of ways in which it engages in the process, through its 
presence at the CFS, from the formal spaces in the round table sessions and 
plenary to participation in side events, through media work through to lobbying 
and creating alliances with member states. In 2011 CSOs dissatisfied with the 
lack of progress made on land grabbing also held a number of events to 
highlight this contentious issue.51  
 
As part of the feedback process different sections of the CSM hold regular 
meetings, especially during and following the few days of the CFS annual 
meeting, to inform all participants of the on-going debates. In addition progress 
is monitored and follow-up points identified. For example, in 2011 meetings of 
the Concord European Food Security Working Group and the CSM-Western 
Europe (2011) gave their feedback on progress made on the voluntary 
guidelines for responsible tenure of land, the policy round tables on food price 
volatility, how to increase food security and smallholder-sensitive investment in 
agriculture and on gender, nutrition and food security, as well as the global 
strategic framework.  
 
The two groups assessed the outcome of the 37th session of the CFS in two 
ways: by determining the degree to which the CFS was able to build its authority 
as the foremost global forum on food issues and the degree to which CSOs had 
                                            
51
 In 2011 CSOs held a number of events, including public action, to denounce land grabbing 
and corporate investment. These actions were timed to coincide with the negotiations on the 
FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests in the Context of National Food Security. (CSOs, 2011b)  
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been able to use the CFS to advance their own positions. The two groups 
during their respective meetings (2011) came to the conclusion that the answer 
to the first question was positive as there had been a strong presence and 
active engagement and the answer to the second was more mixed given some 
member states’ unwillingness to tackle the root causes of food price volatility. 
However, the groups recognised that there had been good progress made on 
shifting the terms of the debate on investment in agriculture away from that set 
out in the discussion paper, which was based on neoliberal market driven 
solutions in favour of corporate investment, public-private partnerships and 
global value chains, to language that recognised the primacy of small-scale 
sustainable food production and the value that small scale producers bring to 
the issue of food security as the major investors in agriculture. 
 
In addition to participating in the debates on the different issues the CSM also 
plays an important role in ensuring the CFS is fulfilling its role. In this capacity it 
has raised concerns (CSM, 2014a) over the lack of progress on implementing a 
framework for monitoring CFS decisions and recommendations, which is one of 
the key functions of the CFS. The CSM criticised the CFS for not implementing 
its monitoring and accountability mandate, five years after the reform. In the 41st 
CFS session in October 2014 (CFS, 2014a) the CFS agreed a framework for 
monitoring its decisions that will include conducting baseline assessments of 
CFS effectiveness, opinion surveys of CFS stakeholders and implementation of 
in-depth country level assessments to be undertaken on a voluntary basis.  
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In a statement for FAO Regional Conferences (2014c) the CFS Chair, Gerda 
Verbung, also invited stakeholders to participate in a number of stocktaking 
events to foster more participation and to determine whether the policy 
recommendations and guidelines were being implemented and if so their 
effectiveness.  
 
The formal participation of CSOs in the reformed CFS has been 
groundbreaking. Its implementation is being watched with great interest by 
international organisations and CSOs and NGOs operating in different arenas. 
Some states were not sure about the inclusion of CSOs 
but now we have a process in place that allows for 
different voices to be heard. The director general wants to 
move FAO into becoming a multi-stakeholder operation. 
The CSOs are in now and international organisations are 
relying on all actors for mandate. I think the director 
general now feels that institutions can have CSOs involved 
more formally. The CFS could be a model for other 
committees.52 
As a multi-stakeholder model the CFS is leading the way. As participants in this 
experimental governance structure the CSM needs to ensure it not only fulfils its 
                                            
52
 Personal interview with Thomas Price 
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own mandate but that the CFS continues to do so.  The relationship between 
the CFS and the CSM is one that will be watched with interest. 
Convening as a Global Public Good 
Bringing different actors together to debate food and agriculture related issues 
has been one of FAO’s main roles from the start. Over seven decades FAO has 
been the host and facilitator for hundreds of summits, conferences and 
workshops. Representatives from member states and non-state actors have 
been able to exchange viewpoints and information to foster shared 
understandings, which in turn helps to enable decision-making and policy 
formation to address some of the most important challenges facing the world. 
This has been at every level local, national, regional and global with many 
policies, especially those concerned with sustainability, aimed at creating a 
better world for future generations.  
 
As such FAO in its general role as a convener is providing a GPG, by bringing 
many different actors together, as it attempts to be as inclusive as possible, to 
debate many trans-boundary and global issues that will impact upon this and 
future generations. As FAO also has a commitment to share best practice and 
the knowledge gained as a result of these meetings through many different 
media, including the internet, it can be argued that this role is non-excludable 
and non-rivalrous.  
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As the CFS has been the focus of this section of the thesis then it is the CFS 
that will be the main focus of the analysis both for its provision of GPGs and 
then in relation to the four main themes of regime theory. It has to be noted 
again that the CFS is not solely a committee of FAO but instead an 
intergovernmental entity. However, it has very close connections with FAO; 
hosted by FAO, championed by FAO and as a potential reform blueprint for 
committees within FAO. FAO is heavily involved in the reform and the work of 
the CFS and as such its provision of GPGs can be partially credited to FAO. In 
addition if FAO decides to adopt this multi-stakeholder model in other 
committees and bodies within FAO it is relevant to FAO’s ability to provide 
GPGs in the future. 
 
The participation of so many CSOs and NGOs through the CSM, with over 900 
different organisations consulted and involved in the policy debates, has 
enabled the reformed CFS to become far more inclusive (CSM, 2015b). Within 
the CSM, the way in which information is shared, feedback provided and policy 
debated has created an inclusive mechanism for the CSM, which is beneficial to 
the CFS as a whole. This breadth of perspectives, especially taking into 
consideration the experiences of those most affected by food insecurity and 
small scale food production, informs the debates and also the policy formation. 
Although it is physically possible to exclude individuals and organisations from 
attending CFS meetings the way in which the CSM operates, in accordance with 
its mandate, allows for a broad range of views to be taken into consideration, 
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which then informs its position on each issue. The CSM mandate is closely 
related to that of the CFS, which also ensures that the CFS is a more inclusive 
space than any other committee operating at this level. In this respect the CFS 
is arguably non-excludable. 
 
One of the main purposes of the CFS is to extend the global knowledge relevant 
to food security and nutrition issues; the information that is gathered is shared 
throughout the networks. This has created a non-rivalrous system, which fulfils 
the second GPG pre-requisite. Additionally, the issues that are addressed by 
the CFS are global issues that take into consideration this and future 
generations. In this respect, as in all others, the CFS undoubtedly provides 
GPSs.  
 
With this level of participation and consensus building the policies that are 
eventually adopted should have a better chance of successful implementation 
as there is a broader range of actors that have voiced their support for them. 
However, as the framework for the monitoring of implementation is in the early 
stages it is too early to determine if this will be the case. 
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The Role of Convening in the FAO as an 
International Organisation 
 
As an international organisation FAO has always played an important role as a 
convener. The CFS in its new role as a multi-stakeholder forum and through its 
close connections to FAO is in the vanguard of reforms that, if proved 
successful, may change the way in which FAO operates. This new approach to 
negotiations may also aid FAO in the implementation of its new Strategic 
Objectives, which require action at all levels of society, from farming 
communities to international fora.  
 
In the CFS the member states are still the main actors. Only states can be 
members of the Bureau. However the level of participation granted to different 
entities in the Advisory Group gives this committee a much broader participatory 
approach to governance than any other body at this level. This approach has a 
number of implications. 
 
Different voices can be heard, including those most affected by the issues 
debated. By engaging with every level of society, with a much wider breadth of 
knowledge and experience, there are greater opportunities of finding practical 
solutions to the many challenges. It also gives the CFS a far greater level of 
legitimacy if it has a mandate from the people affected as producers and 
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consumers and not just governments, some of which are not democracies and 
therefore do not even have a mandate from their own populations.  
 
It can also be argued that if people have been engaged in the negotiation 
process they should also be more engaged in the implementation of the 
policies. This level of engagement should have a positive impact on the policies’ 
overall success.  
 
In addition, as different partners have been involved in the formation of policy 
and have an in-depth knowledge of how and why it was developed they are in a 
better position to judge whether it is being implemented correctly. The CSOs 
and NGOs that have been involved in the CFS are also involved in the 
communities, in which the implications of the policies can be felt most keenly. 
They are in a better position than any other organisations to monitor and 
evaluate the policies’ performance, their success, or not. They are also in the 
best position to ensure member states do exactly what they have promised. If 
this approach works as expected it should act as an excellent motivator for 
member states that have to return to the CFS every year to explain their actions. 
 
The CFS is an intergovernmental body that reports annually to ECOSOC; it is 
not a committee of FAO, WFP or IFAD. Nevertheless, it still has to fulfil its remit 
and justify its budget. This reform process has already elevated it from a 
committee that was under threat to an integral part of the international response 
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to food insecurity and if it is successful in achieving its aim (CFS, 2009, p.2) it 
will become “the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental 
platform” to co-ordinate and support country-led processes to eliminate hunger. 
 
As the CFS demonstrates its ability to deliver well-formed policies in a number 
of important areas under its remit and as the relationships between the different 
partners continue to develop it will gain a greater standing in the overall global 
governance structure. If successful its reputation will also grow. At the moment it 
is being observed; it is too early to determine how successful it will be.  
 
However, with the increased participation of CSOs and NGOs, it will be under 
more scrutiny than most committees. The CSM is highly motivated to scrutinise 
the success of the CFS and the actions of its member states because it has 
been involved in the policy formation process and has partial ownership of it. 
Additionally it represents millions of small-scale food producers who have to live 
with the consequences of failure. Therefore the CFS is being monitored by 
organisations that have an in-depth understanding of the policies, have a stake 
in the policies’ success and represent the people most affected by their 
implementation. This level of scrutiny will ensure accountability as the CSM will 
mobilise its own members and public opinion if member states attempt to 
sideline the CFS or fail to implement agreed policies.  In addition, if the CSM 
participation is successful there will be greater opportunities for CSOs to 
participate in other international organisations. 
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During each annual CFS plenary there are round tables, working groups, friends 
of the chair groups, side events as well as the plenary itself.53 All these different 
meetings allow for discussion on all relevant issues, as do the informal lunches, 
receptions and evening gatherings. Each year the CSM also organises the Civil 
Society Forum as a preparatory event to the CFS. This is just the activity during 
the plenary itself. Throughout the year the work and communications continue 
ensuring the CFS is the hub to a network of individuals and organisations all 
working with the same aim; to tackle food insecurity.  This interaction has 
created a network of actors that operate interdependently and this is one of the 
greatest strengths of the CFS. 
 
Information that is perceived as objective, independent and reliable is vital to the 
CFS and this is demonstrated in the structure of the committee, which includes 
the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE). It has three well-defined functions54 
designed to ensure the quality of the reports it produces, including the provision 
of “scientific and knowledge-based analysis and advice” (CFS, 2015b). It is 
composed of ten to 15 internationally recognised experts in areas relevant to the 
work of the CFS, who all have proven abilities in conducting quality research 
and accessing networks. As such the HLPE is able to produce reports, which 
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 As observed by the author at the CFS Plenary sessions in 2011 and 2012 
54
 To assess and analyze the current state of food security and nutrition and its underlying 
causes; to provide scientific and knowledge-based analysis and advice on specific policy-
relevant issues, utilizing existing high quality research, data and technical studies; and to identify 
emerging issues, and help members prioritize future actions and attentions on key focal areas. 
(CFS, 2015b) 
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may focus on contentious issues, but which are of sufficient quality as to be 
accepted as the starting point for debate by all participants.  
 
However, information is not just provided by the HLPE. As there are many 
different participants in the CFS so there are many different sources of 
information. These sources may originate from member states, CSOs, NGOs or 
other interested parties. These sources may be of varying standards of 
objectivity and scientific rigor. In addition the CFS has the scope to take into 
consideration the opinions of those most affected by food insecurity and the 
challenges facing small scale food producers, and in so doing, arguably gains a 
deeper understanding of the issues. The CFS also draws on other sources, 
such as the FAO SOFI reports, which are presented to the committee each 
year. As discussed previously FAO produces a great number of publications 
relevant to food security and nutrition.  
 
Through accessing a range of sources, including the experiences of different 
stakeholders, the CFS can gain a broad understanding of the issues. However 
by having its own HLPE, which is directed by the committee, it can obtain the 
information most relevant to and which can inform its programme of work. To 
ensure the reports of the HLPE have the gravitas required each member of the 
panel also has to possess this gravitas and in their own right be part of the 
epistemic community within the food security arena. Therefore, information and 
those that provide it are essential to the CFS and its reputation. 
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Conclusion 
The CFS has become a very interesting case study in its multi-stakeholder 
approach to governance. If successful it may form the basis on which many 
more committees, within FAO and beyond, are constituted. It has the potential 
to provide a wide range of GPGs through its participatory role, which is 
exceptionally inclusive, and its global reach, not only of its policy 
recommendations but also the organisations with which it engages. However, it 
is too early to gauge its level of success. The CFS offers an opportunity for 
further study. The next chapter will examine the role of FAO in norms and 
standards setting. 
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Chapter Nine: 
FAO and the Provision of GPGs: 
Norms and Standards Setting 
Introduction 
FAO works in a number of ways to establish norms and set standards. In 
addition to its provision of statistics and publications and as a convener it is also 
an active partner in the formation of international agreements, voluntary 
guidelines and principles, codes of conduct and technical standards, as well as 
through the work of its departments.  
 
This chapter will start by establishing the importance of norms and standards 
setting for FAO and the reform of that provision as part of the organisation’s 
overall reform process. This will be followed by an examination of a small 
number of examples of FAO’s normative work across different formats including 
international treaties, by highlighting the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture and norms established as part of the MDG 
and SDG framework. In addition there will also be an examination of the role of 
FAO in the creation of guidelines and principles, by taking as examples the 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests 
in the Context of National Food Security and the Principles for Responsible 
Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems adopted by the CFS. This will be 
followed by a discussion on its standards setting work, by highlighting the 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and the Codex Alimentarius 
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Commission. As in the last two chapters this will then be followed by a 
discussion on the role of this work in FAO’s provision of GPGs and through the 
four interlinked themes of regimes and international organisations. 
 
Although normative work is an important part of FAO’s role its value is difficult to 
ascertain. According to the IEE (2007, p.12) the organisation had “become 
trapped in a misleading discourse of ‘normative versus operational’” which has 
had an impact on its ability to make critical strategic choices within the area of 
GPG provision. The IEE argued that this has contributed to distrust and 
“introduced definitional and conceptual confusion in the organisation.” Member 
states have played a part in creating this confusion. The IEE (2007, p.12) found 
that “some members express the view that FAO should have no significant role 
outside the normative. Others tend to see the normative as primarily of interest 
and benefit to developed countries and claim that ‘what FAO does on the 
ground is all that really counts’”. The IEE argued that both of these viewpoints 
were vast oversimplifications and both disregarded FAO’s mandate, which 
requires FAO to function both normatively and operationally to provide GPGs 
and ensure their accessibility to everyone who needs them. 
 
The need for both functions has received recognition in the new Strategic 
Objectives, in particular the Sixth Objective, which is designed to “cover the 
provision of technical quality, knowledge and services for the organisation 
encompassing core normative work.” (FAO, 2013d, p.21) In the new 
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organisational structure the majority of the normative work will be dealt with 
centrally by the corporate programmes and the departments, each with its own 
remit, will have as their main responsibility the enhancement of the technical 
capabilities of the organisation. The “departments will contribute to specific but 
limited areas of normative work in thematic areas and disciplines under their 
remit that cannot effectively be managed by the corporate programmes.” (FAO, 
2013d, p.26)  
 
This is part of the move to decentralise the organisation whilst maintaining its 
technical integrity and “building its capacity to mainstream key technical 
functions beyond institutional boundaries”. The Sixth Objective aims to achieve 
three outcomes, the first of which is the “quality and integrity of the technical and 
normative work of the organisation.”55 (FAO, 2013d, p.26) The organisation’s 
normative role is also defined in the FAO’s seven core functions, the first of 
which is its normative work and standard setting instruments. 
 
To ensure FAO is more effective than it has previously been this normative work 
has to deliver change. In his forward to the Reviewed Strategic Framework 
(FOA, 2013d, p.2) the director general set out his vision for the new, 
modernised and transformed FAO. “The aim is to improve the delivery and 
impact of FAO’s programmes by effective translation of our normative work into 
                                            
55
 The second and third aims are to achieve: “quality and integrity of the data produced and 
analysed by the organisation” and “quality services, coherent strategies and approaches to work 
on governance and gender equality and women’s empowerment in the Strategic Objective 
programmes.” (FAO, 2013d, p.26)  
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country-level impact of our global knowledge products into tangible change in 
policy and practice.” By creating a better connection between the normative and 
operational work of the organisation FAO should be in a better position to 
address its first global goal; the elimination of hunger.  
 
Not only does the normative work have to relate more directly to action on the 
ground but it also has to deliver a more general change in attitudes if it is to 
effect real change on a more permanent basis. Issues connected to food and 
agriculture are so wide-ranging and impact on so many other areas of concern, 
from resource use to climate change and trade policy to human rights, that if an 
approach based on sustainability were to be taken to address the challenges 
faced in food production many other positive outcomes would follow. This would 
require a paradigm shift; one which could be achieved if the norms relating to 
food production and consumption were addressed.  
 
FAO’s director general outlined the challenges (Da Silva, 2015) 
The input intensive agricultural development model that we 
have used for the past 40 years has worked well. But it is 
unsustainable in the long run. It is time for a paradigm 
shift. Business as usual would mean a huge and 
simultaneous increase in the need for food, energy and 
water in the next decades: 60 percent more food, 50 
percent more energy and 40 percent more water by 2050. 
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As with the strengthened three global goals of FAO the director general has 
again challenged the status quo and the neoliberal business-as-usual model. 
The main objective of FAO is to help achieve a food secure world; a one size fits 
all approach will not deliver food security for everyone. By repositioning the 
debate FAO aims to play a leading role in this new sustainable approach to food 
and agriculture. 
 
Through the provision of statistics and publications, by bringing together 
different organisations, both state and non-state actors, as well as its work on 
international agreements, codes of conduct, technical standards and voluntary 
guidelines FAO has always been able to set norms and standards. However the 
IEE found that this work had been confused and therefore did not always have 
the desired impact. The new Strategic Objectives are designed to bring clarity 
and increased effectiveness.   
 
The different types of work relating to norms and standard setting will now be 
examined. This work covers a wide range of issues and areas. It is not possible 
to give a comprehensive overview in this thesis therefore a small number of 
examples will be highlighted, including its work to protect genetic resources 
through the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, norms established as part of the MDG and SDG framework, the 
Voluntary Guidelines and Principles adopted by the CFS and the work of the 
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International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission. These areas have been selected as they are good examples of 
the wide range of the norm and standard setting work performed by FAO, as 
well as being GPGs. 
International Treaties 
As a specialised agency of the UN FAO has an important role to play in the 
development of international treaties related to food and agriculture. One of the 
best examples of this work, which is also a GPG, is its work to protect genetic 
resources, through the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (the Commission) and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (the Treaty) (FAO, 2015c). The 
Commission is the only intergovernmental forum that deals specifically with all 
components of biodiversity for food and agriculture. As part of its role it 
oversees and guides global assessments, negotiates global action plans, codes 
of conducts and other instruments relevant to conservation and sustainable use.  
 
The Treaty is the only international legal and operational instrument that covers 
all plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA). The Treaty assists 
this international cooperation through systems that include the Multilateral 
System of Access and Benefit-sharing (MLS) and the Global Information 
System on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. By establishing a 
plant genetic resources commons the Treaty is designed to lower transaction 
costs for conservation, research, breeding and training, as well as redistributing 
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back to the commons some of the financial benefits derived from the 
exploitation of some of the resources. The open exchange of genetic resources, 
through international cooperation, is essential to ensure food security (FAO, 
2015c) and through this function the organisation is playing an important role in 
the provision of GPGs. 
 
Negotiations for the Treaty took six and a half years from the 1st Extraordinary 
Session of the Committee in November 1994 to the 6th Extraordinary Session in 
June 2001. It was approved by FAO on 3 November 2001. It now has 135 
contracting parties. (FAO, 2015g) The negotiation process had been long and 
arduous with many disagreements between developed and developing states. 
The scope of the materials to be included was one of the most contentious 
negotiating issues, as well as the terms of benefit sharing and intellectual 
property rights. In the end 35 crops and 29 forage genera were included in the 
MLS. There was also a disparity between the member states’ ability to prepare 
for the negotiations, with African states at a clear disadvantage through a lack of 
intersessional regional meetings to enable them to debate the issues and agree 
a common stance. (Halewood and Nnadozie, 2005) The private sector also 
participated in the negotiations, most notably through the International Seed 
Federation, which directly or indirectly represents more than 10,000 seed 
companies around the world. 
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Despite the difficulty reaching agreement the Treaty is still seen as a significant 
achievement. Michael Halewood and Kent Nnadozie (2005, p.115) argue that it 
“represents a spirited reaction to the rising tide of measures that extend private 
or sovereign control over genetic resources.” It recognises the fact that 
agricultural biodiversity must be treated differently given its essential role in food 
security provision. Now that this step has been taken Halewood and Nnadozie 
(2005, p140) argue that this model could be adapted for use in other 
international systems for a wider range of genetic resources. “The existence of 
such a mechanism should encourage states to see the proliferation of such 
commons-based systems as a real possibility.”  
 
Through the Treaty and the Commission FAO assists member states to develop 
effective policies for the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic 
resources. It has also built international awareness about the importance of 
such work, supported capacity building and strengthened information 
management and exchange. The importance of this work will become ever more 
apparent as the significance of genetic resources gains greater and wider 
recognition. FAO is leading the way in this field. 
 
Norm Setting as part of the MDG and SDG 
framework 
FAO has played an important role in the development of the MDG agenda, on 
issues relating to food security, and it is now one of the specialised UN agencies 
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working on the SDG framework. Established in 2001 the MDGs set the agenda 
for development in the first 15 years of the new millennium and have “produced 
the most successful anti-poverty movement in history” (UN, 2015c, p.3). The 
eight time-bound targets have helped to mobilise efforts to lift millions out of 
poverty, improve health and well-being and give people opportunities for better 
lives.  
 
There has been good progress made towards meeting the first MDG; to 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. According to the most recent MDG 
report (UN, 2015c) the number of people now living in extreme poverty has 
declined by more than half, falling from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015. 
There’s also been a rise in the number of people identified as in the working 
middle class, which is anyone living on more than US$ 4 a day. This number 
has nearly tripled between 1991 and 2015. The proportion of undernourished 
people has dropped by almost half since 1990. However, the report 
acknowledges more progress is needed as there are more than 90 million 
children under five who are still undernourished and underweight and globally 
there are 795 million people estimated to be hungry. 
 
Although targets on alleviating poverty were reached relatively easily progress 
on hunger has been much slower than expected.56 Ben Belhassen highlighted 
the critical shortcomings in the design of the MDGs, which he argued took a 
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 Personal interview with Erwin Northoff 
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siloed approach to development and had insufficient emphasis on sustainability. 
Food security and nutrition suffered as a direct result. Belhassen (2015, p.1) 
argued: “The MDGs’ exclusive focus on reducing hunger – certainly one of the 
gravest human conditions – unfortunately left many facets of food security 
unnoticed, almost completely bypassing the problem of malnutrition, and 
disconnecting both these issues from agriculture and natural resource 
management.”  
 
He was more optimistic about the potential of the SDGs following the publication 
of the Open Working Group’s final report in 2014 which he argued represented 
a “breakthrough document that does not shy away from tackling critical issues 
such as governance, trade, climate change, inequality, peace and security and 
the means of implementation.” (Belhassen, 2015, p.1-2) He welcomed the 
emphasis placed on national ownership of the goals and the comprehensive 
vision for food security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture. Business as usual 
is not an option in the face of increasing economic, social and environmental 
challenges; he therefore called for a paradigm shift in agricultural production 
systems. He argued (2015, p.2) that “this means investing in the capacities, and 
securing the tenure rights of the half a billion or so smallholder farmers who 
produce most of the world’s food, in order to help them remain stewards of 
natural resources and environmental wellbeing.” 
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The SDGs are therefore seen, not only as the next step in the development 
agenda to guide policy and funding for the next 15 years, but also as an 
opportunity to create a much better framework, learning from the MDG 
experience. The overall aim of the SDGs is to “end poverty. Everywhere. 
Permanently.” (UNDP, 2015) In response to criticism of the MDG development 
process, which had been seen as an exclusive donor driven agenda with little 
involvement of developing countries and other stakeholders, (Fehling, 2013) the 
UN invited a diverse set of stakeholders to participate in the development of the 
SDGs, including governments, UN agencies, civil society, NGOs, the private 
sector, academics, research institutions and ordinary citizens. As part of this 
global conversation 7.3 million people ranked their priorities for the future as 
part of the United Nation’s My World survey, national consultations were held in 
almost 100 countries, there were 11 global thematic consultations and six 
consultations on the means of implementation (UNDP, 2015). Through all these 
different channels people have demonstrated their wish to be part of the 
decision making process; to help set the agenda.  
 
FAO has also played a crucial part in the process by co-leading one of the 11 
global thematic consultations. The organisation co-led the consultation on 
hunger, food security and nutrition with the WFP and also supported meetings 
of the Open Working Group (OWG), which is one of the two distinct streams of 
the agenda process; the second is the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts 
on Sustainable Development Financing. Both were initiated by member states in 
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2012 at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio (Rio+20). 
Taking the input from all the different stakeholders the OWG (2014) has put 
forward a chapeau, 17 goals and 169 targets. Debates based on these goals 
and targets have been held at high-level meetings in the UN in 2014 and 2015 
with the final decision expected at the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government level between 25 and 27 September 2015. (FAO, 2015h) 
 
If member states endorse and adopt the proposed SDGs outlined in the OWG 
report the development framework for the next 15 years will be much more 
holistic than the previous MDGs, with ambitious goals and clear objectives 
outlining the best way forward, with long-term benefits for everyone.  
 
FAO is a key player in this new development chapter. SDG2 (UNDP, 2015) 
which aims to “End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and 
promote sustainable agriculture” is obviously under FAO’s remit; however SDG 
6, SDG14 and SDG15 are also very closely linked to the work of FAO being 
concerned with water, oceans and forests. In addition, FAO’s work is also 
instrumental to areas covered by SDG1, SDG3, SDG5, SDG8, SD12 and 
SDG13, based on poverty eradication, health and well-being, gender equality, 
economic growth, consumption patterns and climate change. FAO will play a 
vital role in delivering the new SDGs in many different ways. Its proven ability to 
include many different stakeholders and work in partnerships will prove to be 
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one of its main strengths in the implementation of the post-2015 development 
framework. 
Voluntary Guidelines and Principles 
Through its convening role FAO is able to bring a range of different actors 
together, which is the starting point for debate. Within this space actors can then 
work together to establish guidelines and principles. There can often be 
disagreements, especially when contentious issues are discussed, and 
sometimes not all partners endorse the final product but even in these cases the 
debate has begun. By agreeing voluntary guidelines and principles actors have 
a framework on which to build. 
 
At a special session of the CFS on 11 May 2012 the Voluntary Guidelines on 
the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security were endorsed. This was seen as a 
significant landmark for the CFS and for those who had worked tirelessly on this 
contentious issue. Agreement had been reached after many rounds of multi-
stakeholder discussions and consultations. The debate had also been informed 
by the HLPE report,57 which had been commissioned by the CFS in October 
2010 and published in July 2011. The aim of the guidelines is to promote secure 
tenure rights and equitable access to land, fisheries and forests to help 
eradicate hunger and poverty, through the provision of a framework that states 
can use when developing strategies, policies, legislation and programmes. 
                                            
57
 Land Tenure and International Investments in Agriculture (HLPE, 2011) 
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Consultations took place during 2009 and 2010, through regional meetings that 
brought together almost 700 people from 133 countries, representing the public 
and private sectors, civil society and academia. Four consultations were held 
specifically for the civil society organisations of Africa, in Mali; of Asia, in 
Malaysia; of Europe and Central and West Asia, in Italy; and of Latin America, in 
Brazil. These consultations were attended by almost 200 people from 70 
countries. These were in addition to the 70 people from 21 countries from the 
private section (CFS, 2012d). A questionnaire was also made available via the 
internet to allow more people to participate in the process.  
 
These CSO regional meetings and questionnaire were used to inform a CSO 
document (2010) that outlined the CSOs’ vision and aspirations as well as 
covering a wide range of issues relating to land tenure. At the start of the 
consultation process the CSM urged the CSOs to participate as there would be 
many benefits despite the fact these would be voluntary guidelines and not 
binding legislation. The guidelines would help to clarify the content of existing 
obligations and legislation relevant to land tenure issues, such as human rights 
laws, including the rights to adequate food, housing, health and work, as well as 
environmental laws. Participation was also seen as an important contribution to 
the “more democratic global governance of food and agriculture based on the 
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UN system, the subsidiarity principle58 and the institutionalised participation of 
social movements and other civil society organisations.” (CSM, 2010)  
 
Issues surrounding land tenure rights evoke strong reactions as they are often 
associated with land grabbing, as discussed in chapter one. The CSM argued 
that in recent decades most of the agenda setting and decision making 
concerned with land and natural resources have been heavily influenced by 
IFIs, with disastrous consequences. However, the CSM voiced its optimism in 
the reformed CFS and FAO as a whole. “FAO as a multilateral exchange forum 
and specialised UN agency with a mandate to work on normative issues related 
to food and agriculture and the current process of reform of the CFS offer a 
more democratic arena to achieve a multilateral agreement on land and natural 
resources governance.” (CSM, 2010) 
 
Negotiations continued, through meetings and via the internet, based on the 
three drafts of the guidelines between April 2011 and May 2012. Throughout the 
process the CSM continued to call for greater protection for small-scale 
producers, the food insecure, poor and marginalised groups, who were worst 
affected by large scale investment in land. During the final stages of the 
negotiations the CSM argued that CSOs were particularly concerned about the 
“widespread hostility of states to recall their human rights obligations” and 
                                            
58
 The Principle of Subsidiarity is based on the notion that problems should be dealt with at the 
most immediate or local level and that a central authority should have a supporting function. It is 
fundamental to the functioning of the European Union and contributes to decisions being taken 
as closely to the citizen as possible.  (Eur-Lex, 2010) 
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fearing any new commitments “many governments are doing all they can to 
weaken the language and the recommendations.” (CSM, 2011)  
 
When the guidelines were finally endorsed the CSM voiced the CSOs’ mixed 
reactions to the final document (CSM, 2012). The process itself, which had 
allowed the CSOs full participation at all stages, including the negotiations, was 
praised and commended for use in the entire UN system. It was acknowledged 
that several principles important to the CSOs had been recognised, in particular 
those relating to human rights in the context of tenure and the clearly defined 
principles of implementation. However, the CSM outlined the issues which were 
still of concern including the fact the guidelines did not challenge the role played 
by large-scale investments in industrialised agriculture, fisheries and forests, the 
failure to further consolidate the rights of indigenous peoples and the exclusion 
of water from the scope of the guidelines.   
 
Similar to many issues related to food and agriculture land tenure is very 
complex. States would be unwilling to create binding legislation that would limit 
their ability to act now or in the future and so agreement on voluntary guidelines 
in this area is the most that can be expected of states in this first stage of 
negotiation. However once the norms have been accepted they may then 
develop in the future. 
With guidelines in place you have something to work on, 
political parties can use them and so can civil society. And 
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then there will be one milestone reached after another; it’s 
an evolution in incremental steps. Complexity has an 
impact on the process; the situation is very complex, as is 
the process, which means that the voluntary guidelines 
also have to be complex.59 
It is beyond the remit of this thesis to examine the many issues surrounding 
tenure rights; however the type of governance within a state is recognised as a 
key contributing factor. Establishing good governance can have a significant 
and positive impact. In the guidelines (CFS, 2012d) it is noted that “many tenure 
problems arise because of weak governance and attempts to address tenure 
problems are affected by the quality of governance.” Weak governance can 
have negative consequences in many different areas but “responsible 
governance of tenure conversely promotes sustainable social and economic 
development that can help eradicate poverty and food insecurity and encourage 
responsible investment.” (CFS, 2012, p.5)  
 
Many individuals and groups taking part in the negotiations for these voluntary 
guidelines will hope that these represent the first step in an evolutionary process 
towards a more formalised system of tenure rights for land, fisheries and 
forests. There will also be some organisations and individuals, such as 
multinationals and corrupt state officials that profit from agribusiness land deals, 
                                            
59
 Personal interview with Erwin Northoff 
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which hope these guidelines signal the end of the process and business can 
continue as normal. The CSOs will have an important but challenging role to 
play in their communities and home countries ensuring these guidelines are 
implemented. However, by taking part in the negotiation process these CSOs 
have gained an in-depth understanding of the guidelines and the states’ legal 
obligations based on human rights and environmental legislation. They have 
also created a strong global network, on which they can rely for support in any 
action they may deem necessary to encourage implementation. This will 
continue to be an interesting area of research.    
 
Following the success of the agreement on tenure rights the CFS has, through 
another round of multi-stakeholder consultations and negotiations, reached 
agreement on the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food 
Systems (2014d) which were approved at the CFS on 15 October 2014. If 
agreement on voluntary guidelines can be seen as a first step in setting in 
norms in a contentious area establishing principles is the preliminary stage in 
the process. However tenuous these principles may be as voluntary and non-
binding on member states and non-state actors, they nonetheless represent the 
first global consensus between governments, private sector, CSOs, UN 
agencies, development banks, foundations, research institutions and academia 
on what constitutes responsible investment in agriculture and food systems that 
contribute to food security and nutrition. (CFS, 2014d) 
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FAO Director General Jose Graziano da Silva applauded the agreement and 
argued the principles would “enable larger and more sustainable investment in 
agriculture while also making all stakeholders responsible for creating the 
conditions for the principles to be met. The private sector will play an important 
role in implementing the principles.” (Da Silva quoted in FAO, 2014d)  
 
Not all parties to the negotiations were as positive about the principles or the 
role to be played by the private sector. CSOs have been campaigning for 
effective legislation to regulate private investment in agriculture for many years, 
at the World Trade Organisation, and across fora. In the CFS the CSO 
delegation to the 36th session of the CFS in 2010 had successfully blocked the 
endorsement of the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that 
Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (RAI) which had been developed 
by the World Bank, UNCTAD, FAO and IFAD the previous year. At the time the 
CSOs (CSM, 2014b) declared: 
The RAI is not an adequate instrument to regulate private 
investment; moreover, RAI principles have been 
formulated through an exclusive process without the 
participation of communities and constituencies most 
affected by agricultural investments, especially private 
investments.  
The CSOs then welcomed the opportunity to take part in an inclusive 
negotiation process, involving regional consultations and three rounds of debate 
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centred on the development of the principles document. Throughout the process 
the CSM put forward the CSOs’ position on investment with the focus on the 
constituents of civil society. The final principles document failed to meet the key 
points on which their position was based, including protection for small-scale 
food producers. The CSM argued that “the principles stand or fall as a whole 
and their foundation is fundamentally flawed...Civil society is concerned that the 
weaknesses and incoherence in the principles will be used to legitimise 
irresponsible investments.” (CSM, 2014c) 
 
FAO estimates that there will have to be an average net investment of US$ 83 
billion a year to raise agricultural production by 60 percent to feed the expected 
global population of nine billion by 2050 (CFS, 2014d). All stakeholders agree 
that increased investment is needed however there will continue to be serious 
disagreements between the two opposing perspectives on where this 
investment would be best placed. CSOs argue that small-scale food producers 
are already feeding the majority of people now and given adequate protection, 
as well as investment, they will be able to feed even more. Although they have 
been disappointed with the results of this consultation process the CSOs must 
continue to participate because until now their views had not been heard at all in 
global negotiations.  
Standards 
The work that FAO performs as part of its standards setting is important in 
establishing the recognised international standard in each area of concern. The 
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organisation’s reputation is a crucial element in this work to ensure these 
standards can be upheld in international courts as part of dispute settlements, 
as is the case with those set by the International Plant Protection Convention, 
as discussed below. 
 
There are many risks to the health of plants, animals and humans that can 
travel across borders, especially with the increase in the globalised food trade, 
which is worth approximately US$ 200 billion annually (Codex Alimentarius, 
2015). These risks need to be recognised and protections put in place, which 
necessitates international agreements. One such accord is the Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement), 
which is an international treaty of the World Trade Organisation. Through this 
agreement member states have to comply with international standards relating 
to food security, which covers bacterial contaminants, pesticides, inspection and 
labelling, as well as animal and plant health, known as phytosanitation, with 
regards to imported pests and diseases (WTO, 2015c).  
 
The agreement is not only designed to protect consumers’ health but also to 
ensure fair practices in the food trade. The SPS Agreement states that 
“Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is 
based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence.” (WTO, 2015c, Art 2 (2)) It continues “Sanitary and phytosanitary 
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measures shall not be applied in a manner which constitutes a disguised 
restriction on international trade.” (WTO, 2015c, Art 2 (3))  
 
To ensure decisions are based on scientific evidence there are three standards 
organisations that assist member states. Two of these are connected to FAO: 
the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (the Codex). The third organisation is the 
World Organisation for Animal Health (The Office International of Epizootics, 
OIE). 
 
The IPPC is a multilateral treaty for international cooperation in plant protection. 
Initially established in 1952 it has been amended twice, the most recently in 
1997 when it was updated as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements of the 
WTO, to ensure it was compatible with the WTO-SPS Agreement. Its aim is to 
protect cultivated and wild plants by preventing the introduction and spread of 
pests. Its work with member states on these preventative measures is designed 
to help preserve food, biodiversity and to facilitate trade. There are 180 
contracting parties and a secretariat based in Rome. Each party has a National 
Plant Protection Organisation and there have been ten Regional Plant 
Protection Organisations established around the world. The IPPC is recognised 
by the WTO as the international standard setting body responsible for plant 
health standards. (Peralta, 2013)    
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The relationship between the IPPC and WTO is a two-way process, between 
science and trade, creating opportunities for the improvement of standards.   
The SPS Agreement was created as a part of the WTO 
rules with focus on trade. It was written by legal people, 
not scientists, but the work of the IPPC is science-based. 
The WTO asks advice from the IPPC, which has scientific 
discussions and then provides guidelines so that the WTO 
doesn’t have to start from scratch. By participating in the 
development of standards it means the IPPC gets better 
standards; we’re always improving.60                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The remit of the IPPC is very broad covering all types of agricultural plants and 
plant products as well as all conveyances, non-agricultural plants and plant 
products, the pest risks associated with living modified organisms (LMOs) and it 
also applies to aquatic plants. It concerns a wide range of pests as well, 
regulated and non-regulated, which includes “any species, strain or biotype of 
plant, animal or pathogenic agent injurious to plants or plant products – fungi, 
insects, bacteria, viruses, weeds.” (Peralta, 2013)  
This is a young body but the expectations placed on this 
section are huge. As part of the FAO reform some units 
are shrinking but the IPPC is increasing with more 
voluntary finding coming in. But we need more resources. 
We’ve set 35 or more standards since the 1990s but 
                                            
60
 Personal interview with Yukio Yokoi, Secretary of the IPPC Secretariat, FAO, Rome, 2013 
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there’s over 100 topics still waiting for standards. We can 
only do three or four a year.61 
The IPPC has a close working relationship with the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) as there is increased interest in plant protection, especially from 
those concerned about the environmental risks. Recently there has been 
greater acknowledgment of the increased risks, especially with the increase in 
the movement of people and in trade, and the changing nature of global trade. 
Pests can be carried in many different ways and certain methods of transport, 
such as sea containers, are creating new challenges. 
Ten years ago we set standards regarding the wooden 
pallets and containers used for sea freight. Now sea 
containers are proving a very different but important issue; 
it’s a much more complex situation now. Sea containers 
are used repeatedly beyond national borders, loading and 
reloading different products in many places. Who checks 
to see if the sea containers are safe and who has the 
responsibility to say they are OK? We are providing the 
forum for the discussion.
62 
The work of the IPPC is varied and wide ranging, as is that of the Codex. Both 
organisations are providing the scientific evidence required by the WTO’s 
members to ensure food safety and facilitate trade. However, acting as an 
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 Personal interview with Yukio Yokoi 
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adjudicator between two potentially opposing perspectives may place each 
organisation in a difficult position. This question is beyond the remit of this thesis 
but would be an interesting avenue of research to pursue. 
 
The Codex has the responsibility for implementing the Joint WHO/FAO Food 
Standards Programme, which was established in 1963, and so predates the 
WTO (1994) but not its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, created in 1948. The first meeting of the Codex in Rome brought 
together 120 delegates from 30 countries and 16 international organisations. At 
its 35th session in 2012 there were 625 delegates from 145 member states, one 
member organisation and 34 international organisations and NGOs. It has 
established hundreds of standards, guidelines and codes and set thousands of 
maximum limits, as well as found “a way of working together based on science 
and built on trust.” (Codex Alimentarius, 2015)  
Norms and Standards Setting as a Global Public 
Good 
FAO’s normative role has always been important for the organisation but it had 
become fragmented, disorganised and ineffective before the reform. Through 
the new strategic objectives, most notably the sixth objective, it has now 
regained its place within FAO, which will be beneficial to the organisation as a 
whole and also its ability to provide GPGs, especially the overall aim of ensuring 
food security.  
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Norms and standards are designed to be inclusive and non-rivalrous, in fact the 
more member states, organisations and individuals accept the norms and 
standards the more established they become and the more power they possess. 
In so doing they occupy the opposite position to a rivalrous good as they grow in 
strength with use rather than become diminished.  
 
The inclusive nature of the consultation process for the SDG framework has 
brought into the discussion millions of people, through the use of the internet. 
This was essential for the UN to avoid the same criticisms that had been 
levelled at the MDGs and to ensure greater engagement in the overall process, 
which will hopefully lead to greater overall success. The world has changed in 
the last 15 years; the internet has allowed people to become more actively 
engaged in many different arenas, from reviewing hotels to participation in 
global social justice campaigns. Individuals expect to be able to voice their 
opinions and will not be satisfied with any system that does not allow this.  This 
desire for involvement has also been seen throughout the CFS reform and the 
CSO participation in the negotiations for the voluntary guidelines and principles.  
 
By their very nature the norms and standards discussed in this thesis are global 
and are aimed at assisting this generation as well as future generations. The 
MDGs and SDGs are designed to bring all member states of the UN together to 
tackle the largest development issues of this century. The Treaty and 
Commission act across regions, across the world to create a plant genetic 
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resource commons redistributing the financial gains made from their use to 
assist this generation and protecting them for future generations. The voluntary 
guidelines on land tenure and the principles on responsible investment have 
been created to establish a norm for good practice in these areas; the wider the 
acceptance of these new norms, the more likely they are to succeed. And the 
IPPC and Codex are only successful if all states implement measures to limit 
the movement of pests. 
The Role of Norms and Standards Setting in FAO 
as an International Organisation 
 
The role of norms and standards is important to the work of FAO as is the way 
in which agreement is achieved. This has been highlighted in the reform 
process as the organisation’s normative work has now been centralised in the 
corporate programme. There has been a recognition that the normative work 
needs to deliver results and so the changes that are being made now are aimed 
at making FAO more effective overall. 
 
As always the main actors in the setting of norms and standards are member 
states, however there are many more different actors involved as participation is 
broadened. The inclusion of non-state actors, most notably CSOs, in the CFS 
has proved successful and will have implications for further normative work and 
implementation. In addition the participation of so many different groups and 
individuals in the global debate on the new SDG framework has added a new 
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vitality to the process, which will hopefully ensure a greater level of overall 
success. This will be possible if people are vigilant and put pressure on member 
states to deliver positive change. 
 
FAO is the main organisation working to establish norms and standards within 
the food and agriculture arena. There are other organisations, such as the 
WTO, that are operating in adjacent areas, which may overlap FAO’s territory, 
but FAO has to protect its own reputation within the areas under its remit. This is 
not an easy task as most of the issues are complex, interlinked and often 
contentious. It is responsible to its member states but these do not represent a 
homogeneous group; instead the states form smaller groups, such as the 
OECD, the G20 and the G77 and China, which all have different priorities and 
agendas.  
 
FAO has to take into consideration the perspectives of all its member states, as 
well as the many non-state actors that are involved in the norm setting process. 
However, if there is within the organisation a consensus on the best way to 
achieve food security then this approach should be promoted through all its 
norms and standards. There have been arguments put forward by the director 
general, in the three global goals and in reports for a paradigm shift towards a 
more sustainable agriculture. If these arguments were to be accepted by 
member states it would have a positive impact on many integrated and wide 
ranging food and agriculture issues. It would also be another step away from the 
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one-size-fits-all neoliberal market driven approach, which has been responsible 
for increased privatisation, as discussed in chapter one. 
 
One of FAO’s strengths is its ability to bring together many different actors. By 
bringing together these state and non-state actors, facilitating collaboration and 
enabling the formation of partnerships and networks FAO is ensuring, not only a 
better chance of agreement on norms and standards, but also a better chance 
of successful implementation. Partnerships are essential to the normative work 
of the organisation. 
 
Reliable and trustworthy information is essential to FAO; it helps inform the 
debates and set the agendas. For example, reports used by the CFS have to be 
accepted by all participants as a reliable starting point for debates and statistics 
provided by FAO have to be trusted if they are to inform the global debate on 
the new SDG framework. The science-based information provided by the IPPC 
also has to be above reproach for use by the WTO in trade disputes over trade 
barriers.  
 
Those that provide this information, from the HLPE to the statistics department, 
play a vital role. However, it is not just the experts who have a voice; through 
the internet questionnaires and consultations millions of individuals have also 
been heard. These are also legitimate perspectives that should be taken into 
consideration. 
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Conclusion  
FAO’s normative work is not only important for the organisation to help it 
establish itself centrally in the food and agriculture arena, but also for the wider 
world, which benefits from the GPGs that are provided as a result of it.  
 
All of the areas highlighted are clearly GPGs. For example, the voluntary 
guidelines and principles may be non-binding on member states, but at least 
they represent the first step in the process of formalising the governance on 
these contentious issues. They also give non-state actors a platform on which to 
campaign for better protection for small-scale food producers.  
 
The Treaty and Commission on genetic resources again have placed a complex 
and divisive issue on the agenda and compelled member states to consider the 
importance of these resources to the future provision of food and agriculture. 
This is a first step and if successful will have positive implications for food 
security for this and future generations. 
 
If FAO is successful in its normative work it will have helped to set the agenda 
and shift the focus onto broader human security issues. Whilst doing this it has 
also brought together many different organisations and individuals. These 
strong networks will play an important role in ensuring the norms and standards 
are communicated widely and the issues remain on the international agenda. 
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The role of FAO in the provision of GPGs, through its three main roles in 
measurement, as convener and its norms and standards setting role, and its 
ability to continue to do so will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Conclusion: 
The potential of FAO in the provision of  
Global Public Goods 
Introduction 
The global food system is unbalanced and unfair; it needs to change. There are 
almost one billion people hungry and as many as two billion suffering the life-
long consequences of micronutrient deficiencies. In addition industrial 
agriculture is responsible for the provision of numerous global public bads from 
significant greenhouse gas emissions to extensive water pollution (De Schutter, 
2014; Beddington, 2009; FAO, 2011d). As the UN’s specialised agency with a 
global mandate covering all aspects of food and agriculture FAO is in a unique 
position to help facilitate the changes that are required. However, FAO does not 
operate in a vacuum; instead its actions are governed by the different actors 
within the international system; states being the main actors in this anarchic 
state-centric arena, and the dominant ideology used to determine policy, which 
for the last three decades has been driven by a market-based neoliberalism.  
Aim of the Thesis 
The central argument of this thesis is based upon the hypothesis that the 
challenges faced by the global food and agriculture system in the twenty-first 
century are unlikely to be resolved through the implementation of neoliberal 
policies. One main question and two secondary questions were put forward as 
part of the investigation to determine the validity of this hypothesis:  
 Is FAO in a position to provide a food secure world? 
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 Following the extensive reform of the organisation is FAO now in a 
stronger position to provide the GPGs required? 
 Will a shift in emphasis to the provision of GPGs offer an alternative to 
neoliberalism? 
The investigation centred on the ability of FAO to provide a range of GPGs that 
would lead to a food secure world, which is the primary aim outlined in FAO’s 
first global goal (FAO, 2013d). The organisation operates in a number of ways 
to provide GPGs, most notably through its three main roles; measurement, 
convening and norms and standards setting. These GPGs play an important 
role in facilitating improvements in the food system, whether that is by providing 
information that can aid greater understanding to inform policy decisions, 
bringing together different actors and providing a space in which to discuss 
contentious issues, or providing a set of norms on which debate can be based. 
Ideally FAO will be in a position to provide all these GPGs as interconnected 
goods that deliver benefits in many different ways and on a number of levels. It 
has to be noted that although the organisation also delivers a wide range of 
valuable technical programmes these in the main have a local or national focus, 
and so do not qualify as GPGs. 
 
Through the examination of the GPGs that FAO provides and a historical 
analysis of the organisation, as well as its reform process, this thesis has set out 
to determine if FAO is in a position to provide a food secure world. It has been 
argued that through its provision of GPGs it is indeed in a strong position to 
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contribute to the provision of a food secure world but only as one organisation, 
among many, working for the same aim. Unfortunately, a world, in which 
everyone has sufficient food, although theoretically achievable, is not yet within 
sight. Nevertheless, given its historical and central position within the food and 
agricultural arena FAO is in a stronger position than any other organisation to 
lead the way in the provision of GPGs to help achieve this laudable aim. 
Following its reform, with its streamlined objectives and renewed focus and 
energy, it is in a much stronger position to lead the way. In addition, taking 
FAO’s provision of GPGs in relation to food and agriculture, the shift in 
emphasis to GPG provision can arguably offer a viable alternative to 
neoliberalism. This thesis argues that this is especially evident as GPGs take a 
wider and longer-term perspective, to address transnational and 
intergenerational issues, which are so relevant in agricultural production, as well 
as food access and distribution. 
 
Measuring, convening and norms and standards setting were selected for 
investigation as they form part of FAO’s main work within the global arena and 
they fulfil the criteria of GPGs as non-excludable, non-rivalrous, global and 
intergenerational. These three roles also allow for the analysis of FAO through 
the four key themes outlined in the theoretical framework; main actor identity, 
level of autonomy, interdependence within the international system and the level 
of importance granted to information and the communities that provide it. By 
placing an emphasis on the provision of GPGs and by creating an inclusive 
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negotiating process FAO has moved further away from a purely market-driven 
neoliberal agenda. However it can be argued the organisation has never 
completely adhered to the ideals promoted through neoliberalism. GPGs are 
ideologically opposed to market-driven neoliberalism, with a wider focus taking 
into consideration trans-boundary and intergenerational elements, as well as a 
focus on the public rather than the private, and therefore offer an alternative to 
neoliberalism.  
 
The data gathering for the research was conducted on three separate visits to 
FAO headquarters in Rome; it included a number of elite interviews, the 
attendance of two CFS meetings and through extensive examination of primary 
and secondary sources, including those contained in FAO’s library. Throughout 
the duration of the research FAO was in the process of implementing the most 
extensive reform in its history following the IEE. It is hoped that this reform will 
strengthen FAO’s ability to provide a range of important GPGs, through which it 
will be able to play its part in creating a food secure world.  
FAO’s Challenges 
FAO is placed at the centre of the food and agriculture system, an ideal position 
from which to offer a range of GPGs; in fact it is the only organisation in this 
position. Nevertheless, despite its centrality; a position it has occupied for seven 
decades, the organisation has faced mounting criticism, from both its member 
states and non-state actors. This loss of faith led to the extensive evaluation 
conducted by the IEE, which prompted the re-evaluation of FAO’s global goals 
365 
 
and strategic objectives, and initiated the root and branch reform of the 
organisation.  The question is; have these reforms placed the organisation in a 
stronger position to provide the GPGs now required?  
 
In order to answer this question it has been necessary to examine food security 
in the twenty-first century; in particular the challenges of food insecurity and the 
international instruments designed to alleviate these problems, the methods of 
agricultural production and the impact that they have socially, economically and 
environmentally, as well as the reasons for the most recent food price crisis in 
2007-2008. The food price crisis was one part of the overall global financial 
crisis; both occurred in part as a result of neoliberal policies implemented in a 
wide range of arenas, through increased financialisation, liberalisation and 
privatisation. 
 
Through this examination of the food system it was found that although there is 
widespread agreement on the need for a world in which everyone has sufficient 
food to eat there is little consensus on the best way to accomplish this. 
Agricultural production is contentious; different methods of production provide 
not only food, but also global public goods or bads. Agriculture, if conducted in a 
sustainable manner, has the capacity to produce a number of very important 
global public goods, such as environmental protection, social benefits and rural 
livelihoods, as well as nutritious food to maintain a population enabling everyone 
to reach their own social, educational and economic potential. FAO is in a 
366 
 
strong position to facilitate these GPGs by providing a range of its own GPGs, 
through its three main roles; measurement, convening and norms and standards 
setting.  
 
However, although sustainable agriculture has the capacity to provide these 
GPGs many methods of industrial agriculture are responsible for a wide range 
of global public bads. To inform the research the impact of market liberalisation 
was assessed, as well as the promotion of industrial agriculture over sustainable 
methods, often employed by small-scale farmers, and the affect that this 
continues to have on climate change, water and land.  
 
Many of the policies pursued through neoliberalism have had a direct negative 
impact on food security. These policies have included unbalanced and unfair 
levels of market liberalisation; the promotion of industrial agriculture with 
increased mechanisation and through the ‘green revolution’ with its over-
reliance on oil-based inputs and genetically modified seeds and detrimental 
impacts on water quality and quantity, as well as significant greenhouse gas 
emissions (De Schutter, 2014; IAASTD, 2009; Wanki, 2011; McKeon, 2013; 
McMichael, 2013). These are in addition to the privatisation of land, which has 
allowed large-scale investors to appropriate large tracts of land, in what have 
become known as ‘land grabs’ and increased biofuel production, as well as the 
deregulation of the financial markets, which has led to high prices and extreme 
volatility in the commodity markets (Weis, 2007; Clapp, 2006; WDM, 2012; 
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Elliot, 2014). Many of the arguments put forward as part of food security 
discourse have been used to justify industrial agriculture. (Nally, 2015) 
However, Sen (1980, 1981, 1986, 1989) argued in his ‘entitlements’ approach, 
increased production will not solve these challenges; instead people’s access to 
food needs to be addressed.    
 
Many of these neoliberal policies have been implemented through IFI structural 
adjustment programmes throughout the 1980s and 1990s, through which many 
forms of state assistance for small-scale agriculture were limited or removed 
completely and markets were liberalised in developing countries, which often 
proved ruinous for small-scale farmers, whilst protecting industrial food 
producers in developed countries, most notably the US and EU through the 
continued use of substantial subsidies and tariffs. Many of these policies have 
had significant negative impacts on small-scale farmers, communities, 
especially the poor in developing countries, and the environment. As such 
industrial agriculture often provides a number of global public bads, the cost of 
which are not factored into the cost of production but instead borne by those 
least able to bear it. (Weis, 2007; De Schutter, 2014; Clapp, 2006) 
 
Nevertheless there are various methods of agricultural production, such as 
agroecology, which produce a number of GPGs from the basic product, food, to 
environmental sustainability and rural livelihood development. (WDM, 2012; 
HLPE, 2013; IAASTD, 2009) Therefore the promotion of a more sustainable 
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type of agriculture could assist in the provision of GPGs. Agriculture can be part 
of the problem, especially in relation to environmental damage and climate 
change, and so it has to form part of the answer. There is an expanding 
community of individuals and organisations, backed by an extensive and 
increasing body of evidence, which is challenging the policies of market-driven 
neoliberalism (De Schutter, 2014; IAASTD, 2009; Wanki, 2011; McKeon, 2013; 
McMichael, 2013). It is accepted by many that the business-as-usual approach 
is unsustainable and cannot continue. Would a shift of emphasis to the provision 
of GPGs offer an alternative to neoliberalism? 
GPGs as an alternative to Neoliberalism 
As non-excludable, non-rivalrous, global and intergenerational GPGs are not 
only clearly suited to international organisations, as these organisations are the 
only entities within the international arena with the capacity, reach and mandate 
to provide them, but they also provide an alternative to the market-based 
policies of neoliberalism. With a wider holistic perspective across state borders 
and across generations GPGs are far removed from the narrow and immediate 
considerations of monetary gains and their non-excludability and non-rivalrous 
aspects are in direct opposition to the financialisation and privatisation of 
neoliberalism. GPGs may offer an instrument through which a rebalancing 
between the public and private spheres can take place, bringing back into the 
public arena control of many elements that have been privatised. 
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However, despite their appeal as an alternative to neoliberalism GPGs have to 
overcome a number of challenges for successful implementation. Recognition of 
the connection between the required good and the action to provide it has to be 
made and agreement on this may prove problematic, especially as an 
international organisation, such as FAO, is far removed from any individual who 
may benefit from such a good. This connection, which can help create 
legitimacy and deliver a mandate for action, is essential when making the case 
for additional funding for the provision of GPGs and maintaining the political will 
to implement policies, which may benefit future generations at the immediate 
expense of the present generation.  
 
International organisations may be in the best position to provide GPGs but 
there are many stages in the process between the identification of an issue that 
needs to be addressed and the implementation of policies to achieve change. 
Change requires active participation at each and every stage to ensure success, 
without which the dominant status quo will prevail, especially if there are 
powerful and well financed actors with vested interests in the maintenance of 
the current system. International organisations have to be able to put forward a 
convincing argument that there is a need for action in a certain area, and that 
the best way to address the issue is with the provision of a GPG rather than a 
market-based solution, and that as the international organisation with a remit in 
this area, it is in the best position to provide it. Once this level of agreement has 
been achieved the international organisation then has to create the best arena 
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for its member states and other entities in which to reach agreement, not only 
on the best way to achieve success but also who will fund it. International 
organisations can play a facilitation role in the implementation of GPGs by 
bringing together different actors and helping to inform the debate.  
 
These are significant obstacles to the provision of GPGs, nevertheless by 
having clear goals and a strategic plan for achieving success progress can be 
made. For example, FAO has set the eradication of hunger as its primary goal. 
It has also emphasised the need for sustainable rural development and the 
sustainable management of natural resources for this and future generations. 
These goals have widened the debate from the narrow financial targets, such as 
profit and low inflation, set through neoliberalism to one which takes into 
consideration a range of goods including the development of rural communities 
and environmental protection, as well as the welfare of future generations. 
However these goals cannot be achieved by one organisation; partnerships are 
essential for any level of success in attaining these very ambitious goals. The 
GPGs that FAO provides are goods designed to promote partnership working 
through which progress can be made.  
FAO within the International System 
FAO does not operate in a vacuum. Instead its actions are governed by the 
different actors operating within the international system and the dominant 
ideology used to determine policy. Six main theoretical approaches can be 
identified when attempting to explain the interaction between the different actors 
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within the international system; realism, neo-realism, liberalism, neoliberalism, 
constructivism and cognitivism. There are four key themes addressed by the six 
main theories, which have been used in this thesis to examine the role of FAO 
in relation to its provision of GPGs. They are main actor identity, level of 
autonomy, interdependence within the international system and the level of 
importance granted to information and the providers of this information.  
 
States are still arguably the main actors within FAO, as the entities that have the 
ability to make the final decisions and as the organisation’s funders, but there 
are a number of other non-state actors now taking a greater role in the 
negotiating process. At the creation of FAO the champions of nutrition formed 
the epistemic community, which Haas (1993) would recognise as networks of 
professionals. In the twenty-first century these networks, include not only the 
staff at FAO, but also a wide range of non-state actors, such as the CSOs taking 
part in the CFS, which have a form of legitimacy difficult to deny. For example, 
La Via Campesina acting on behalf of two million small and medium-scale 
farmers can offer a perspective lacking in diplomatic circles. In addition, as a 
voice of those most closely affected by food insecurity and the policies 
implemented they have a strong desire to see people-focused policies succeed. 
By providing the space in which all these actors can meet and debate all the 
relevant issues FAO is providing a GPG that enables partnership building and 
effective policy formation. Therefore, although states are still the main actors 
FAO has brought together a number of additional non-state actors to work 
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alongside states allowing for increased interdependence within the international 
system. 
 
As a knowledge-based organisation FAO places great emphasis on information. 
It does this through the provision of statistics and publications that are then 
freely available to all and able to form the basis for debate, on a range of 
different issues, many of which are contentious. To be accepted as the basis of 
any debate on these contentious issues the information has to be seen as 
trustworthy and reliable by all actors. To achieve this level of acceptability the 
providers of the information also have to have a reputation for honesty and 
integrity. This information and the communities that provide it are seen as very 
important within FAO and beyond and as such form part of the epistemic 
community. 
FAO’s Historical Setting 
During the last years of World War Two the champions of nutrition worked hard 
to convince world leaders that an organisation dedicated to food and agriculture 
was essential for post-war reconstruction. Food production needed to be 
increased significantly to meet the needs of the millions who were starving and 
coordinated action required across borders. FAO’s founders, the champions of 
nutrition, wanted to create an international organisation with the authority and 
finances to change the ailing system of food production and distribution to 
enable everyone to access a nutritious diet. It was hoped that a well fed 
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population and optimally functioning food system would be able to lift the world 
economy and drive development for everyone’s benefit. 
 
FAO was established at the Quebec Conference as part of the wider UN system 
and in addition to the restructuring of the economic landscape through the 
creation of the Bretton Woods institutions, most notably the IMF and the World 
Bank. As such, despite the desire of the founders of FAO for a regulatory 
organisation, FAO had to operate in a system that had been established by the 
victors in the war, the strongest and most influential of which was the US, who 
wanted the system to operate in line with their own ideology; regulated 
capitalism (Dumenil and Levy, 2011; Kotz, 2015). This created a challenging 
dynamic at the centre of FAO, with the champions of nutrition, including its first 
director general Boyd Orr, fighting for the authority to control the production and 
distribution of food, especially through food surpluses, and its most influential 
member states, which wanted an advisory organisation that would not interfere 
with the global markets. Throughout the 1960s technology was seen as the 
panacea to provide food security, however these technological fixes promoted 
through the ‘green revolution’ created their own problems and were delivered as 
part of a system established by the richest countries and operated in such a way 
as to promote industrial agriculture and maintain the status quo.  
 
This system of regulated capitalism did allow for state intervention through tariffs 
and control over capital but it was also used to limit the authority of FAO. Each 
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of the first directors general, Boyd Orr, Dodd and Sen, had their plans for control 
over surplus grains thwarted. By the early 1970s the Bretton Woods economic 
system was at breaking point and there were a number of challenges to the food 
system, from droughts causing bad harvests to the green revolution starting to 
plateau, and the oil price rises to the population increases; none of which FAO 
was in a position to control. However, despite its lack of culpability FAO’s 
response to the situation was seen as lacking. 
 
The 1970s was a decade of political and economic upheaval, which created the 
conditions for the emergence of a new type of capitalism, neoliberalism. 
Through the implementation of SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s, with reduced 
state support for agriculture, increased market liberalisation and greater 
privatisation, these policies increased food insecurity and through the promotion 
of industrial agriculture the many social and environmental problems continued 
to develop.  
 
FAO was struggling to operate in this system, which was becoming increasingly 
fragmented and globalised. A wide range of actors, including private foundations 
and multinational corporations, were exerting increasing influence within the 
sphere of food and agriculture but were also beyond the influence of FAO. 
These well-financed private actors were also promoting industrial agriculture 
and the neoliberal agenda. In addition to the private foundations and 
multinational corporations the millions of small-scale farmers were themselves 
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joining forces to allow themselves greater influence within the global system. 
Organisations such as La Via Campesina challenged FAO to reject the 
neoliberal policies promoted by many of its member states and these private 
actors. In this complex arena FAO had to re-establish its central position or risk 
becoming irrelevant. Reform was essential. 
 
By conducting a historical analysis of FAO this thesis has been able to trace the 
organisation’s origins and development through the changing political, economic 
and social dynamics of the international system. At the end of World War Two 
there was an optimism that an organisation created to oversee the production 
and distribution of food on a global scale would be in a position to create a fairer 
world. Those who advocated a regulatory organisation were seeking to move 
the focus from national state interests to one in which the epistemic community 
would have more authority to act and to steer global policy through FAO.  
 
However, this aim was to be thwarted. Even between the Hot Springs 
Conference, at which the epistemic community set out its aims, and the Quebec 
Conference, at which FAO was established, there had been a dilution of its 
remit. Krasner (1993) argues that regimes are distributors of power and 
interests, through which the players and game rules are decided by those in 
power. In the post war world the victors were undoubtedly the most powerful 
players, and thus the US and Britain, ensured FAO did not possess too much 
authority; they limited its remit at the moment of its creation. 
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Throughout FAO’s early development attempts by the organisation’s directors 
general were repeatedly unsuccessful as states rebuffed all threats to their 
sovereignty. Arguably since the 1970s FAO’s directors general have accepted 
the more limited nature of the organisation’s work; concentrating more attention 
on its technical and advisory roles. Although this may have been seen as a 
disappointment by its founders; a restraint on FAO’s potential, it is still a vital 
role to play within the international system, and one for which FAO is uniquely 
equipped.  
 
The importance of information and the communities that provide it is not 
inconsequential. This becomes even more significant as decision makers are 
forced to deal with a broader range of issues, which are interconnected in a 
myriad of ways creating a complexity previously unknown. Haas (1992, p.2) 
argues that this complexity has undermined the arguments put forward by 
conventional approaches to international relations that “presume that a state’s 
self-interests are clear and that the ways in which its interests may be most 
efficaciously pursued are equally clear.”  
 
In the twenty-first century there are now even greater levels of uncertainty for 
decision makers; of consequences of their actions that may not be known for 
generations, such as responses to climate change and different methods of food 
production. This uncertainty places even more emphasis on those epistemic 
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communities able to provide the information that will help states identify their 
interests, frame the issues for collective debate, propose specific policies and 
identify relevant points for negotiation. This is the vital role played by FAO. Haas 
(1992, pp.2-3) argues that “control over knowledge and information is an 
important dimension of power and that the diffusion of new ideas and 
information can lead to new patterns of behaviour and prove to be an important 
determinant of international policy co-ordination.” 
 
FAO may not have become the authoritative organisation that its founders, the 
champions of nutrition, hoped for but its role is important nonetheless. FAO has 
faced a number of challenges, even as an advisory organisation, in the last 
seven decades. However, in recent years its reform and the renewed vision 
imbued by the new director general have brought it closer to the founders’ vision 
for an organisation able to play a vital role in combating worldwide hunger. 
FAO’s Reform 
The need for reform had become urgent as the organisation struggled to fulfil its 
mandate as its budgets and staff levels were forced into decline, the enormity 
and complexity of the challenges of global food insecurity increased and 
member states failed to reach consensus on a number of important but 
contentious issues. The FAO Council agreed to launch the IEE, the most in-
depth and comprehensive evaluation in the history of the organisation. Its 
report, published in 2007, acknowledged the world’s need for FAO but called for 
extensive reform of the whole organisation, from its headquarters in Rome and 
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throughout all its field operations. Despite a slow start to the reform process the 
pace of change was increased significantly following the appointment of the new 
director Jose Graziano da Silva in 2012.  
 
As part of the reform process FAO’s global goals have been updated to reflect 
the overall aim of eradicating hunger. Its strategic goals have been streamlined, 
its bureaucratic structure overhauled and the management of its human 
resources, restructured from headquarters to the field, as part of the 
organisation’s transformational change designed to enable FAO to tackle the 
present and emerging challenges in the food system. It is hoped that, if 
successful, this reform will have moved FAO from a position of near irrelevancy 
to one of trailblazer, leading the way in organisational reform. 
FAO’s provision of GPGs 
GPGs theory was investigated to ascertain its suitability to address the role of 
FAO within the food and agriculture arena. An examination of the theory from 
Samuelson’s public goods theory to that put forward by Kaul and her colleagues 
for the global sphere showed that GPGs theory was ideal for the purposes of 
this thesis.  
 
FAO plays an important role in the provision of GPGs. As a specialised agency 
of the UN with a clear mandate and global reach it is in a better position than 
any other organisation to provide the GPGs in the areas within its remit. All the 
GPGs discussed in this thesis are vital individual components in the on-going 
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work to create a food secure world; taken together they offer a suite of tools to 
tackle the complex challenges faced in the twenty-first century.  
 
The collection and dissemination of data, through the organisation’s 
measurement role, is crucial as it facilitates well-informed debate. By addressing 
all issues related to food and agriculture, many of which are complex, 
interconnected and global, FAO has a broad remit. FAO is the only organisation 
with the capacity to provide data on all these issues and on this scale. Through 
this provision it has increased the level of understanding of relevant issues, 
which has informed policy formation and driven technical assistance, as well as 
gained a well-earned reputation at the forefront of the epistemic community.  
 
This is in addition to its normative role, through its norms and standards setting, 
which deliver a range of GPGs available to states and non-state actors, to help 
formalise governance and provide a campaigning platform in areas of 
contention, such as genetics or land tenure. If FAO is successful in its normative 
work it will have helped to set the agenda and shift the focus onto broader 
human security issues, whilst helping to create strong networks between 
different actors. As such this is also part of its partnership building work.  
 
Some of these goods are just the starting point for further negotiations and 
many require implementation at the country-level to have the desired impact. 
Political will is required to make positive change. States, as the main actors 
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within FAO and the international system, should be the source of this political 
will, especially as states are the entities that have the final decision-making 
prerogative, the finances and the responsibility of implementation at the country-
level. Nevertheless despite the obvious need states have often displayed a lack 
of political will when addressing issues relating to hunger, with many competing 
interests taking precedence. However, with the inclusion of so many different 
actors the situation has become more complex.  
 
For example, by bringing CSOs into the CFS negotiations there are now many 
more voices heard; including those most affected by the policies agreed. This 
adds authenticity and legitimacy to the process. It also creates a new dynamic 
during the negotiations as states have to consider different viewpoints at every 
stage, as well as during implementation. CSOs with an in-depth knowledge and 
understanding of the policies are in a better position to judge the level of 
success of their implementation. The CSOs share partial responsibility for the 
policies as they have been part of the negotiation process; they also represent 
those most keenly affected by the policies and so have a greater interest in the 
policies’ success. If the policies do not deliver the desired results, or the states 
do not implement them correctly, the CSOs are in a better position to challenge 
the states at all levels, nationally, in the CFS itself, or globally through their 
networks and by using the media.  This has been made even easier for the 
CSOs through the formalisation of their networks with the creation of the CSM. 
States may still occupy their central position within FAO but with the inclusion of 
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a wide range of non-state actors states may face more challenges to their 
authority. 
 
As CSOs develop their levels of expertise through their involvement in the 
different negotiations they are becoming part of the epistemic community; not 
only gaining greater understanding from the information already available but by 
also adding their knowledge and experience to the wider knowledge pool. 
Information is being provided through the official channels within FAO, for 
example through the provision of statistics and publications and the work of the 
HLPE, but also through the experiences of different groups, such as small-scale 
farmers. The pool of legitimate sources of information has been widened. This 
has also been seen through the engagement of millions of people as part of the 
SDG framework consultation. 
 
Cognitivists recognised that not all opinions carry the same level of authority. 
Those who responded to the My World survey do not possess authority as 
individuals however as a body of millions their voice should be heard. Members 
of civil society who are small-scale farmers have added legitimacy as they have 
first-hand experience and many of the CSOs have in-depth knowledge of the 
issues. By including more voices the debate has changed. Rather than a state-
centric, state security based argument, as seen by the realists and neo-realists, 
different elements of human security have emerged as important. This is evident 
in FAO’s strengthened global goals and its strategic objectives; human security 
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has been given a higher priority than large business interests and profit. There 
is a shift away from the market-driven neoliberal agenda towards a more holistic 
human security framework that addresses many different aspects of food 
security from tackling rural poverty to promoting sustainable agriculture. 
 
In addition by refocusing its global goals with an overall aim to eradicate hunger 
instead of just reduce it FAO is sending a clear signal to its member states that 
hunger should not be tolerated anywhere and that means that every state has to 
work to end hunger within its borders. Arguably this has been designed to 
inspire action and promote partnerships. The overarching objective is to end 
hunger but FAO cannot do that by itself; only through partnerships can all the 
challenges be addressed. 
The potential of FAO to provide GPGs in the 
future 
The goal of creating a food secure world is ambitious; it is also beyond the 
reach of any single organisation. To achieve food security all actors within the 
food and agriculture system will have to work together, from states to farmers, 
and international organisations to NGOs, with the goal of food security kept 
firmly at the forefront of all decision-making processes. Agriculture has the 
capacity to produce not just food but also a wide range of public goods or bads. 
To deliver food security now and for future generations, whilst protecting the 
natural systems on which the world relies, sustainable agriculture has to be 
promoted instead of industrial agriculture, which is detrimental to people and the 
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planet in so many different ways. If food is produced in a sustainable manner 
agriculture has the potential to provide many different GPGs.  
 
FAO is in an ideal position to assist the different actors within the international 
system to ensure agriculture provides these GPGs. It can achieve this through 
providing its own GPGs, especially through its three main roles. By measuring 
the many complex issues in the arena of food and agriculture, setting the 
agenda, informing the debate and bringing the different actors together, 
providing a space within which to debate and form policy, as well as facilitating 
the creation and maintenance of working partnerships FAO is playing a vital role 
in helping to provide a food secure world. 
 
FAO has always provided GPGs and it continues to demonstrate its ability to do 
so. However, it has to become more efficient and targeted in its approach. By 
becoming a more focussed and flexible organisation, by inviting more actors into 
negotiations and by establishing partnerships it will be in a better position to 
deliver GPGs more effectively to make a significant contribution. Through its 
reform, revised global goals and streamlined strategic objectives it should be in 
a better position to fulfil its remit and to provide GPGs. It is too early to ascertain 
how successful this reform has been.  
 
Nevertheless there have already been a number of positive changes. For 
example, with the extension of the epistemic community and the inclusion of 
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more non-state actors member states will have to recognise the fact that 
although they continue to be the main actors they are now not the only actors 
with vested interests in the outcome of negotiations, debates and agreements. 
More people now have a voice; including the hungry. 
 
The future potential of FAO to provide GPGs will depend on the partnerships 
that it helps to build and maintain. It will also depend on its ability to persuade all 
actors of the need for GPGs, its suitability as the best provider of such goods 
and consensus on the goods’ scope and financing. It has been successful in 
persuading its member states of the importance of its GPGs’ provision in 
regards to its three main roles, for this support to continue it needs to provide 
them to a high standard to ensure it receives sufficient funding. 
 
Through its three main roles FAO is in an ideal position to not only provide a 
range of valuable GPGs, but to also offer an alternative to neoliberalism. With a 
wider holistic perspective across state borders and across generations GPGs 
are far removed from the narrow and immediate considerations of monetary 
gains. In addition their non-excludability and non-rivalrous aspects are in direct 
opposition to the financialisation and privatisation promoted through 
neoliberalism. Through the provision of these GPGs FAO aims to deliver action 
on its strengthened global goals, which are also ideologically opposed to the 
neoliberal agenda and instead rooted in the common cause of humanity. By 
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helping to promote sustainable agriculture FAO will be able to play an important 
role in ensuring food security for this and future generations.  
 
Therefore, in answer to the three research questions outlined in this thesis; FAO 
is in an ideal position to provide a range of GPGs that will be instrumental in the 
provision of a food secure world. However, it cannot do this alone, but only as 
part of a network of organisations and individuals. Nevertheless, following its 
extensive reform it is in a stronger position to provide these GPGs and to take 
the lead in the eradication of hunger and in so doing it will offer an alternative to 
the predominant ideology, neoliberalism.   
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